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SMALLER NATO COUNTRIES' SDP'S MEET FOR DISARMAMENT TALKS

Oslo AFTENPOSTEN in Norwegian 19 Jan 81 p 9

[Article by Morten Fyhn]

[Text] The Social Democrats in Norway and in most other NATO countries in Europe have begun a broad offensive aimed at increasing pressure on the superpowers to go along with mutual disarmament and arms control. It is our understanding that activity is occurring on several fronts to influence incoming U.S. President Ronald Reagan to start negotiations with the Soviet Union on limiting the number of medium-range missiles in Europe.

The chairman of the West German Social Democratic Party, former FRG Chancellor Willy Brandt, has confirmed that fellow Social Democratic parties are interested in a joint initiative with regard to Reagan. However Brandt did not spell out the purpose of this which probably means that they are waiting for Reagan to make a move. But if Reagan does not announce soon after he becomes President this Tuesday that he intends to hold a NATO meeting of government leaders the Social Democrats will probably make a move themselves with regard to the President. The aim would be to get Reagan to follow up on the contact made between the United States and the Soviet Union during the month-long talks in Geneva last fall.

In Norwegian circles--that is both in the government and in the sections of the Labor Party where people are working actively on disarmament--there is very little optimism about the possibilities of achieving short-term results. But it is stressed that they must make use of the opportunities that exist to influence the superpowers.

The Social Democratic meeting in Amsterdam last Sunday with delegates from the Benelux countries, Denmark and Norway is regarded as just the beginning of a broader gathering in which other larger Social Democratic parties will be involved. This refers first and foremost to the West German Social Democratic Party whose influence is assigned great importance by the Norwegian Labor Party. However there is some discussion going on within the party on this topic since some people see a cooperation among the small NATO lands as valuable in itself. This is countered by arguments that little can be achieved without including the West Germans, for example, and that the problem is different in Norway than

it is in the Benelux lands. This is especially true of interest in nuclear-free zones which is somewhat smaller there than it is in Scandinavia. Those countries are especially concerned with starting negotiations that will block the realization of the NATO resolution on deploying new nuclear medium-range missiles in Europe.

It is planned to arrange a new Social Democratic meeting in Oslo in the latter part of February to follow up the Amsterdam meeting. Willy Brandt has been invited to Oslo among others and it is possible they will also try to involve the British Labour Party in this work. When this meeting is held they will probably also have a clearer idea of what course Reagan will follow with regard to the Soviet Union.

It was stressed to AFTENPOSTEN that the Social Democrats are in no way working for--nor do they want--unilateral western disarmament. The goal is a balanced and mutual disarmament and arms control. The main thing therefore is to implement the part of the NATO resolution from December 1979 that was a negotiating offer to the Soviet Union aimed at keeping the missiles from being deployed. It was also emphasized that West European Social Democrats were working primarily on a party basis in this phase and not on a government level in the countries where the Social Democrats are in power.

In the future many meetings and conferences will be arranged, all with disarmament at the top of the agenda. On Monday and Tuesday the Foreign Ministry is holding a 2-day seminar on the place of disarmament work in security policy. On Thursday the Labor Party will hold a 1-day conference at which Reiulf Steen, Knut Frydenlund, Jens Evensen and Gro Harlem Brundtland among others will discuss detente and disarmament. On the international level there will be in addition to the upcoming Social Democratic meeting in Oslo toward the end of February a new meeting of the so-called Palme Commission on Disarmament in which Gro Harlem Brundtland among others will participate. This will take place in Vienna on 6-7 February. Nordic Social Democrats also have a security policy group which will meet soon.

In addition the Socialist International is working continuously on this, with a separate group under the leadership of Finnish party chairman Kalevi Sorsa continuing its work even though it has issued its report.

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CSO: 3108

CIVIL DEFENSE PREPAREDNESS, MOBILIZATION PROCEDURES

Lisbon NACAO E DEFESA in Portuguese Jul-Sep 80 pp 121-142

[Article by (Navy) Commander Antonio Vasco Pinto de Magalhaes Martinha: "Denmark: The Total Defense Country;" dated 14 July 1980]

[Text] 1. The Reason for Total Defense

Before our century, the effects of war were limited primarily to the combatants, specifically the soldiers. In those times, wars naturally had economic and material consequences for the societies involved, but they were limited in space to specific geographic areas, without the direct involvement of the population in the conflicts.

Also added to this is the lack of interest by the population, depending almost always on the caprice of a more or less tyrannical prince or ruler.

1.1. Technological Development and Extension of War

This scenario changes with the technological development unleashed in the last century. The largest organizations of a country, railroads, telecommunications and industrial enterprises in the greatest variety of branches, are now mobilized, making it possible to assemble, move and supply large concentrations of military forces. In our times, troops can move by land, sea and air, with combat occurring everywhere, including, as is obvious, the people's living and working areas. Any kind of production, primarily industrial, is normally a potential target of military operations involving the population in the hostilities. Total defense is based on this concept of total war.

Technical development also brought with it another basic threat. Society became more vulnerable to the effects of war. Everyday activities are carried out in buildings or similar facilities that can be destroyed easily: for example, electric powerplants, pumping and water lifting stations, telecommunications stations, paralyzation of railroad networks, hospitals and many other structures basic to the functioning of a modern society.

1.2. Civilian Population -- Target for Military Operations

World War II showed us the effect of military operations on the population. The advance of armies causes the flight of civilians, and air attacks make it necessary to occupy cellars and special shelters for days and nights in a row. In recent

years, a new phenomenon, the so-called "revolutionary war," on the increase all over the world, can make the ordinary citizen the direct target of military operations. Examples of aircraft hijacked, bomb attacks, kidnapings and assassinations are, unfortunately, very familiar. The effect of this kind of event can have more influence on the population than what happened in World War II. The civilian population, which had not yet thought about defense plans, is now forced to face up to reality. It cannot wait longer to ensure its means of protection.

1.3. Essential Preparation

In 1959, the then prime minister of Denmark, H. C. Hansen, made the following statement in Parliament:

"A war may affect every sector of society to a degree unprecedented up to now and the ability of the authorities and of the civilian population to cope with the conditions of a present-day war and to maintain the vital production, supply and transportation facilities will necessarily affect any political decision, if Denmark enters the war, as well as the ability of the Armed Forces to provide for our defense." He also stated that in the specific sector of defense exceptional measures should be taken in the area of civil defense, primarily with regard to structures, for which a special program would be justified. In other words, a specific high degree of preparation was becoming necessary. In view of the rapidity of development of modern combat means, the Danish Government would have to make very rapid, definite decisions. For these reasons, special importance was given to the so-called information and vigilance services, in order to allow the government a minimum delay in its action, because the measures to be taken depend, in many aspects, on the action taken by civil authorities. This aspect, for example, is fundamental in the preparation of laws and regulations for immediate implementation of a control of all national resources. The psychological aspect of the problem must never be underrated. The population must maintain confidence in the authorities and in effective defense capabilities.

1.4. Definition

This introduction leads us to define total defense as an assemblage of all the efforts, civil and military, needed for defense of the Danish nation.

2. Organization of Total Defense

The plan that went into force, both in the individual sectors of society, and in the administrative departments of the government, is determined by pertinent laws already in effect, like the following: the National Defense Law, the Civil Defense Law, the Civil Emergency Plan and the Law on Administration of Justice (which determines the legislation governing the police).

Therefore, total defense may be regarded as divided into:


1. Military defense.
2. Civil defense.
3. Civil emergency plan.
4. Police.

2.1. Isolation of Territories

Both in peace and in war, the Supreme Command stays in the government. In wartime, however, situations may arise in which communications between regions or territories are reduced or completely cut off. Thus, it is possible for the government to continue to carry out its tasks, just as in peacetime. Therefore, specific measures must be taken with a view, especially, to wartime conditions, since, in each part of the country, there is a supreme civil authority responsible for maintaining the principal resources in every necessary area.

2.2. Regional Divisions

For the purpose of solving this problem, Denmark was divided into seven regions in accordance with the following diagram, in which each one has a series of specific tasks that can be performed independently of the central government, because the central government may be put out of action or much lessened in its possibilities for exercising authority.



Each of these seven regions is subdivided into one, two or three counties, with a local government in each as supreme civil authority in the area.

2.3. The Two Territorial Commands


Two territorial commands were established, respectively to the east and to the west of the Great Belt, for coordination of operations in the respective territories and for acting in replacement of the central government in case of a communications failure.

2.4. Structure of the Tripartite Command

The organization of total defense may be outlined as functioning on the basis of a Tripartite Command at whose top we find:

1. National Command (also designated as Governmental Level or National Level).
2. Territorial Command (also designated as Territorial Level).
3. Regional Command (also designated as Regional Level).

In wartime, the four components of total defense (military defense, civil defense, civil emergency and police) are organized in outline form in accordance with the following diagram:



Key: 1. National Command; 2. Territorial Command; 3. Regional Command; 4. Minister of Defense, Defense Command; 5. Minister of Interior, Civil Defense Command; 6. other ministers, authorities at every level; 7. Minister of Justice, director general of police; 8. Territorial Military Command; 9. Territorial Civil Defense Command; 10. ministers' representatives; 11. Territorial Police Command; 12. Regional Military Command; 13. Regional Civil Defense Command; 14. county governor; 15. Regional Police Commandant.

3. Military Defense

It is important to point out that this component (which includes the National Guard), including present operational forces, Army brigades, operational naval forces and fighter aircraft squadrons, will be incorporated, in case of war, in an Allied Operational Command, starting at a certain instant specified by the government. During peacetime, none of this happens and, even in wartime, this incorporation is more in the direction of operational control, guided by the operations in progress at a given time and in a given area. Administration and logistic support are always Denmark's task.

The reason for this plan is the fact that the Danish Government is responsible for war expenditures in its territory. The Danish military are still subject only to the laws and regulations of their country.

3.1. Two Command Channels

This situation leads to the existence of two command channels: an Allied channel and a Danish channel. In accordance with the National Defense Act, the Defense chief is the primary military adviser of the minister of Defense and also the liaison between the government and the allied supreme military authorities.

The Defense chief represents, together with the respective command, the military component in the total defense structure.

3.2. Regional Commandants

At the territorial command level, cooperation with the other structural organizations is accomplished through the military territorial commands (east and west).

The Army, naturally, takes on a predominant position at the regional level. The Army regional commandants also are responsible for regional defense. The National Guard is also an important component in regional defense. It is responsible for specific tasks. The regional commandant of the National Guard is directly responsible to the Army regional commandant, acting as adviser in all matters pertaining to the employment of National Guard units.

3.3. Cooperation Between Authorities

The regional commandant takes on and coordinates cooperation between the civil authorities and the naval or air units based in the region. Liaison between the allied forces and the civil authorities is also accomplished by the regional commandant, who represents the three branches of the Armed Forces for this purpose. With regard to military defense, cooperation with the civil authorities is achieved by coordinating the provisions of those authorities with the military operations.

4. Civil Defense

The Danish Parliament has appointed a committee to coordinate all the work carried out in the area of civil defense, as well as pertinent planning. This committee receives instructions every year from the minister of interior, all tending to safeguard the population in any case. These measures are taken by the civil defense organization, part of the total defense structure, on an equal footing with military defense, with civil emergency and the police.

4.1. Protection of Life and Property

The objective of civil defense is to safeguard life and property against the consequences of military operations.

Civil Defense Organization in Peacetime



Key: 1. Minister of Interior; 2. Civil Defense Command; 3. Civil Defense League; 4. Municipal authorities (emergency hospitals); 5. civil defense sections; 6. civil defense regions; 7. local civil defense; 8. hospitals; 9. police headquarters; 10. civil defense committees; 11. National Ambulance Service.

The Civil Defense Organization is humanitarian, because it is not a military organization. The basic idea governing the organization is to foresee the consequences of military operations and, in case of an attack, to attenuate their consequences as fast as possible.

4.2. Prevention

Preventive action consists in:

- a. Warning the population of air attacks and radioactive fallout.
- b. Evacuation of the population.
- c. Construction and maintenance of shelters.

4.3. Rescue

Rescue operations are performed by auxiliary services, including auxiliary municipal services and the Civil Defense Corps with its mobile components, among which the National Ambulance Service is prominent. Because it is not feasible to design a 100 percent efficient civil defense system, it is feasible, however, to organize a system that makes it possible to save lives and to limit property damage.

These tasks are performed by civil defense, which includes the Civil Defense Corps, the Emergency Hospital Service, the National Ambulance Service and the local services scattered all over the country, based on municipal authorities.

4.4. Civil Defense Organization in Peacetime

In general, each municipality has a civil defense area with a committee headed normally by the president of the municipal council whose principal adviser is the police commandant. The task of this committee is to organize and, if necessary, to direct local civil defense.

4.6. Territorial Civil Defense Commands

In case of war, the Civil Defense Administration assumes direction of operations, activating all the territorial and regional civil defense commands. The following is the organization chart of its functioning:



Key: 1. Minister of Interior; 2. National Committee; 3. West Command; 4. East Command; 5. Regional Defense Commands; 6. Police Commandants; 7. Heads of Defense Committees; 8. The authorities mentioned may use the following organizations; 9. Civil Defense Corps; 10. National Ambulance Service; 11. Emergency Hospital Service.

4.7. Air Attacks or Radioactive Fallout

Air attack warnings are given by means of sound signals located in urban areas. Civil defense is notified of the enemy's approach by Air Force units, which then take their own steps. Report is also received of any nuclear explosion (regardless of where in the world it occurs) and this information, together with weather data, provides the basis for radioactive fallout warnings. These warnings are transmitted by the Danish radio broadcasting system, stating in detail where and when fallout occurred and how long it will be necessary to stay in the shelters.

4.8. Evacuation

This is used basically to limit the loss of human life. The evacuation plan is normally prepared by the police commands and implemented by the local authorities. The plans must be flexible, taking into account the potential number of individuals to be evacuated, the routes that can be traveled and the areas that can be used for evacuation.

4.9. Shelters

The construction of shelters is regarded as the most important part of all civil defense in the sense of saving human lives in a modern war. At this time, there are shelters that can hold close to 2 million persons. Since 1950, on the basis of specific proportions, buildings have been provided with reinforced cellars that can be rapidly converted into shelters. In addition, there also are public shelters, both in the form of isolated and easily identifiable buildings, and in the form of underground structures used in peacetime for parking or for storage.

4.10. Incorporated Protection Services

This concept includes safeguarding industrial facilities, apartment complexes, private and state property. These services are all carried out by volunteers and will normally be the first to go into action.

4.11. Auxiliary Municipal Services

These include firefighters, Search Service and special technical services, including demolitions. They go into action as soon as the previously mentioned services prove to be insufficient. There are control centers scattered about the various areas, to initiate and conduct assistance operations. These centers are tied to all the authorities involved in this defense system, including the civil defense regions, by means of a complex communications system.

4.12. Outside Assistance

If the damage caused is excessive, to the point that local civil defense cannot control it, due assistance can be furnished by means of a neighboring municipality or by the Civil Defense Corps itself. In peacetime, this corps is based in barracks scattered all over the country. In wartime, its members are available to civil defense, dispersed in every area regarded as necessary.

4.13. Emergency Hospitals

In accordance with the laws governing civil defense, all hospitals must be prepared, in peacetime, to receive both civilian and military sick or injured persons. They must also always be ready to function as auxiliary hospitals. The number of hospitals as well as the number of beds available in each one is constantly increasing in Denmark. An auxiliary (or emergency) hospital is understood to be a completely equipped unit medically and surgically with a minimum of 200 beds. These hospitals can easily be moved from one place to another in emergency situations. The basements of a large number of Danish hospitals have been converted into special shelters, fitted for all kinds of treatment. This plan also involves a large

supply of medications and remedies. They all have a large number of physicians and of nursing personnel. As a general rule, they are built by county authorities, in accordance with the guidelines indicated by the Civil Defense Administration.

4.14. Ambulance Service

The civil defense ambulance service is part of the organization designed for treating the sick and wounded in wartime and it includes close to 2,200 vehicles capable of accommodating 8,800 stretchers. In an emergency, these facilities, properly equipped, are based in the main hospitals. The incorporated protection services and the auxiliary services apply first treatment or first aid on the scene, then take those injured to points where there are ambulances for the fastest possible transportation to hospitals. The civil defense regions control the ambulance service. Each region has previously positioned hospitals to which the vehicles will converge. This system makes possible the best performance within the means available.

4.15. Civil Defense Tasks in Peacetime

Its usefulness in peacetime is well known. Modern technological development has increased the number of these tasks. We should recall great catastrophes like the explosion of the Valby gas storage tanks in 1964, the disaster of the Odense express in 1967 and the 1976 floods in Jutland, when the dikes burst. The action of civil defense in these sad events was notable in every respect. We must not forget that a good organization in peacetime will be the fulcrum of a practical functional organization in wartime and that only in this way can it be given proper effectiveness.

5. Emergency Civil Planning

The areas of society not covered by military defense, civil defense or police legislation are covered by the laws on emergency civil planning, providing the bases for the implementation of a large number of measures, showing clearly and conscientiously the objective of civil preparation. The following extract from the first paragraph of the law is cited:

"The objective of the planning activities stemming from this law is directed toward the generalized defense of persons and property, for maintaining, in case of war, the government's administrative functions, including the regional level, for maintaining law and order and discipline and utilization of all the nation's resources for maintenance of the activities of production and transportation, as well as the means of communications, for safeguarding all lives and property in the country."

5.1. Four Important Sectors of the Emergency Plan

On the following pages, the types of plans involved in a civil emergency are divided in the following four sectors, for reasons of clarity and presentation:

1. Administrative Plan.
2. Economic Plan.
3. Public Information Plan.
4. Health Plan.

5.2 Administrative Plan

The objective of this plan is to ensure continuation of governments, both the central government and regional governments. The plan is carried out by the minister of Interior and is based on the fact that, in case of war, the government must concentrate its efforts in the following areas:

- a. Political problems.
- b. Conduct of the war.
- c. People's living conditions.
- d. Need for information and support.

The government also has to focus its attention constantly on coordinating the various sources of national resources, because the needs that arise then cannot all be met at the same time and in the same way. In order to fit the government for performing these functions capably, the ministers and various other high-level officials are freed from routine tasks, which will be handled at a lower level. The first tasks are the responsibility of the local authorities, until the regional governor, acting through his own channels, lays the groundwork for the necessary cooperation between the various regional authorities. In wartime, it becomes necessary to decentralize the decision level. Therefore, the functions of the Administrative Plan are very important. However, it is still more important to guarantee public administration in wartime, including maintenance of communications, in order to ensure the necessary contacts between the central government and the various territories or regions. Planning experience has to be acquired through courses and exercises, designed and conducted by the Ministry of Interior. Every year, a total defense exercise is held in which all the civil as well as military authorities participate.

5.3. Economic Planning

This plan includes the measures to be taken to utilize all the production potentialities of the nation, as well as the means of transportation and communication that make it possible to safeguard and distribute all kinds of necessary supplies. The nation's production capacity must be utilized as best as possible for the good of the citizens. This means that every enterprise must work to the maximum of its possibilities, and that the finished product must be distributed in a balanced, reasonable manner to the population. One of the many problems that may arise in wartime is the lack of imports. The NATO civil committees are trying precisely to coordinate these problems at the international level.

The following are the matters studied: problems tied to shipping and its insurance, land and air transportation, fuel supply, problems associated with industry and the economy. Denmark maintains representatives on all these committees.

5.3.1. Supplies

Planning pertaining to supplies, including food and fuel reserves, is carried out by the Ministry of Commerce. It includes the following physical and administrative measures: the Ministry of Commerce determines the policy to be adopted with regard to supplies and is responsible for setting up an organization at the national and regional level, aiming especially at the difficulties in communication between the various regions that will come up inevitably in wartime. The civil defense regions

are assisted by experts from private industry (in the fields of production and distribution). The principal measures to be taken for maintaining a specific level of fundamental supplies in a given area are assurance of supplies and taking steps to avoid superfluous consumption.

5.3.2. Emergency Levels

These are fundamental, primarily with regard to foodstuffs and fuels. It must be pointed out that these levels prove to be very useful when unfavorable atmospheric conditions cause irregularities in supply by sea.

5.3.3. Electricity Supply

The Ministry of Commerce is responsible for furnishing emergency electricity. The pertinent planning is carried out in close liaison with the Danish Energy Producers Association. As is known, electricity has such an effect on modern living that it is necessary to control its distribution constantly, in order to avoid sudden service interruptions. Generating and distributing stations are designed with a high safety factor and are supervised constantly, with repair teams ready to act at the first sign of failure. Even in peacetime, this whole system is kept in a high degree of readiness and is backed up in wartime by cooperation with the civil defense regions. Planning, in peacetime, also includes fuel storage, in order to ensure operations of powerplants and stockage of spare parts for all the essential components of those plants.

5.3.4. Sea Transportation

Emergency planning of sea transportation is also the responsibility of the Ministry of Commerce, in accordance with the regulations specified in international agreements. In case of war, these rules permit immediate control of all national ships for safeguarding the nation's supply and for maintaining traffic between the parts of the territory. The safety of merchant shipping is the responsibility of the Navy. Various alternative emergency plans are provided.

5.3.5. Highway and Railroad Transportation

Here, the Ministry of Public Works is responsible for planning. The requirements for these kinds of transportation, in wartime, are much more complex than in peacetime. Problems may arise, however, if there are restrictions on gasoline and diesel supplies. Thus, it is necessary to differentiate between vital traffic and low-priority traffic. Planning consists primarily in maintaining essential traffic, based on the existing fuel reserves. It should be noted that similar planning is necessary for air transportation.

5.3.6. Telecommunications

The implementation of any defense systems depends on telecommunications. The government must be in a position to maintain communications with any part of the territory and also with foreign countries. All operations of the defense forces, of civil defense and of the police depend on good communications, as well as the authorities controlling the sectors of transportation, radio, television and press. Responsibility for this aspect of total defense planning is incumbent on the Postal and

Telegraph Services together with the telephone companies. It is difficult to protect telecommunication systems against damage, but very effective steps can be taken to mitigate its effect. In case of a very serious breakdown, it is necessary to specify who can use the remaining communication channels. Because total repair is not feasible, repair teams must give priority to the most important means and that can give guarantees in the shortest time.

5.3.7. Labor Force and Equipment

It is absolutely necessary to be able to maintain and repair all the machinery pertaining to the country's everyday activity. This task includes maintenance of railroads, highways, bridges, energy production facilities and communications equipment. All the planning pertaining in particular to these tasks is executed in part at the regional level and in part at the central level, depending on the magnitude of the task to be performed. The Ministry of Public Works is again at the top. It is responsible for general planning. In wartime, there always is a shortage of manpower, in part owing to calls to the ranks, and in part also owing to alterations in production conditions. Thus, it may happen that, in some areas, there are greater requirements, while in others the reverse may occur. Responsibility for this kind of planning still lies with the already mentioned Ministry of Labor, which will have to provide all the labor force requirements through special offices scattered all over the country.

5.4. Public Information Planning

It is extremely important, in wartime, for the government and the authorities to keep the public constantly informed of the present situation and of the steps to be taken with regard to it. Therefore, very specific instructions must be given to the press and to radio. They must be as adequate as possible for keeping the public informed, with avoidance of all that may give rise to panic.

Emergency planning will have to be accomplished by the Ministry of Interior in co-operation with civil defense and, as far as possible, with regional organizations and representatives of the press and radio. Breakdowns in the communication systems must be expected. Therefore, all functions must be decentralized by disseminating them at the regional level. Information planning measures also include the preparation of informative bulletins at the regional level.

Public information is part of what can be called psychological defense.

5.5. Health Planning

Health planning (control of foodstuffs, and so on) lies in the area of the Ministry of Environment. The living conditions brought about by war increase the danger of epidemics, primarily owing to contamination of water and of the atmosphere. Thus, it becomes necessary to alert the local authorities in peacetime, in order to protect public health.

The Ministry of Environment and the veterinary authorities are the ones responsible for the emergency measures to be taken. Municipal veterinarians, representative of the local authorities, play an important part in this planning, together with the public health inspectors. Health inspection of drinking water and of food reserves

is basically a local task. The presence of Regional Civil Safety is only for co-ordination and combination of efforts.

6. Police

While the Armed Forces and civil defense are prepared for war tasks, the police force is primarily directed toward peacetime tasks. The missions and organization of the police are specified in the so-called Administration of Justice Act (a government document specifying the functions of the police). These missions are:

Maintenance of domestic law and order and safety.
Watching over compliance with the laws in force.
Combating crime in every possible respect.

6.1. Police Districts and Regions

Denmark is divided into 54 police districts. Each one is headed by a police chief. The Copenhagen area, together with the Kastrup Airport, forms a police district.

The Minister of Justice is the supreme head of the police force. He is represented in each region by a regional commandant of police.

In peacetime, the main duty of the regional commandants is coordination of everything pertaining to police activities (including the highway police, criminal records and the motor vehicle registration center).

6.2. Tasks in Time of War

They are similar to the peacetime tasks. In time of war, however, combating espionage and various civil defense activities are also assigned to the police. Thus, priorities have to be assigned. This becomes possible, because some of the tasks require less personnel.

This is true, for example, of a reduction in traffic, which requires much less personnel to function.

The director general of police must, in time of tension or conflict, take command of the operations leading to maintenance of domestic order, discipline and law and order. The minister of Justice and the regional commandants of police will assist the director general in performing his duties. Two territorial commands, for the east and the west of the Great Belt, are being set up. The director general can act in either of these two commands. As long as the communication networks are kept operating, one of the two commands will function as liaison between the director general and the police regions. If communications break down between a territorial command and the director general, the other command will automatically assume direction of operations. Likewise, if communications fail between a region and the permanent command, the regional police commandant will immediately take over direction of operations (domestic safety, maintenance of law and order and discipline and fight against espionage). The following is the organization of the police in wartime:



Key: 1. Minister of Justice; 2. National Civil Defense Command; 3. Director General of Police West Territory -- East Territory; 4. Territorial Command; 5. Territorial Commands -- Region; 6. Police Chiefs in ... Districts.

6.3. Personnel

The police maintain a high degree of training in peacetime. Therefore, they should be fitted for coping with wartime. A war situation will immediately cause the personnel force to increase. There are special corps for reinforcing the police, like territorial police companies. These units are commanded by police officers who report to the territorial commandants as soon as necessary.

The police can also act as a special civil defense corps, in order to handle all task pertaining to it.

7. Regional Cooperation

As has already been mentioned, the government can transfer many of its obligations to the regional authorities. Cooperation of the four components in the organization of a local defense, or at the regional level, will be very important to the population. For this reason, the region organized for total defense must be regarded as a unit within the whole civil defense structure. The government will put legislation in effect for the functioning of the regional commands. Each of the four commandants exercises authority in accordance with the laws and other regulations applicable to his area. They also must keep each other informed with regard to the situation and its foreseeable development. Important decisions will have to be made jointly.

7.1. Authority of the Regional Commands

In wartime, situations may arise in which the normal procedures of cooperation may cause delays in decisionmaking. In these cases, the regional governor may, as representative of the government, make decisions himself. Under the same conditions, the regional Armed Forces commandant may make decisions with regard to operations within the area of his region. It must also be said that regional civil defense planning activities are coordinative in nature. This results from the fact that, in wartime, the three kinds of organization -- national, local and private -- will have to act with a high degree of uniformity. The regional governor, who heads the civil part in the region, has a secretariat available, assisted by a certain number of sections, each pertaining to specific areas, like transportation services, supply services and manpower recruiting.

7.2. Planning Committees

Over the years, a large number of exercises have been held for the purpose of giving experience to the various organizations in performance of their specific tasks, especially with regard to coordination problems. As a result, the regions have committees for permanent liaison, carrying out peacetime tasks, within the principal areas, assisting in ensuring that planning conditions for the individual defense sectors will always be the best possible. It must be pointed out that only cooperation at the regional level will be capable of maintaining tolerable social conditions.

8. Total Defense in Everyday Situations

Our society, immersed in a constant flow of technology, presents to the authorities situations resembling war situations.

Within the boundaries of total defense ideas, planning must be carried out, in order to be able to solve situations of serious disasters.

The police chief is the one who normally takes the necessary steps in case of disaster or serious emergency. If necessary, all the police forces can be grouped and be placed under his command.

8.1. Emergency Forces

According to law, civil defense must provide assistance in case of a serious disaster or emergency. The civil defense corps is thus organized to act under these conditions based in its own areas and using its already previously equipped teams.

Hospitals maintain emergency teams, in order to be able to go into action immediately, if necessary. The Navy and the Air Force constantly maintain teams ready for assistance to accidents at sea, and military barracks have plans to set up forces ready to go into action immediately to handle accidents or serious emergencies promptly.

Every sector of the total defense structure is organized to give assistance, in accordance with its possibilities, in major disasters and catastrophes in peacetime.

These structures must be augmented constantly, in order to provide, intelligently, more and more performance. Thus, their efficiency is constantly being improved, so that, when they are required, they will be fitted for giving full performance.

WIND-SUN POWERED PLANT SUPPLIES TELECOMMUNICATIONS STATION

Paris LE MONDE DIMANCHE in French 28 Dec 80 p 14

[Article by Annie Batlle: "Wind and Sun at La Turbie"]

[Text] Photoelectric solar cells coupled with a windmill make up the Aerosolec experimental station on the Cote d'Azur. It continuously produces the 180 watts necessary for Hertzian transmissions.

La Turbie, between Nice and Monte Carlo, is a place of rocky, isolated hills lashed by the wind and drenched with sunlight. Right at the top, a strange pair: the shiny, geometric facets of solar modules; the slim outline of a windmill. This is Aerosolec, an experimental telecommunications station.

The supplying of telecommunications stations located in isolated areas has always been a problem: as it is most often a question of places rich in renewable energy, the National Center for Telecommunications Studies [CNET] was quick to conduct research to produce electricity from natural elements. Since 1965, it has been involved in photovoltaic conversion, the only way of directly transforming the sun's energy into electricity with the help of photovoltaic cells (or photoreactors).

This is when experimentation began--on the La Turbie site--on the first nationally built solar cells. Silicon-based, they were originally devised to provide for the electric needs of satellites. In 1975, the photovoltaic network really started. For once, France was at the forefront. Technological developments, progress in the production of modules, the idea of combining photovoltaic and wind energy, prompted the CNET to establish the Aerosolec experimental station.

The wind and sun will furnish continuous energy of 180 watts, enough to supply a telecommunications station.

What is the device that is used? The solar generator (photovoltaic) is made up of photoelectric cells (made by R.T.C.). The fixed panels, facing the south and tilted 47 degrees on the horizontal, have a "top power" (maximum power) of 1,000 watts, for an illumination of 1 kW/m^2 . On the other hand, a wind generator equipped with a horizontal axis engine furnishes 300 watts of power from a wind with a speed greater or equal to 7 m/s.

A device to store energy was essential, since one of the basic aspects of telecommunications systems is their continuous functioning. It is made up of a main

battery and an emergency battery, which absorb the surplus energy furnished by the generators. If the weather conditions are unfavorable, the emergency battery takes over.

Little Maintenance

For 2 years, the solar radiation (average daily annual value: 4 kilowatts/square meter per day) and the energy produced by photovoltaic and wind-powered generators (180 watts) was measured. In this way, the Aerosolec system proved its reliability. Little maintenance is necessary. A simple annual inspection check is sufficient. All the parts can withstand even the most severe climatic conditions: outdoor temperatures from -30 to 60 degrees, relative humidity of 100 percent at 45 degrees centigrade, wind speed of 200 kilometers/hour, air heavy with salt and sand.

It all works without human intervention. But certain nights, some valuable modules have vanished into nature....

Other experimental stations of the same type have also been proven. The Pardailhan station, near Montpellier, furnishes a continuous power of 450 watts. It comprises a photovoltaic generator, a solar generator and an electricity-generating group, which comes into play when the battery tension drops to 45.6 volts. The station on the Ese plateau, in Corsica, independently supplies a Hertzian relay, which links Ajaccio to Bastelica. A continuous power of 15 watts under 48 volts is necessary. The Losquet Island station, near Pleumeur-Bodou (Cotes-du-Nord) supplies the beacon lights of a pylon and a radio contact with a total and continuous power level of 400 watts.

A Photovoltaic Plan

Only photovoltaic energy could have been successfully used or proposed for several very special telecommunications systems, notable for their isolation. These have been, among others, highway telephonic terminals, telephonic extensions for phone users and telephonic repeaters for links by optical fibers. At the end of a series of experiments lasting more than 10 years in the photovoltaic area and of close to 5 years in that of wind power, the CNET technicians today consider that no new demonstrations of technical feasibility are required. The industrial phase must be reached in order for this technique to attain its expected development. But the expansion of the applications of photovoltaic energy is slowed by the high cost price of photoreactors.¹ The installed price per watt is presently Fr 100. From now until 1985, taking into account drops in price linked to those of raw materials, to increases in production and to automation, it will reach Fr 10 to Fr 25 per watt. In any case, this is what the government foresees. In 1980, it brought about, through the COMES (Solar Energy Board) the beginning of an industrial photovoltaic plan intended to maintain the position of French industry in the international setting.

1. Four companies manufacture them: R.T.C., France Photon, Photowatt International and Sahel (a subsidiary of Thomson C.S.F.)

"While still remaining high in relation to the cost of electricity produced by, conventional or nuclear means," stated Mr Henry Durand, president of the COMES², "the price of photovoltaic should favor a considerable development of the market: photovoltaic energy could then become directly competitive with electricity-generating groups, whose market in developing countries, lacking interconnected systems, is very considerable." But can France maintain its lead? In 1980, the "photovoltaic" budget of the COMES was Fr 32.5 million, the American budget was equivalent to Fr 640 million....

2. Solar energy conference organized in October 1980 by the COMES and the Commission of the European Communities.

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BRIEFS

STATOIL RESEARCH IN NORTH--Harstad, 15 Jan (AFTENPOSTEN's correspondent)--Statoil, in cooperation with a number of oil companies, including Mobil, Conoco, and Esso, has gotten a big research and development program under way that will give answers to the questions that arise when exploitable finds of oil and gas are made off the coast of Norway north of Trøndelag. The Statoil group started its preliminary work last year, but the whole program will not be completed until the end of 1983. Among the many questions that will be more closely investigated are the problems surrounding development and bringing ashore at depths up to 350 meters and the effects that development of a large field will have on the northern Norwegian society, both with regard to employment and housing and with regard to the existing work and economic life. The research and development program embraces 20 different project areas. [Text] [Oslo AFTENPOSTEN in Norwegian 16 Jun 81 p 25] 8815

CSO: 3108

SIR IAN GILMOUR TALKS ABOUT EEC, NATO, GIBRALTAR

Madrid EL PAIS in Spanish 7 Jan 81 p 4

[Interview with Sir Ian Gilmour, lord privy seal and foreign affairs spokesman of the British Government in the House of Commons, by Andres Ortega, EL PAIS correspondent in London; date not given]

[Text] Sir Ian Gilmour, lord privy seal and foreign affairs spokesman of the British Government in the House of Commons, is arriving today in Madrid on an official visit. "This visit," Gilmour told EL PAIS, "is within the context of the negotiations for Spain's entry into the European Community." Gilmour recalled the visit to London last November by Eduardo Punset, the minister for relations with the EEC, and stated that in addition to him he would meet with Calvo-Sotelo, Perez-Llorca and Robles Piquer on Thursday and Friday to discuss "international and bilateral affairs."

Question: What is the outlook for the EEC at the moment and to what extent will the restructuring of the community's budget affect Spain's entry?

Answer: Political cooperation within the community has improved considerably, and we have resolved the issue of Britain's contribution to the community budget, but the major problems of restructuring the budget and overhauling the common agricultural policy remain to be resolved. All of this obviously affects Spain's entry into the community. Although some of these things will have to be taken care of beforehand, much of the restructuring and the negotiating for Spain's entry into the community can be carried out in parallel fashion. The restructuring is no reason whatsoever not to move forward with the expansion.

Question: What are the major problems between Spain and Great Britain as far as our country's entry into the EEC is concerned?

Answer: There is nothing in particular between Spain and Great Britain, but there is between Spain and Europe. Spain enjoys a high degree of protectionism vis-a-vis the community, and we hope that customs barriers will soon be lowered. Agriculture will be a problem area. Under current laws, Spain's entry into the community could cause an imbalance in markets, especially for products such as olive oil, wine or fruits and vegetables. Fishing will be another difficult issue, because it has always been a problem for the community.

Question: When do you think Spain will probably enter the community?

Answer: The Spanish Government has stated that it would like to complete the negotiations so that Spain could join the EEC on 1 January 1984. I do not wish to underestimate the difficulties in adhering to such a timetable, but the United Kingdom will do everything possible to keep things moving forward.

Question: Is there any connection between these negotiations and the talks on the Gibraltar issue?

Answer: There is no formal connection. The negotiations on Gibraltar will begin as soon as the border has been opened. We hope that we do not have to wait until 1984 to implement last April's Lisbon treaty. A closed border between two members of the EEC is inconceivable.

Sir Ian Gilmour added that once Spain has joined the community, it would be natural for workers, goods and capital to move freely between Gibraltar and Spain. He rejected allegations that Great Britain had repeatedly violated the Treaty of Utrecht, under which it acquired the Rock, adding that "both sides have recently agreed that it would be a mistake to return to the futile legal arguments of the 1960's."

Question: Under the current circumstances, Great Britain has been accused of discriminating against Spanish workers in Gibraltar. For its part, Great Britain says that it is now the Spanish Government's turn to implement the Lisbon agreements. Are we at an impasse?

Answer: I would like to once and for all explode the myth that Spanish workers are discriminated against in Gibraltar. The notion that we are at an impasse is also mistaken. Perez-Llorca has stated that the agreement will be implemented soon. We are prepared to begin the negotiations as soon as the Spanish Government opens up the border.

Question: Could there be a solution to Gibraltar like the one that has been proposed for the Falkland Islands?

Answer: There has not been a solution for the Falkland Islands, and I do not think that parallels should be drawn between different places. The two cases are very different. For example, the Argentine Government provides direct communication with the Falkland Islands.

Question: What will happen if the residents of Gibraltar refuse to accept a solution?

Answer: The aim of the negotiations, which will begin as soon as communications are reestablished, is to overcome the differences between us. Naturally, I cannot foretell what might be discussed during them, although our commitment to the people of Gibraltar is as solid as iron.

Question: Would it help to resolve the Gibraltar problem if Spain joined NATO?

Answer: The decision regarding NATO is entirely up to the Spanish Government. Such a move would please us, but it would in no way alter our commitment to the people of Gibraltar. It would surely lead to joint use of the military installations, whose strategic value can be appreciated by just looking at a map, a strategic value that is no greater for Great Britain than for its NATO allies.

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CBO: 3110

GENERAL SPANNOCCHI INTERVIEWED ON STATE OF ARMED FORCES

Vienna PROFIL in German 5 Jan 81 pp 12-13

[interview with Army Commander Eral Spannocchi by Wilfried Ahrens: "Essential Needs Not Yet Met"]

Text7 PROFIL: Switzerland has 625,000 soldiers and Austria has 160,000. They have three times as many tanks, eleven times as many aircraft and twice as much money in their military budget. Does the Vienna general staff get an inferiority complex when it compares figures such as these ?

Spannocchi: Complexes have never yet kept wars from breaking out. With all due respect for the great achievements of our western neighbor, we have not made it our business to follow his example in each and every regard. We must operate with Austrian means and under Austrian conditions and try to meet our own defense needs which we have developed in accordance with the very specific geographic and topographical conditions obtaining in our country. And, we are making progress.

PROFIL: By now, even the Swiss general staff agrees and they used to be among the harshest critics of the Austrian defense effort. To be sure, they do not agree without any reservations whatsoever. Following the "in-depth defense exercise '79"...

Spannocchi: ...one Swiss observer said to me: "The defense systems of Austria and Switzerland are entirely comparable. The only difference is that where we have a regiment of 5,000 men in position you have a battalion of 1,250 men."

PROFIL: Yes. At present, Austria can put a maximum of 160,000 men into the field. In 6 years, it will be 186,000 men and sometime in the nineties, 300,000. That is still far off and even then it will be less than half of what Switzerland can mobilize.

Spannocchi: It is not our military aim to put as many Austrians as possible in uniform but to protect ourselves against possible threats to our security. It is true that our in-depth defense plans cannot become fully operative until the 300,000-man goal is reached. But even now our every ready rapid deployment force of

15,000 men and those militia units not needed in a specific area afford sufficient protection in case of national emergency and in case our neutrality is violated, which is to say in case of a conflict in our vicinity which threatens to spill over onto our territory.

PROFIL: And what about the so-called defense situation in case of a direct attack on Austria ?

Spannocchi: There is no need to secure all our frontiers at the same time. There is a very small likelihood, I think, that we will be attacked from the north and south and east and west all at once. It would be nice and in a way it would be our goal simply to push a button in case of danger and the whole country would be secure. That, of course, is something we cannot yet do with our 160,000 men, nor will we be able to do it with 186,000. But there is one thing we can do-- I call it the spirit level principle: we have a number of mobile units-- the rapid deployment force, eight mobile militia brigades and another 20 units of battalion strength. Drawing on these, we can augment the militia units tied to a specific area, if we feel threatened in one sector or another. These mobile forces --by now comprising a good deal more than 100,000 men and getting bigger every year-- I look upon as our flexible item. Like that eye inside the spirit level, they gravitate to the point of danger. We must also ask ourselves what threats there are. Given the present confrontation situation between East and West, we believe that the Warsaw Pact would no doubt have a conventional force superiority in case of an armed conflict but that the 4000 kilometer long demarcation line running the length of Europe would make it impossible to commit more than ten divisions to the relatively small Austrian sector with N.A. being able to commit nowhere near as much strength. And, for that matter, the lack of those ten divisions would certainly be felt elsewhere.

PROFIL: That sounds quite reassuring.

Spannocchi: From a strictly quantitative standpoint, yes-- and for the very reason that a modern pact army is far better equipped in qualitative terms than the armed forces of a small country that must fend for itself, we have developed our in-depth defense plans which call for spreading battles out into many individual engagements-- in the areas an attacker must pass through, at points which are geographically and topographically most advantageous and which we have previously selected and appropriately prepared.

PROFIL: And do you propose in this way to offset the massive superiority of a conceivable invader in tanks, aircraft and missiles ?

Spannocchi: We are aware of the fact that the main problem in repelling aggression is how to mount an effective anti-tank and anti-aircraft defense. Since we do not have any defensive missiles, we must come up with alternatives-- and there are such or there will be in due time. For that matter, the effectiveness of missiles with shaped charge projectiles against newer generation tanks is constantly declining. This calls for different technologies, none of which are forbidden to us: high-velocity projectiles with sub-caliber cores; arrow projectiles; final phase guided homing projectiles guided by laser or magnetic field techniques.

PROFIL: Are those just a gleam in your eye ?

Spannocchi: No; they already exist, either on the drawing board or as prototypes. It can be produced or bought; it is ready for use. We are laying the groundwork now in order to turn these items over to the armed forces by the mid-eighties.

PROFIL: Are such things being developed in Austria ?

Spannocchi: No comment. Once our artillery units get these new projectiles --and I can tell you that these high-velocity projectiles can pierce anything from the Leopard II to the newest prototype of the American XM-1, to say nothing of the less thickly armored Soviet tanks-- then we have an alternative. We already have something along these lines; we are in the midst of it, including prototypes. And another thing: we can barricade the country with all available means from felling trees to flooding the countryside to putting up anti-tank hedgehog obstacles...

PROFIL: ...which are simple anti-tank obstacles consisting of three iron bars welded together.

Spannocchi: They are 4,000 Schillings apiece so that we should be able to get a hundred thousand of them at some point without going bankrupt. An aggressor can fire away at these things as much as he pleases. They just topple over and are even harder to remove as a result.

PROFIL: But none of this offers any protection against air attacks from modern helicopter gunships for instance.

Spannocchi: From an operational standpoint, there is no substitute yet for anti-aircraft missiles. In this regard we are just starting; I readily admit that. But there is an alternative emerging. What is it that actuates a helicopter ? It is a helicopter's aim to dispose of the defender's tanks, bunkers and obstacles by means of homing weapons. Now how does that work ? It works electronically or broadly speaking in the frequency range from infra-red to supersonic to laser, which is the maximum frequency. If we can block these homing frequencies, the missiles

intended to travel three or more kilometers do not hit their target but fly off aimlessly.

PROFIL: When will that be ?

Spannocchi: These things are also on the drawing board. We know a lot about them; now we have to make them a reality-- not by tomorrow but by the end of the eighties. Those are things of the future.

PROFIL: And in the meantime ?

Spannocchi: We have to make do with simpler solutions. There are relatively simple methods to make bunkers invulnerable to a hit by the first and second projectile: you protect them with wire fences three deep or three high. If a guided missile has to penetrate two or three wire fences, it is bound to explode by the time it reaches the third --more likely when it reaches the first-- and the bunker below or ahead of it will still be intact. If the aggressor fires three times, he will destroy the fence; but he will have to fire three times to do it. As you can see, we have thought of quite a few alternatives that turn utter impotence into relative strength and help us reach our primary goal which is to lend credibility to our defense posture.

PROFIL: Which would be a great deal easier if we had 625,000 men under arms like Switzerland and the corresponding number of tanks, guns and defensive missiles. I would think you get envious when you look at the Swiss.

Spannocchi: Of course I do. I wish we had as much as they. Every general would like to have as many men and as much material as possible to fulfill his mission. And I am quite sure we have not yet done what is most essential. We must get to a point where we spend as much on defense as our neutral neighbor to the west. We have made some efforts over the past few years, it is true, but nowhere near enough. We must draw the line at some point where we stop improvising for lack of money. But as far as the 625,000 men go: I do not believe in the rule of thumb that says a country must have 10 percent of its population under arms.

PROFIL: The 300,000 men you are looking for-- is that the maximum ?

Spannocchi: I would say a little more than that; but not much

PROFIL: 450,000 ?

Spannocchi: So you know our figures. Yes, that would be about it. That would give us a 200,000 to 300,000 man mobile force to secure all our borders under an operations plan based on the spirit level

principle. In the technological field --as long as we are speaking about what would be desirable and what we still lack-- we are, as I said, in the process of working out solutions to the urgent problems of tank and air defense. To sum up: we are conducting our defense program with the means at our disposal and the Swiss are going about theirs in the same way. Both of us ought to retain our separate philosophies to some extent.

PROFIL: The Swiss tend to appreciate the fact that you have made a virtue of the necessity of living up to the election slogan "six months is enough."

Spannocchi: I was just about to mention that myself. Maybe that is the way it was; it had to be done. Let us be careful and just say that it might even work in the bargain. I am not saying that our programs are totally effective but that they could be. We all know the story of Columbus and the egg-- but where are the Columbus and where are the eggs ?

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CSO: 3103

ANDROSCH'S HEADING CREDITANSTALT BANK MEETS WITH OPPOSITION

Zurich NEUE ZUERCHER ZEITUNG in German 14 Jan 81 p 2

Article by R. St.: "Androsch's Future As Yet Uncertain"

Text Opposition by OeVP

The situation surrounding the changeover of finance minister Androsch to the post of heading Austria's largest bank, the /Creditanstalt-Bankverein/, is getting more complicated. The original plan called for Androsch's leaving the government on Tuesday and having the Creditanstalt board of directors at least vote to give him a seat on the board by Thursday. The SPOe had let it be known that it would announce its decision on a new finance minister on Wednesday. There is practically no doubt but that the second most important cabinet post will go to the Tyrolean Herbert Salcher, who has headed the ministry of health since late 1979 and that his job will go to the physician Kurt Steirer. Kreisky has presented Salcher as a political thinker to the public and not as an expert in economic and financial matters and has assigned a state secretary to assist him, the non-partisan director of the economic research institute, Hans Seidel.

Although these cabinet changes must still be submitted to the appropriate party committees for approval, they are almost certain to be ratified. What is no longer certain is exactly when they will take effect and that is a direct consequence of the turbulent events surrounding finance minister Androsch. The OeVP is making every effort of preventing Androsch from becoming a board member of the largest bank now and of heading it at a later date.

PPOe Is Split

The PPOe which holds the 27th seat on the board of directors (as against 13 each for the two major parties) appears to be split on the issue. As chairman of the parliamentary investigating committee into the general hospital scandal, PPOe party chief Steger has earned a great deal of prestige both for himself and his party in a relatively short time by proving to be efficient and incorruptible in his conduct of the investigation. By coming out in favor

of the finance minister at this particular juncture, he might forfeit these gains in prestige. On the other hand, he probably wants to retain the position of the FPOe of being an acceptable coalition partner of the SPOe sometime in the future. On the weekend, two land organisations of the FPOe have spoken out against Androsch. Since the two major parties cancel each other out, every single FPOe vote counts at this stage although the party has 20 times fewer members than either of the other two. The eventual outcome of this tug-of-war is hard to predict.

Charge of Tax Evasion

It seems therefore that the decision is likely to be postponed. On Monday, Mr Graff, a lawyer who has figured in this affair several times previously, announced that he would lodge a complaint against Androsch not just for being accessory but for actually evading payment of taxes. Androsch denied the charge by Graff, who is an OeVP member and accused him of defamation of character and a violation of professional ethics. Chancellor Kreisky will attempt to smooth things over at a dinner he is to have with OeVP chairman Mock. Should Androsch not be confirmed, this would be viewed as a personal defeat for Kreisky who thought this might be an elegant way of ridding himself of a cabinet member who had become politically untenable. The fact that the solution of this affair will now turn out anything but elegant is due to the overbearing way in which the governing party attempted to provide Androsch with a lucrative post without regard for political morality and without giving any but their own partisans a hearing.

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CSO: 3103

VU'S SCHILTZ DISCUSSES ECONOMIC, SOCIAL CRISIS

Brussels KNACK in Dutch 17 Dec 80 pp 26-29

[Interview with Hugo Schiltz, parliamentary party leader and former president of the VU, by Frans Verleyen: "Without the People, Nothing Is Possible"; date and place of interview not given]

[Text] While the government is going to the extreme of its technical and legal means to conduct an economic and social policy which is supposed to contain "the new poverty," the opposition is being somewhat forgotten. On the liberal side, there is not only talk about the "too little and too late" of the cabinet measures, but the young Guy Verhofstadt is preparing a completely new ideological base for the PVV [Party of Liberty and Progress]. It is so sharply, radically and scientifically worked out (and it fits so well in the exchanges of the congresses) that we are actually witnessing the birth of a new political party, which is steadily swallowing its old PVV mother.

The situation which has developed in the People's Party [VU] is less clear. This party, which still holds 14 Flemish parliamentary seats, has put a great deal of energy primarily in itself. Following the electoral defeat of December 1978 and the resignation of President Schiltz in June of last year, the VU has tried to overcome its "depression and confusion," to find a level on which some national unity would be possible again, and to give the new President Vic Anciaux a chance. Schiltz, as is well known, has correctly participated in the healing of all this after-pain. He created a journal and related study group (VLAANDEREN MORGEN) to open up themes which are not directly related to the daily politics of the communities. Around Halloween, he became president of the IBL [expansion unknown] holding company, and thus managed to settle a rather quiet Antwerp struggle --following the death of Fernand Nedee -- to obtain this piece of financial - economic influence, in his favor. However, following this year's constitutional revision and the temporary disruption of major community work projects, the VU is having trouble appearing in the neighborhood of the political center of gravity: the economic and social crisis. How is all of this viewed on the Barrikadenplein in Brussels? Parliamentary party leader Schiltz speaking.

[Schiltz] We do not have much sympathy in the VU for thoughts of doom and "the crisis of the regime." We are not pleading for less social security. We do recognize that the crisis is a significant event, but we are wondering whether a place is being cleared in it for a Flemish model and recipe. That recipe does exist, on the condition that the instruments are put in our hands. They are to be found in the area of legislation, the distribution of power and the financial means which can yet be derived from the August bill on state reform.

Otherwise, we must naturally live in an overall West European or even Western context. Our "own model" cannot rest on an alternative economic or an alternative social system, which would depart completely from our neighboring countries. And yet, a correct analysis must be made, which could then possibly apply for most modern countries living in a crisis. In our country, such an analysis may well include a typical element: that our industrial structure is geared too one-sidedly to a few large sectors, and that the demise of a single sector could sweep the rest away. Steel, for example, represents such a threat.

[Question] Is there a Flemish structure which could avoid this bad structure?

[Schiltz] We have a financial reserve, an enormous amount of black money which circulates in Flemish households and enterprises. Hence, the crisis could play havoc here for years without visibly affecting the general way of life. The Flanders still finances itself from its reserves, and consequently it is even able to thumb its nose at Wallonia. The proof of this situation can be found in the statistical assessment which shows that in recent years the Flemish households have consumed a great deal more than Walloon households with, however, equal or even slightly lower incomes. Thus, there must be financial reserves here. This is probably why we have relatively fewer bankruptcies of small enterprises, even though these figures have recently also started climbing. Thus, it is time to intervene in a Flemish fashion.

[Question] Is it a financing crisis which has toppled our KMO's [small or medium-sized businesses]? An interest rate so high that only the mammoths are able to stand up to it, so that later on all the small companies lie dead along the road and the multinationals meanwhile have swallowed up all that life?

[Schiltz] The capital reserves in the West are large enough to restore a large and general economic balance. This crisis is not determined by any single element. It is based on the fact that the West, and consequently also the people in our country, have reacted too late to the new world situation. For 200 years we have lived in a kind of balance: the industrial monopoly against the rest of the world. This primary balance has been disturbed, because our economy is no longer able to pay the price itself (with or without military means) for its imported raw materials and energy. The awakened nationalism in the young countries has definitely changed these data. With the advent of Yamani, I already made speeches with the warning: the days when we had a monopoly in terms of supplies, production and sales, are past. Wake up. We did not wake up.

Change

[Question] Are we losing the monopoly of our technological knowledge?

[Schiltz] Not as such. But we can no longer convert it into products which command an obtainable price on the world market. Technologically speaking, we can achieve as much or even more than the South Koreans, but we cannot conduct a South Korean welfare and social policy. This would not even be desirable. Thus, from an industrial point of view, we must develop new fields in which no price exists and for which the rest of the world cannot offer better conditions. We have thought too little about this in the West, and least of all in Belgium. The /French/ [in italics], on the other hand, are working on a new recipe with which they might be able to surpass the Germans. With the, from a democratic point of view, not always attractive means of Gaullism they have developed a new constitutional system which makes a stable policy and strategy possible. They have gotten a great deal further with their steel crisis than we have, and they are in the process of becoming number one in the field of biogenetics. For convenience sake, Giscard refers to this altered world situation as "the change," but in France they are at least striving for a policy to absorb all of that. I acknowledge that this may require moderation measures, but a party such as the VU resists the idea that it solves all our problems. It is not a charm, but a small ingredient of the changeover. This change can no longer take place with the fine words of the period of prosperity. The disintegration and the lack of solutions of the political authority must be brought to an end. Only later could there be a consensus to work on something with a real goal in mind. Without the sincere consent of the people, nothing is possible. Without it, the Flemish would also end up in a kind of vassal area, a Lebanon, a reserve zone which would pick up some of the crumbs in the tertiary sector thanks to, for example, its favorable maritime location. But then our economy would become a local and regional one, like the Flemish economy used to be with regard to Belgium as a whole. Then our economic base, the manner in which the Flemish earn their money, would become completely insecure.

[Question] To tell you the truth, this kind of theme sounds a little strange from the mouth of a man from the People's Union. Do they have a reasonable chance in your political milieu?

[Schiltz] In principle, exceedingly so. Meanwhile everybody knows, of course, that after 1978 the Flemish federalist party had to go look for a valid general concept in order to overcome its frustrations about the Egmont line. Hence, the rank and file sometimes occupies itself with a flight into the future, through discussions about the republic or the monarchy and so on, while the most urgent questions lie elsewhere. But that is not due to a lack of understanding of the crisis in the Flanders. Five years ago, we had already developed plans for a reorganization of the RMZ [Social Security Administration], of employment and the like. All of this is now being borne out by the facts.

[Question] Does the VU want to return to an economy which would be based much more emphatically on a free market?

[Schiltz] Our capital market is too small to finance a purely free economy. The government should be involved in this on a large scale -- but pragmatically and without complexes. Secondly, the position of the worker with regard to "capital" (thus, the employers) should also be settled. Aside from any ideological gripes, it is indeed clear that productivity, renewal, success in the face of the industrial challenge, are no longer possible within the framework of the traditional and hierarchical relationship between labor and capital. We are going to have to work hard

on that. As a matter of fact, being a small economic community, we cannot afford a planned economy. Consequently, we must once again become an attractive area for the industrial game. The management business must once again become worthwhile here. In a socially highly developed society like ours, this can only take place through a pragmatically organised common interest between labor and capital. There is no other choice.

The government can help achieve this by granting financial and political means. /Afterwards/ [in italics] it will, in the name of the community, be rewarded with a larger industrial and thus also fiscal return. /Previously/ [in italics] it must guide the people through the narrow bottleneck, with temporary measures to keep the ship afloat. But it should not elevate this emergency policy into a system. In our small corner of Europe, long-lasting government planning has no chance.

[Question] What is the VU then going to do in parliament with the current reform bill?

[Schiltz] /Not/ [in italics] adopt it, because it includes the lie and creates the illusion that with a couple years of moderation measures the crisis will be solved. These moderation measures do not alter anything about the basic international problem. They /renew/ [in italics] nothing. It continues to authorize us, even with a reduced standard of living, to continue to produce printed cotton and so on. The government must develop a plan based on the question: what will we be able to produce and sell on full markets some 10 years from now? What is necessary for that? And then set those means aside to allow us to reach that other shore. Monetary means, scientific research, support for export. Legally, that is to say using the existing laws, the government is capable here and now of conducting such a policy. However, from a mental and social point of view, it does not appear able to handle it. It continues to waste all its means on old industries, old university organizations, and old services for industrial promotion. We will demonstrate this during the upcoming parliamentary discussions.

Way Out Plan

[Question] You don't have, as VU, a press organ to propagate your ideas.

[Schiltz] We have never had one. And yet, we were able to turn the idea of self-government into the main political theme for a whole decade. I believe that our view of the crisis will clear the way even more quickly. Indeed, it does not bear upon the intangible /values/ [in italics] which are associated with the organization of the Belgian state, but upon the concrete fate of the people. It will go /search/ [in italics] for the right interpretation of the crisis and not wait for difficult or superficial messages. The VU is capable of becoming a spearhead in the Flemish struggle against the crisis. It is mentally best equipped to act beyond socialism or liberalism. It is best suited for the acceptance of an effective way out plan. Our originality lies in the attempt to re-formulate a basic consensus by means of a very modern "liberalism," in so far as that word has not been compromised here. The traditional parties are woven too tightly into their visible and invisible links to be able to do this yet.

[Question] Isn't it very unpleasant to advocate a political consensus in a world of social, material and intellectual inequality?

[Schiltz] Power, knowledge and property are much worse off in this society than the theory of the class struggle would have one believe. You must admit, after all, that power and property have become very /precarious/ [in italics]. Today, power and property are very quickly lost when they are not compensated by /remuneration/ [in italics]. There is more than one nobleman in jail. The time of long lasting and hard to accept privileges no longer exists. The workers, those people who /make/ [in italics] the economy, are subject to an enormous revaluation and are being engaged increasingly on the basis of the respect they deserve. The movement /within/ [in italics] the old social classes and ranks, the rising and falling, is increasing all the while. The annoying part is that this mobility, this interpenetration is not yet reflected in the political structures. Everyone maintains his old compartment: the middle class union has "its" minister, etcetera, but "the" middle class, as it is interpreted in politics, has long ceased to exist. The parallel pressure groups no longer have such future.

[Question] And the state?

[Schiltz] The VU refuses to participate in such cheap slogans as the state being a greedy glutton and the like. It is indeed urgent for the state to clear the capital market somewhat, but its overall retrenchment will take time. And yet, the state could change its transfers -- to industry and to citizen consumption -- very quickly. Not through phasing out, but through a much better choice of the goals for which it spends money. Goals in the economy, in education, in public health... The state, as the embodiment of the people, must learn to know what it wants. In the nature of things, a Flemish state should be quicker to perceive this than the Belgium of today. As a matter of fact, politics or officialdom cannot /replace/ [in italics] the popular will. They can only summarize it -- as De Gaulle did in the end. An economic policy cannot be conducted with a people who no longer have an economic will. The feeling of belonging to a /striving/ [in italics] community cannot be replaced by bayonets or fiscal jail sentences. The political authority only serves to preserve the rules of the game in which this feeling can come into its own. It must, for example, guard against the most demanding group being granted social advantages (the somewhat better off middle class), rather than the least equipped group which is often the most peaceful with regard to the authorities.

[Question] Should the state guarantee the right to work for everybody?

[Schiltz] Even if it were to conduct a major policy of industrial renewal (I said: were), we would still have hundreds of thousands unemployed in the current sense of the word. The full employment theory is as dead as a doornail. The only outlook we have is on a society in which something like one-third of the available manpower can produce enough to keep society as a whole going. This requires a policy of just employment, but also of built-in unemployment. We will not only have to implement a general reduction of working hours, as Professor Syakens predicts, but we will have to handle several concepts at the same time. Among other things, we will once again have to turn a number of now unpaid jobs into wage earning jobs. Today's unemployed are not sauntering through the streets twiddling their thumbs. They are /doing something/ [in italics], but are not being paid for that. A country that would once again become a full-fledged competitor on the world market and which would have phased out its deficit, would once again be able to pay for this kind of labor (digging in the vegetable garden, putting up wallpaper for an aunt ...)

and include it in the real GNP. Then the danger of aggressive frustration would also disappear from society. But a well led state should also be able to handle even the unemployed residue; it must then recognise certain forms of social volunteer work, make it respectable and reward it.

Brainstorming

[Question] In your opinion, the Flanders should get the opportunity to set this up independently of Wallonia?

[Schiltz] Yes. I cannot see how all of this could be talked about with the Walloon unions of today or with the worn out Walloon employers. The only chance for success left lies with our own people.

[Question] The current government calls itself "predominantly" federalistic.

[Schiltz] Practice teaches otherwise. Even a measure such as the refunding of the BTW [Value-added Tax] to stimulate housing construction (and what could be more regional than that?), is brought about legally via an opinion from the council of state and an initiative of the central parliament. And where did you see any regional dimension at the National Labor Conference, where the famous consensus should after all have taken shape? I wonder what kind of picture a Flemish labor conference would have presented. In all of this, VESOK -- the Flemish Economic and Social Negotiation Committee -- was not even called upon to provide answers to questions which were asked at the conference. It is brainstorming, without semi-legal value.

[Question] Should the VU get back into the government?

[Schiltz] There is currently no reason for it, but I believe that the Flemish federalists should participate in the decision making surrounding the struggle against the crisis. As a matter of fact, there is a great need for a political group which is sufficiently detached from the old interest structures. They too will undoubtedly, in turn, become rigid; that is the way politics is, but for the time being ... If the renewal is not organized by the governments themselves, then the voters will have to look for it themselves. Alas, this could lead to strange developments: the voters of the Weimar republic looked for renewal in their own fashion... In our country, it has not yet come to such a political denial of politics, even though civilization has clearly become "more rightist": everything no longer has to be allowed or be possible, expressionist painting is back, and Van Ostaejen is experiencing a come back.

[Question] You are asking for a new consensus. The CVP [Social Christian Party], which is predominant in the Flanders, offers one high up on its banner. Is there still a need then for the VU to provide one?

[Schiltz] The CVP may not be able to detach itself from its pillar interests, embodied in its unions, its health insurance funds, its financial and farmers organizations, etcetera. Are we really aware of how brittle they now are? I can imagine that 5 years or so from now, even these apparently powerful elements of society may have been completely washed away. Gone. That they will no longer be able to give the people the minimum for which they were established.

[Question] Isn't the VU already old too? What "new pattern" should one turn to here?

[Schiltz] The generation to take care of the changeover is available. The generation which has been at it for 20 years is on the way out. The second line can only hope now that it will not be pushed and compelled into a wrong corner by the Flemish Movement as a whole.

B463

CSD: 3105

ECONOMIC RECOVERY PLAN CHANGED, SATISFIES UNIONS

Brussels LE SOIR in French 10 Jan 81 p 2

[Article by J.V.H.: "Administration Retains Essential Aspects Of Its Plan But Gives Moral Satisfaction to Labor Unions"]

(Text) The administration has at last accepted three amendments from its own majority to its recovery plan. One amendment is still up in the air. The deputies and senators of the Social-Christian coalition had introduced some scores of amendments! After a series of hectic meetings among the delegation leaders of the majority parties, a ministerial committee on general policy finally achieved a breakthrough. As we shall see, these three amendments do not in any way modify the economy behind the project—as the premier had wished it. On the other hand, they do give the labor union organizations a certain degree of moral satisfaction.

The administration first of all accepted an amendment by virtue of which the provisions concerning the moderation in revenues would be eliminated if an agreement among the various worker categories should take place prior to 15 February 1981, producing an equivalent effect in the matter of wage moderation as compared to the effect provided for by the bill. By virtue of this fact, the administration then gave the social partners one last chance to arrive at an agreement between the worker categories prior to 15 February.

Wage Schedule Increases

The second amendment adopted by the administration called for accepting wage schedule increases in the private sector "if they are compensated, as they are in the public sector, by other forms of moderation."

"These are moderations which must be agreed upon prior to 1981 in a committee based on equal representation in connection with which a royal decree, adopted by the cabinet, prescribes the degree of equivalence." We know that the administration in its plan had provided that, in the private sector, all salaries higher than 35,000 francs gross be irremediably frozen and that they be simply indexed which means that all of the collective bargaining agreements already concluded, including the wage hikes and the wage scales, are no longer applicable. Identical measures had been provided for the public sector but one problem sprang from the fact that, for

civil servants, the career aspect and the calculation of retirement pay is intimately tied to the development of the wage scale. The administration then announced that it would pay the biennial amounts parallel and that it would pledge, prior to 15 January, to implement a measure applicable to civil servants which would have the same effect.

Through its new amendment, the administration allowed the continuation of all agreements in progress and the wage hikes provided for in the private sector but reserved itself the right to take a moderation measure for the public sector identical to the one it had provided earlier.

Result of Income Moderation

The third amendment accepted by the administration more particularly concerns the result or yield from the income hold-down. This amendment provided for the funds deriving from this hold-down to be used obligatorily for the promotion and protection of jobs. This amount remains in the enterprise and its use must be the subject of an agreement either within the enterprise council or, if there is none, with the labor union delegation, and, if there is no such delegation, after coordination with the worker organizations. If no agreement is possible, the dispute is brought before the appropriate parity commission.

Finally, the amendment furthermore states that, if there is no agreement prior to 31 December 1982 on the amounts due for 1981 and prior to 31 December 1982 for the amounts due for 1982 [as published], these amounts must be turned over to a solidarity fund whose operation the king will determine. In no case, the amendment states further, can the yield from this hold-down be distributed by the enterprise among the workers or among the stockholders.

The administration's plan provided for all of the savings resulting from its plan to be accounted for separately in each enterprise and for the employers to have to inform the enterprise representatives about this. Parallel to that, the labor unions wanted to make sure that the amounts received would be collected in a national inter-category fund managed equally and allocated exclusively to the promotion of jobs. The solution in summary is a middleway between the two formulas.

This leaves us with one amendment concerning the crisis tax which did not get the approval of all of the majority parties. The delegation leaders must get together with the administration again on that score this coming Friday. Another issue which likewise has not been resolved involves the De Wulf in the matter of unemployment, which was worked out at the end of the year.

There is however one plus for the administration: The employment commission adopted the bill pertaining to social security and welfare in 1981 by 14 votes against three, with one abstention. The Flemish socialists had reintroduced an amendment aimed at eliminating the 13th and 14th months of family allowances for families having incomes of more than 1.25 million francs per year.

The amendment was finally withdrawn. The Interior Committee likewise on Thursday evening adopted the bill establishing a solidarity contribution to be collected

from persons who are directly or indirectly paid by the public sector; the majority was able to win out over the opposition while the VU [People's Union] abstained.

The Senate approved three bills, one on tax fraud, the other two on pensions.

PRL: A "Ridiculous" Plan

The parliamentary delegation of the PRL [Party of Liberty and Walloon Reform] in turn decided to vote against the eight parts of the recovery law which it considered "ridiculous and discriminatory" and "which would not in any way make it possible to implement the anticipated revival and the promised recovery." The liberal members of parliament filed not only amendments but also counterproposals.

The groups also denounced the "haste and disorder prevailing during the submission of the administration's bills."

The parliamentary delegation of the PS estimates that the solidarity efforts must involve cumulative incomes, not just incomes taken separately. As for the bill aimed at reducing the number of hospital beds, no decision could be made without prior consultation of the hospital planning board.

5058

CSO: 3100

ECONOMIC RECOVERY PLAN ACCEPTED BY GOVERNMENT MAJORITY

Brussels LE SOIR in French 15 Jan 81 pp 1, 2

[Article by J. Ly: "Recovery Plan Revised By Parties Reconciles Majority"]

[Text] High incomes will pay more for unemployment. It seems definitely that the discussions prior to the voting in parliament on the government's recovery law will close on the basis of this decision. This undoubtedly is a victory for the prime minister who on Tuesday had to produce a blend of water and fire, the CVP (Social Christian Party) and the SP (Socialist Party).

The agreement on lifting the ceiling on unemployment compensation will not cost terribly much. Each month, it will, for example, trim a gross income of 71,000 F [Belgian francs] by 220 F. But politically and symbolically speaking, this decision represents a relative failure of the chairman of the CVP, Mr Tindemans, who on Tuesday noon proclaimed his definite hostility to any new amendment to the anti-crisis law. As for Mr Van Miert, chairman of the SP and champion of the "crisis tax" on the rich, he had, starting on Monday, been watering the wine down, talking about "contributions," instead of mentioning the word taxes and indicating that he was inclined toward a discussion. Did he do that out of a concern for avoiding a frontal clash with Tindemans or to win the sympathy of the managerial personnel among the voters whom the big Flemish parties are fighting over?

Starting Wednesday morning in the Chamber, and Thursday, in the Senate, the members of parliament will, in public session, have to discuss a bill which the administration has copiously amended itself. There have been some basic changes, compared to the initial bill. The basic principle of certain schedule hikes in the private sector was accepted, with restrictions, as was the principle of starting an employment aid fund, made up of the yield to be derived from moderation. A door was kept open with respect to the social partners from which a solid agreement--today however improbable--would drop the mini-law on the freeze. One week of endless discussions involving just four basic corrections--that, it seems, is the price that will have to be paid for a political agreement within the administration.

Unlimited Unemployment Contribution

There will not be any "crisis tax" to be collected from taxpayers whose annual net incomes exceed 1.5 million francs. This suggestion from the PS in effect was dropped in favor of another amendment drafted by the administration itself and designed

to be added to the recovery program draft; it received the approval of the four majority parties, including the CVP.

According to this amendment, the wage ceiling for workers in the private sector, on the basis of which the unemployment contribution would be calculated, would be eliminated and that calculation hereafter would have to be based on the total earnings considered.

The last of the eight administration recovery projects relative to fiscal measures and social contributions thus got the "green light" Tuesday evening from all of the majority parties. One response which was longer in coming than the others was the response from the CVP to the extent that--during meetings between the administration and the leaders of the parliamentary delegation of its majority--certain delegation leaders had hinted that the Flemish Social-Christians had expressed some reluctance.

The arrangements finally accepted, except for a last-minute snag, by all administration parties are contained in an amendment which the administration itself attached to the initial draft of Mr Dhoore, minister of social welfare. This first draft provided for the unemployment contribution for workers in the private sector to be fixed at a rate of 0.9 percent of the wage which had a ceiling of 65,000 francs (with an indexed rise which today would be 71,800 francs); we recall that right now the rate is 1.2 percent and that the wage ceiling is at 34,750 francs.

The administration amendment calls for lifting the ceiling on the contribution whose rate is maintained at 0.9 percent. This measure was to earn something like [illegible in photostat 750?] million additional francs for the government in 1981. However, since the application of the new calculation method was to begin only on 1 April, the "intake shortfall" for the first 3 months of this year would be compensated by a rise in the rate to 0.95 percent although this would be reduced back to 0.9 percent starting in 1982.

It must furthermore be noted that the removal of the ceiling will remain applicable so long as the number of unemployed exceeds the threshold of 300,000 as of 1 September of the year prior to a return to the new ceiling system.

The Independents

Other provisions in this administration amendment concern the supplementary contributions which will be collected from the independents. Initially fixed at an amount of 3.6 billion francs, they were raised to 3.8 billions even before the introduction of the bill into the Chamber. Only for the means for attaining that amount remain to be spelled out; that will be the task of Middle Class Minister Jose Desmarets, since the philosophy behind the entire undertaking is to demand a greater effort from those people who draw the highest incomes. That is what remains to be determined for the self-employed workers, whereas the administration estimates that it has reached the end regarding the private sector and the public sector.

But this solution, presented by the administration to the delegation leaders on Tuesday morning, must yet be favorably and unanimously received by them. Consultations thus took place in the four majority parties during the morning while a new meeting with the administration was scheduled for the afternoon.

By the end of the afternoon, the delegation leaders of the majority parties left Loi Street 16. Agreement on the administration proposals was in sight at that time. Mr Brouhon, leader of the socialist delegation in the Chamber, estimated that a decision would be made in favor of the administration amendment but added that the CVP was still somewhat reluctant.

The Flemish Social-Christians were supposed to get their head office together early in the evening, before adopting a final attitude. Mr Tindemans, chairman of the CVP, whom we had met prior to that meeting, at that time formally denied that his party was in the least reluctant regarding the administration's proposal. "It seems to me on the contrary quite evident," he told us, "that two delegation leaders cannot by themselves shoulder the responsibility of committing their party on issues as serious as those of the mandatory loan, for example."

The CVP chairman, who had been kept up to date on the development of negotiations among the delegation leaders and the administration, estimated that it was only normal for his party's authorities to comment on the basis of a full knowledge of what was involved, after having heard from the ministers concerned, including Messrs Eyskens, minister of finance, and Dhoore, minister of social welfare.

The delegation leaders of the majority parties gave the administration an agreement, with the express reservation that their "yes" would have to be confirmed by the authorities of their respective parties; according to what in circles close to the premier was called an "ad referendum" procedure, a "no" from only one of the four partners would be sufficient to endanger the entire content of the agreement that had been worked out.

CVP Says "Yes"

Shortly after 1900, the response from the CVP head office became known: as had been anticipated, it was favorable. Chairman Leo Tindemans explained the adoption of this position: "We can accept this administration amendment because it does not involve any new taxes. For us, this point was an essential condition for our agreement. On the other hand, this is a measure of solidarity which to us seems balanced within the framework of the administration's recovery plan." Questioned as to what had motivated the administration to introduce this amendment, itself, to its own bill, the CVP chairman was content with replying: "The premier accepted this modification to his plan undoubtedly in order to save the furniture or the crockery."

The discussions on the various bills introduced by the administration begins this Wednesday in public session in the Chamber. We will undoubtedly see then what the chairman of the Flemish Social-Christians means precisely by "saving the furniture." It is not impossible that the Flemish Socialists of Karel Van Miert, after the failure of their "crisis tax," might be tempted to play the role of snipers. This is one assumption which the happy smile of the premier on Tuesday night however seemed to rule out.

S058
CSO: 3100

FAEROES' PRIME MINISTER: PARLIAMENT TO GET MORE POWER

Copenhagen BERLINGSKE TIDENDE in Danish 27 Dec 80 p 2

[Article: "Faeroese Nonsocialist Government in Early January"]

[Text] Early in the new year Faeroes will have a nonsocialist government with Pauli Ellefsen, chairman of the Union Party, as prime minister. Jørgen Sundstein, chairman of the People's Party, was designated speaker of the Lagting [Parliament] as early as on 24 November.

At the 6 November election 60 percent of the voters voted for the four nonsocialist parties. After a round of formal negotiations, three of these parties on 30 November began negotiations on formation of a nonsocialist cabinet to replace 6 years of Social Democratic control of the cabinet. The three parties are: the Union Party, the largest party in the islands, which hold three seats; the third largest party, the People's Party, with six seats; and the small Moderate Old Home Rule Party, with three seats. Together, they control 17 of the Lagting's 32 seats.

"We have now reached agreement in principle on the coalition," says Pauli Ellefsen to BERLINGSKE TIDENDE. "Early next week negotiations will continue concerning division of committee positions and cabinet positions. In the cabinet we are aiming at five, as against six at the present time. The Home Rule party will have one, and each of the larger parties, the Union Party receiving the premiership.

In filling the committee posts we shall place great stress upon strengthening the work of the Lagting; we wish to break the tendency toward increasing the power of the premier which we have seen during the past 6 years of government under the social-democratic stamped government.

The negotiations have now reached a stage in which there should be no difficulties in principle, but they cannot be concluded until early next year," Pauli Ellefsen concluded.

11,236
CSO: 3106

FOUR LEADERS OF ANTI-EC GROUP IN EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT ARE OUTCASTS

Copenhagen BERLINGSKE TIDENDE in Danish 2 Nov 80 p 13

[Article by Solveig Rodsgaard: "The Four Negativists"]

[Text] "The four negativists" is what their colleagues call the four members of the Parliament of Europe who represent the Folkebevaegelse [People's Movement] against the EC. People are aware of their presence, but they do not count on them because they have chosen to play according to their own rules.

The four individuals whom the People's Movement against the EC has placed in the Parliament of Europe have been isolated. Most of the other Danish members of the Parliament of Europe do not want to have anything to do with them--not even privately --and they themselves are to blame for this, some the Danes believe.

After their first appearance, in July 1979, when the fact that four out-and-out opponents of the EC, without blushing, had established themselves among the members of the Parliament of Europe to throw sand into the machinery attracted attention, interest in the novelty of the situation declined among Parliament members from other countries.

But after Else Hammerich (BF [expansion unknown]) recently began reporting on closed meetings--most recently from a consultation with Gaston Thorn in the Parliament's political committee--and after Jens-Peter Bonde, in reference to an old working paper on uniform compensation for members of the Parliament, talked about putting through tremendous increases in pay, that interest has been increasing again. But not exactly in a positive way, and most of the other Danish members of the Parliament feel ill-treated and are holding themselves very much aloof in order to avoid being lumped with the four.

Furthermore, it has also been observed, outside the Danish members' circle, that Else Hammerich has broken the rules regarding the preservation of secrecy. There will be another consultation with Gaston Thorn during the coming week, and it is expected that the matter will be raised at that time.

The four individuals from the People's Movement are the teachers' college lecturer Else Hammerich, who is on leave from her job and is working full-time as a member of the European Parliament and for the People's Movement; Dean Jorgen Bogh, who now has gone on half-time status in his position in Aarhus; the author Sven Skovmand

and the Sven Skovmand and the editor Jens-Peter Bonde, who is very active with the People's Movement's newspaper, DET NY NOTAT [The New Note].

Politically, it is a heterogeneous group. Else Hammerich describes herself as independent but is believed to fall into the vacuum between the SF [Socialist People's Party] and the VS [Left Socialist Party]. Jorgen Bogh has been expelled from the Social Democratic Party. Sven Skovmand is a former Radical Liberal Party member of the Folketing. Jens-Peter Bonde is a superactive member of the Communist Party of Denmark.

The Danish members of the Parliament of Europe from the other parties do not doubt that it is Jens-Peter Bonde who runs the group. He is energetic and capable as a member of the Denmark Communist Party in the leadership of the People's Movement. The People's Movement group of Parliament of Europe members itself repudiates the idea that anyone would suggest that it is following a communist line. Their behavior is noticed there. "But people do not count on them. People in the European Parliament are irritated with them. They are destroying working morale. Their behavior is ill-bred and boorish. They shout and scream and want to make a mockery of the rules of procedure," it is said. That is how they are characterized by some of the other Danes, and they also think that their behavior in the Parliament resembles "that of Gilstrup and a number of progressive people when they came into the Folketing in 1973. They want to establish the rules of the game at their own discretion."

"The four negativists," as they are also called, mostly are connected with the SF's Bodil Boserup and the member from Greenland, Finn Lynge. They are also seen privately now and then. But the Social Democrats would not touch them with a ten-foot pole. The wound resulting from the Social Democratic Party's defeat in the parliamentary election in June 1979, when it was especially the People's Movement which profited among the Social Democratic Party's voters, has not yet healed.

In the Parliament of Europe, the four individuals from the People's Movement stay away from the six existing political groups, but instead they have joined a technical group fellowship with 7 other people: a Belgium radical, an Irishman and 5 from the Italian left wing. As a result, the four Danes benefit from a number of technical and economic facilities which are given to the 11-member group. Money comes from the Parliament and is administered by the People's Movement. That is observed with a shake of the head by the other Danish members of the Parliament. The phrase "a double moral standard" is on their lips.

The four individuals from the People's Movement get about a third of the money the technical group obtains. For 1981, it is budgeted at 600,000 kroner, with half of that to be used for maintaining .. and "political activity." In addition to that, there is approximately 25,6 .. per month of secretariat assistance per month and approximately 56,000 kroner a month for private secretaries. Subsistence allowances and travel allowances from the Parliament of Europe are also administered by the People's Movement.

Compensation for the Danish members of the Parliament of Europe is paid in this country, and it matches that of members of the Folketing, plus the largest of the tax-free supplements to cover expenses which Folketing members in the provinces

receive, which, at the moment, is a good 151,000 kroner, plus a supplement of approximately 42,500 kroner. The People's Movement members of the European Parliament must not make more than they did before they became members of the Parliament, but they also must not lose any of it. Their tax returns for 1978 constitute the basis for calculation. If they are making more now as members of the Parliament of Europe, the surplus is to be handed over to the People's Movement.

Else Hammerich, who is the political spokeswoman, does not feel frustrated over working in the Parliament as an opponent of the EC. "I would say it the other way around," she says. "If I took the work in the Parliament very seriously, I would be deeply frustrated, but we exert ourselves primarily herein this country. Matters from the European Parliament are to be brought forward here at home so that there can be a debate. That is what we are doing. It is difficult at the beginning. It is always difficult to become known in the press. But now we have gotten debates about the working environment, the question of education and higher wages started which it is difficult to get passed with Danish support."

Else Hammerich is also not disturbed by the fact that she is criticized sharply for reporting on closed committee meetings. "I will continue to do that, but we will never report anything which could damage the Danish government's negotiating position in the budget or agricultural areas, for example. But there is nothing legal in the rules for committee work which can prevent reporting what goes on. The Folketing is democratic; the Parliament of Europe is undemocratic. It is not something I can take seriously, and I have often reported on what went on in closed and secret meetings. Furthermore, the political committee is like a sieve. There are 41 members, plus deputies and secretaries, and everything comes out."

Else Hammerich denies DKP [Communist Party of Denmark] influence. "I do not believe that any journalist will be able to maintain successfully that Jens-Peter Bonde has conducted DKP policy through the People's Movement," she says. DKP members are very loyal, but if Jens-Peter Bonde appears to be the most active of us four it is because he is a member of the Budget Committee and gets many chances to speak. And he also is an old journalist himself, so he is able to get into contact with journalists. Then Skovmand, too, has a lot more political experience than Jens-Peter Bonde because he has been a member of the Folketing. Jorgen Bogh is masterful, and I have the courage of my convictions, so it is not a matter of dominance by a particular political party. "We are very much aware that we should conform to the basic principles which resulted in our being elected, and there is no danger that we will go back on our principles, cutting across party lines as they do. Instead, the danger lies in the possibility that we might slack off on them, meaning that we might perhaps become a bit more adaptable and a little more colorless. But we avoid that through very intensive cooperation with the People's Movement's active local committees. We see the uncompromising line at their meetings."

"Is there a gulf between the actual situation in the Parliament and that in the local committees?" she asks. "No, actually there is not. But it seems to me that I have become a different person than I was when I was a member of a local committee. That is somehow connected with the relationship between emotions and knowledge. My hitherto helpless rage has been replaced by knowledge. I just know more about how one can work against the EC. When one knows, then one can do something, so one is not powerless. We can make a contribution here at home, so that our ministers can display more backbone in the face of the Council of Ministers."

The four individuals from the People's Movement live in an apartment in Strasbourg in something like a collective. In the beginning, there were small domestic problems.

"There was a tendency to think that I should attend to the housework," says Else Hammerich. "I had to put my foot down to get a regular division of labor. That division of labor is in effect now. For instance, Skovmand always prepares breakfast. He is very domestic. And we have an unusually fine comradeship."

The entire Danish delegation was invited to the housewarming in the apartment last year. The Danes also got together for a Martinmas eve celebration last year, but the private get-togethers are now at an end. According to the other members of the Parliament, the conduct of the four in recent months of the Parliament, the conduct of the four in recent months gives no reason for the holding of joint Danish festivities.

PHOTO CAPTION

1. p 13. Else Hammerich: "The Folketing is democratic. The Parliament of Europe is undemocratic."

9266
CSO: 8113/0459A

GREENLAND GOVERNMENT DECENTRALIZATION, YOUTH ACT

Stockholm SVENSKA DAGBLADET in Swedish 23 Dec 80 pt III p 3

(Article by Eja Nilsson: "Risk of a Crash in the Polar Winter")

[Text] Nuuk (Godthab) in November. The snow was falling heavily during my first November days in Nuuk (Godthab) on Greenland's west coast, and it draped the entire town in white. Youths pulled on their fur-trimmed parkas and their brightly colored moon boots and the older generation their homemade fur-lined blouses and embroidered sealskin boots. It was already growing dark at 1600 and snowmobiles clattered around the streets with constant risk of colliding with taxis as they skidded around corners. Winter had come to Nuuk.

The "points office" is one of the most important institutions to Greenlanders today, more than 1 year after the arrival of self-government. It is there that each month they take their "punch cards" with 72 points, which is the alcohol ration for the month. That means 72 beers, or a lesser amount of wine or liquor.

Alcohol rationing, which was introduced one year ago, is their most concrete daily evidence of self-government, which on 1 May 1979 finally gave the Greenlanders real self-determination.

When one asks the man or woman on the street what they have noticed about self-government during the first year, many shrug their shoulders and say, "Don't know," or else they mention alcohol rationing as an example.

The Temperature is High (!)

But if one follows the Greenland press, and that is primarily the only national newspaper ATUAGAGDLIUTIT/GRONLANDSPOSTEN, which comes out once a week, one gets the impression that the political temperature on the world's largest island is high.

The debate is lively, and proposals and ideas come forth in a steady stream. One of the first proposals to come after self-government was that non-Greenlanders should have a "work permit" in order to work on Greenland. That has now been decided, and will go into effect in 1981. Behind this decision is naturally the old and long suppressed dissatisfaction that many of the approximately 10,000 Danes who live on

Greenland fill jobs which Greenlanders could just as well fill, while at the same time unemployment among Greenlanders is increasing.

"Now it is our turn to discriminate," jokingly said a Greenlander with whom I spoke.

This political life is something relatively new on Greenland. Heretofore the political debates have taken place in Danish, and the decisions have been made in Copenhagen, far from those who were affected by them. But during the 1970's young Greenlanders began to raise their voices, talk about self-determination, and form the first political parties.

Until 1953 Greenland was a Danish colony, but it was then changed to an "equal part of the Danish kingdom" with representatives in the Danish Riksdag in Copenhagen. In 1979 it was time for the next step on the way toward greater self-determination, and the so-called "home rule" which gives Greenlanders themselves the responsibility for many more matters in the public area.

We Take the Responsibility Ourselves

"How is self-government coming along," I asked the "head of government" Jonathan Motzfeldt, who received me in a red sweater, with a porcelain polar bear beside his desk.

"I think it is coming along well," he said optimistically. "During the first year we have set up our own administration with more Greenlanders in important positions. Perhaps the ordinary citizen has still not noticed so much self-government in his daily life, but the first change for us is that now it is serious--now we must really take the responsibility for our own country. Previously the Riksdag in Copenhagen made the decisions--now we must decide for ourselves what kind of a society we want."

He also said that what surprised him most after self-government was the activity and desire for initiative he saw in his countrymen.

"We politicians are offended by all the ideas, initiatives, and suggestions for improvement from people who write or come to us in person. It is clear that self-government has released much of the desire for initiative and responsibility which was suppressed during the time the Danes were up here. Previously, people wanted to talk to the Danish governor, who only spoke Danish. Today they can talk with leaders who speak their own language. I sense a positive spirit which bodes well for the future," concluded Motzfeldt, and my interview time with him was over.

A meeting of the Landsting was waiting for him--that is comparable to our Riksdag. Its 21 members meet twice a year.

Then they leave their jobs as fishermen, sheep farmers, hunters, trappers, teachers, or whatever they are and they go to the capital Nuuk by boat and by helicopter to conduct parliamentary business for 10 days.

The meeting of the Landsting resembles any parliamentary body, only in miniature, with long contributions which here on Greenland become even longer, since everything must be interpreted in Danish.

The Big Question

One of the big questions--as I understood from the interpreter--is membership in the European Community and the problems that would create with boundaries at sea and fishing quotas, which are decided at Brussels.

Many foreign trawlers fish off Greenland's coast, and the topic of conversation last summer on Greenland was the large German trawler which was caught red-handed by the coast guard with well-filled holds. They finally had proof of something that Greenland's fishermen had long suspected: that foreign fishermen often exceed their fishing quotas. The German trawler was escorted back to Nuuk where it was tried before a court.

"We will ask permission there in Brussels to fish here in our own waters," said Jonathan Motzfeldt grimly, pointing toward the sea.

Next year there will be a referendum on Greenland on membership in the EC.

In the referendum which preceded Denmark's entry into the EC--when Greenland automatically came in also--the majority of the Greenlanders were against membership in the EC.

Jonathan Motzfeldt also confirmed when I spoke with him that Greenland is on the way to new development and said that the Landsting had just decided that there would be an investigation to see if there is oil on the island.

They believe that they can not continue to import oil if there is oil on Greenland.

Heretofore the Siumut Party, which is the majority party, rejected all thought of developing possible oil discoveries. Siumut means "forward" and it can be characterized as a party with socialistic tendencies.

It was the discussion of possible oil discoveries which was the big topic of debate on Greenland in the 1970's, and it was also oil which almost caused the entire self-government effort to founder when Denmark, during the preparatory stages, demanded the right of control over natural resources. Today the natural resources of Greenland are a common concern between Denmark and Greenland, and both have reciprocal veto rights in such matters.

Many young Greenlanders express misgivings that Greenland will become the EC's "treasure house" if oil is discovered. Uranium has already been discovered in south Greenland, and a search for more is now taking place in a project which is partly financed by the EC.

There is concern also for the development which could follow an eventual oil discovery, and whether such development is really desirable.

In Two Directions

Development on Greenland is pointed today in two diametrically opposite directions. During the 1970's they worked for decentralization. The centralized industrial community was based on cod fishing, which the Danes tried to build up during the 1950's and 1960's, creating difficulties in several areas, with enormous social problems in the towns and shortages of cod. Therefore the slogan of the young during the 1970's was "Go back to your homes." This year the self-governing Landsting is investing many more millions for the construction of dwellings compared with before 1979 when the Danish Riksdag made the decisions.

But plans to search for oil point in the opposite direction--toward a widening of a centralized community with maintenance of high standards. Oil production and oil transport damage the animal life in the sensitive areas of the Arctic, forcing the hunters and trappers to move to the towns. Therefore an eventual oil discovery will probably determine Greenland's future development.

And an eventual oil discovery will in any case answer the question of how much self-determination the so-called home rule really means or if it is, as some critics say, that the Greenlanders have only received permission to take over the less important social areas, which are expensive to operate, while Denmark--with the EC in the background--continues to maintain its influence over that which really means something, namely the natural resources.

9287
CSO: 3109

COUNTRY FACES HIGHER UNEMPLOYMENT, REAL INCOME DROP

Stockholm SVENSKA DAGBLADET in Swedish 5 Jan 81 p 5

[Article by Per Sabroe]

[Text] Copenhagen (SVENSKA DAGBLADET)--This summer 250,000 Danes will be unemployed. The economic crisis in the country appears to be that extensive according to the economists' calculations. At present 200,000 Danes are unemployed, or 7 percent of all who are fit for work.

For 2 years 14,000 large and small concerns have been hurt by competition because they could not cope with the competition and the rising interest rates. Some 35,000 of their employees could not find new jobs.

In agriculture the number of forced auctions is increasing, even though the government has promised assistance to the most vulnerable in coping with their debts and the high interest rates.

In the housing market people are leaving their newly purchased houses; they cannot afford to make the payments when the interest goes up and it may cost nearly 10,000 Danish kroner to live in one's own home. In a new residential area in Tastrup 20 of 100 houses have been given up by their owners in the last few weeks. They were seized by distraining because the occupants could not pay or because they ran away from their debts at night leaving all their furnishings and household equipment behind. On the elegant seaside road between Copenhagen and Helsingør it was almost impossible to buy a house up to 2 years ago. Today there are hundreds for sale.

And it will get still worse in 1981, in the opinion of 72 percent of the Danes interviewed by Gallup and BERLINGSKE TIDENDE.

On the other hand, there are Danes that have enough money during the crisis. A record has been set in the amounts that it was possible to save or invest so as to be entitled to a deduction on the income tax declaration. The banks report that on New Year's Eve long lines formed to wait hours to make deposits. The Mercandia shipping firm, which has specialized in selling shares in ships, which also qualify for exemption, sold 350 million Danish kroner's worth of shares in December. On the next to last day of the year the demand was so great that ship-owner Per Henriksen of the Mercandia firm ordered a new boat quick as lightning

for 100 million Danish kroner at the Fredrikshavn shipyard to satisfy the demand.

Prime Minister Anker Jørgensen thinks the Danes' economy will improve but that there will be a number of small wage reductions during the year. The government also promises an effort against unemployment and declares at the same time that the big foreign debt will be less than anticipated as a consequence of the strict economy policy.

But still the government is approaching hard times in the first half of 1981, and practically every month threatens a government crisis.

In January the government and the opposition are in disagreement about a bill that would take away from the A.P. Møller shipping line large parts of the right to oil and natural gas in the North Sea. In February the government will come under crossfire on defense appropriations. The opposition wants a larger amount appropriated for defense.

The wage-agreement negotiations will come in March, and LO [Danish Federation of Trade Unions] boss Thomas Nielsen is threatening nationwide political strikes if the Folketing takes measures that prohibit, e.g., strikes in so-called vital areas --power plants and hospitals.

In April, as a disturbing element in the job market before the wage-agreement negotiations, the government will propose a profit-sharing law, which is a milder form of economic democracy, of which large parts of the opposition take a critical view.

In May it may be time to think about new taxes and expenditures that will be put before the Folketing.

8815
CSO: 3109

POLL SHOWS ONLY 33 PERCENT FAVOR EC

Copenhagen BERLINGSKE TIDENDE in Danish 29 Dec 80 p 7

[Article by Aager Schultz, director of the Gallup Institute: "Approval of EC as Low as Ever"]

[Text] At regular intervals the Gallup Institute conducts polls for elucidation of the attitude of the populace toward -- since 1971 -- Denmark's membership in the European Common Market.

In these polls a representative cross section of the adult population is asked the question:

"If today you were to vote on Denmark's membership in the EC, would you vote for or against Danish membership?"

In the following review is seen the result of the latest poll, taken in December, and for comparison the results of the earlier polls, taken after the referendum of October, 1972:

	For %	Against %	Don't know %	Total %
2 October 1972	57	33	10	100
February 1973	51	37	12	100
May 1973	46	43	11	100
October 1973	57	33	10	100
March 1974	42	42	16	100
May 1974	38	43	19	100
August 1974	31	53	16	100
October 1974	37	45	18	100
April 1975	40	41	19	100
August 1975	45	41	14	100
March 1976	40	43	17	100
May 1977	30	43	18	100
April 1978	40	37	23	100
February 1979	38	40	22	100
26-30 May 1979	33	46	19	100
December 1979	31	39	30	100
May 1980	36	43	21	100
December 1980	33	48	19	100

As is apparent from the table, the figures for December, 1980 are exactly the same as those for May 1979, at the time when the "election campaign" for the European election was in full swing.

It can therefore be said that the European election did not increase esteem for the Common Market in the Danish population, assuming that other events have not influenced the people, events such as the British Labor Party's position on British membership, or the current EC negotiations about agricultural and fisheries problems.

Together with the May figures, the December figures show the lowest favorable response since the referendum, with close to one half of the voters opposed to membership. From this it can be concluded that one half of the voters would vote for withdrawal from the EC if a referendum were to be held concerning withdrawal.

The result of the poll should be seen as an extension of earlier polls for elucidation of developments since October, 1972. Were a referendum to be conducted on continued membership or withdrawal, or other questions resulting from the current debate affected it, the result could very well be different.

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11.256
CSO: 3106

BRIEFS

SECURITY COUNCIL EXCLUDES PEACE ORGANIZATIONS--The organized peace movements will not be represented on the new security and disarmament council established by the government, said Foreign Minister Kjeld Olesen in an answer to Folketing Member Gert Petersen (SF.) The Foreign Minister assigns great importance to the council representing a broad spectrum of security and disarmament viewpoints, and representatives of all 10 parties in the Folketing are therefore included in the council. Many organizations have stated a desire to become members of the council, but a representative participation by these organizations would disrupt the council's framework and reduce its ability to perform, in Kjeld Olesen's opinion. [Text] [Copenhagen BERLINGSKE TIDENDE in Danish 29 Dec 80 p 7] 11,256

CSO: 3106

VYNNEN DISCUSSES PRESIDENTIAL RACE, COALITION OUTLOOK

Helsinki HELSINKIN SANOMAT in Finnish 2 Jan 81 p 12

[Text] Paavo Vayrynen, the Center Party chairman, is trying to tamper the speed of the presidential election race. Vayrynen announces in SUOMENMAA, the main organ of his party, that the question of the presidential candidate will not be taken up in the Center Party until the 1982 party convention at the earliest.

It is not necessary to take a stand even then, says Vayrynen. In his opinion, Kepu [the Center Party] could schedule an extraordinary convention in 1983 to decide on the presidential question. He emphasizes that his party is behind President Kekkonen as long as he is available.

Chairman Vayrynen also gave his opinion on the government coalition in the SUOMENMAA interview. According to him, the Center Party is satisfied with the way the Koivisto government is working.

Vayrynen says that the different parties' collaboration in the government has been very good as compared with the earlier majority governments of the 1970's. In his opinion, the Koivisto government has been subjected to excessive criticism. "Certainly the government has managed all the important matters at least satisfactorily."

Vayrynen also responds to the opinion expressed by the Social Democratic Party chairman, Kalevi Sorsa, just before Christmas that the end was in sight for the present government coalition.

Sorsa's evaluation is accurate in a certain sense, says Vayrynen, but it is superficial and only half-true. There is no doubt that the best days of the center-left cooperation were those when plentiful economic resources were available, says Vayrynen. "We no longer have the means to pull through costly reforms, neither is there any pressing need for them."

Vayrynen feels that for the smooth running of affairs it is important that the Center and Social Democratic Parties' government collaboration continues. He hopes that the pressures inside the parties will not succeed in shattering this collaboration.

Vayrynen also discussed the possibilities of widening the government base. "We have let it be known that the Center Party is ready to widen the base to the right. However, it has not been possible to realize these hopes because of opposition by the left."

According to Vayrynen, the left has announced that there are forces in the Conservative Party with which the left could not collaborate. The left has never revealed what these forces are, Vayrynen said.

9571
CSO: 3107

KOIVISTO: WOULD ACCEPT CONSERVATIVES IN COALITION

Helsinki SVOMEN KUVALEhti in Finnish 2 Jan 81 pp 28-31

[Interview with Prime Minister Mauno Koivisto by Juhani Aromaki, date and place not given]

[Text] Prime Minister Mauno Koivisto was out of sorts when he returned from a vacation in Yugoslavia in the fall. During that time, you see, the party newspaper made him the party's presidential candidate.

"Indeed, Sorsa explained this and stated that the intention was not bad..."

Now Mauno Koivisto is sitting in his office dominated by a Christmas quiet and is writing a short speech for the new year of 1981, which will be economically difficult, while making demands on the Bank of Finland and warning wage earners and their organizations not to tie their fate to agriculture.

Prime Minister Mauno Koivisto is wearing a sleeveless woolen vest. The temperature in the building has been reduced to 18°C in order to save energy.

"People come in and take their coats off in warm rooms. Indeed, we are still wasting energy in a senseless manner..."

Mauno Koivisto is browsing through dozens of Christmas cards, which the day's mail has brought. Someone has wished him "peaceful political times", and the Prime Minister makes a point of looking to determine who the sender is.

In 1980 the government hung seriously in the balance three times. He thinks that this year the government's existence and life will be evaluated several times.

In Mauno Koivisto's opinion conditions exist for the government to accomplish many achievements. There are no elections in the near future that would automatically interrupt the government.

"Once during the summer I calculated that I am in fifth place in the prime minister statistics, during the summer I went to fourth place, now I must say that I am in third place..."

He is interested in looking at the government's age statistics -- and laughs:

"One has to have some goals..."

Bank of Finland's Necessity

Since Mauno Koivisto is the Prime Minister, Ahti Karjalainen is handling the affairs of the Bank of Finland. Both men have their concern about the value of the Finnish markka.

Mauno Koivisto does not consider Finland's performance to be good since the rate of inflation has increased. If there had not been an exceptional increase in the price of liquor, the government could consider that inflation coincides exactly with the average level in OECD-countries. Now it is somewhat worse.

According to Mauno Koivisto this is what usually happens. Discussions about economic restoration in Finland have been going on for a long time since the unemployment rate is high. The signs of overheating were becoming rapidly evident.

"There is a great danger that expenditures this year will continue at the same rate..."

"The Bank of Finland, for its part, has emphasized that fiscal policy means have been exhausted. However, in my opinion results which are more conducive to restraining inflation can still be achieved by means of fiscal policy. Indeed, the price with respect to growth and employment is rather high."

In the Prime Minister's opinion the Bank of Finland will find it absolutely necessary more than ever before to conduct a tighter money policy if the results of labor contract negotiations turn out to be bad.

"Even if the Bank of Finland does not intend to sharpen any of its own means, the money markets will become tight..."

In the Prime Minister's opinion an ideal solution would be a postponed labor market solution, either for a year or 2 years, which, for its part, would aid in restraining inflation.

"There is reason to emphasize 'for its part'. If there is just an agreement between the central organizations, it will not mean much if the member unions do not adhere to it. And now there are many signs of such an intent..."

In Mauno Koivisto's opinion the floor should not now be raised too high since in any event an attempt will be made to raise some kind of a structure on it.

The Prime Minister has no worries about the fact that there is very little readiness in the labor organizations to understand the situation.

"It is not a question of problems concerning principle, but a question of how tenable agreements acceptable to the membership can be achieved."

Agriculture's New Bomb

Just as surely as a new year is coming, accelerated agricultural negotiations are also coming. And this year they are once again developing into a 200-million markka bomb.

"A generally accepted idea until now has been that only such production which meets domestic demand will be subsidized by the state. If there is a desire to produce more, then that portion will be paid for only at the world market price.

"According to the 3-year agricultural law agriculture was supposed to pare down its production to correspond with domestic demand. There are no ceilings, but agriculture must pay for overproduction itself..."

In the last supplementary budget for 1980 funds were provided for balancing production. The problem was to have been resolved with 30 million markkas.

"However, this amount will not bring about a balance, but next year a 200-million markka gap is becoming evident. In other words, the 30 million turn into 200 million..."

"When the budget was discussed in the government the Center Party emphatically emphasized that the views of the construction and production policy committees should be considered since funds were presented there for the agricultural development fund.

"The presumption of these committees was that agricultural overproduction will be restrained in the markets in order to save funds. Fewer funds were supposed to be needed, but even more are needed..."

"If the previous principles of agricultural policy are carried out, then this year will leave an awful legacy for the year 1982. I have been amazed that previously as far as agriculture is concerned there has always been a hurry to clarify the continuation of the agricultural income law."

A Gloomy Year

"The issue is now different. The producer has been rather disinterested in a continuation. The agricultural income law remains in effect until the end of the year -- and there is such a great difference of opinions -- this year will leave a heavy legacy for the next year. This is going to become a real bomb, not so much next spring's solution, which is already in itself difficult."

Pekka Oivio and Sulo Penttila are aware of this?

"They are aware. And so are the other central organizations.

"There are three alternative solutions. Agricultural questions are tied to the total solution and then agreement is reached on which is the best. The second best solution is that they are kept outside. The worst alternative is that they are tied to the total solution and no agreement is reached.

"The most important advice to the wage earners is that they do not tie their own fate to agriculture. As far as the agricultural solution is concerned the time will not run out at the end of February 1981..."

"If the labor organizations announce that they will reach an agreement only under the condition that the agricultural question is resolved, there is a danger that

wage earners will find themselves in a situation without an agreement without even attempting to do so."

According to the Prime Minister economic growth is probably at this time already at a standstill in the industrialized countries. The estimates concerning Finland's growth percentages for this year fluctuate between 2 and 4 percent.

"This year will be a gloomy one for us," states Mauno Koivisto.

"Growth or any other desirable development must be achieved with respect to ever smaller elements. Stricter economizing is now required at all levels. There is no room for expansiveness. We must now be poor."

Even though economic growth has come to a standstill, only some Finns know about real economic hardship and experience it daily in their stomachs.

"This is generally so in the world, neither the Swedes or the British live in any kind of poverty and misery," states the Prime Minister.

A Different Opinion than Sorsa

In a certain interview Chairman Kalevi Sorsa stated that the current government basis, this people's front, has eaten its provisions. More than 15 years of co-operation have consumed it.

"In my opinion the current government basis is capable of functioning. Of course, people in the government can always be changed -- and should be changed -- but the bourgeois majority in the parliament is a permanent phenomenon."

The Prime Minister does not say that he believes that next summer's Social Democratic Congress will have an effect on the complexity of daily politics for the time being.

"Party congresses in general activate the people and a discussion frequently becomes significantly more radical. Many questions become aggravated only to level off once again after some time has passed."

The Prime Minister continues to believe in the people's front's ability to function.

"In the Diet there are six nonsocialist parties, which thus make up a bourgeois majority. Even if they all began to support a single government, it would be disunited and would function with only a slight majority."

"Even though there are some attractive aspects in a majority vote system, it does, however, mean a rather weak continuity. It is, of course, more explicit when one or another party has all the power in its hands."

He cites as an example Sweden where a change of a few thousand votes would have meant a completely different government and policy.

"Dividing a nation down the middle causes many problems. This concentration of power by one or the other, the compulsory nature of this concensus-policy is of greater continuity."

"Politics, of course, becomes easily colorless and there are no great surprises. On the other hand, this does, however, lead to greater continuity and is evidently more effective."

Mauno Koivisto recalled the warnings of his colleagues that government negotiations are always the most expensive negotiations.

"If things disintegrate, everyone feels that he is in opposition. I had an exceptionally questionable joy in being the finance minister of a certain minority government. At that time the vast majority in the Diet had a definite desire to taste what it is like to be in opposition and to look at issues from that side of the fence."

One Must Have a Sharp Edge

Mauno Koivisto continues his arguments for a people's front. In his opinion the other alternatives are still worse even though the present course is nothing to be joyful about.

"If we did not have the present government basis, then what would it be? This is the big question.

"A bourgeois majority government is not likely. It could, however, be the hope of a certain leftwing party. Or that an attempt to govern would be made and it would fail at which time the leftwing would gain new impetus for its work.

"Perhaps a slightly more realistic concept would be a bourgeois minority government which would get its support from here and there. Even that would be difficult to imagine as a long-term solution. To the contrary, it would be most probable that the Herods and the Kaifas will find each other in the Diet.

"Even if there were a leftwing majority, obviously neither leftwing party has any interest in forming a leftwing majority government.

"After the 1966 elections we had a leftwing majority, and the great question immediately after the elections was how to include the Center Party. We had people who were for the formation of a leftwing majority government, but those who thought about the issues a little more could see that it would not become permanent.

"However it may go, we will probably always end up with the present type of government. Now whether this present government basis can survive the entry of the Conservative Party into the government in addition to the parties already in it or as a replacement to the Center Party is a different matter. Indeed, both alternatives are in principle possible, but from this viewpoint rather unlikely in practice."

According to Mauno Koivisto only significant election results can change the positions from what they are now. He also cannot see any of the "overall reasons" about which there is so much talk by some.

"I do not see any reason why the Conservative Party cannot be in the government -- and, indeed, it has been. I have nothing against the formation of a government in which the Conservative Party would be included," states Mauno Koivisto.

"It is a different matter as to why nothing came of this. As far as I know this primarily relates to the Social Democrats. The Social Democrats had to make a difficult choice: do they want to enter into a government with the Conservative Party if the Communists leave.

"I do not believe that one can easily find such an inclination in the Social Democratic Party. Since leftwing cooperation is as amicable as it is in many other areas than the government, under any normal circumstances one should not attempt to endanger it. I cannot imagine that the Social Democratic Party would choose the Conservative Party and attach more importance to this cooperation than to that with the leftwing."

It Is Indeed Irritating

Considerable attention was aroused before the 1980 local elections when the newspaper DEMARI made Mauno Koivisto a presidential candidate of the Social Democratic Party in a large front page article. The Prime Minister himself was on a vacation in Yugoslavia after an official visit.

"It was, indeed, irritating in that Sorsa had recently stated that it is correct not to bring too much attention to any one individual. It would, of course, be nice if we were consistent in such things in such a way that attention would not be drawn..."

A Dirty Trick?

"As Aarne Saarinen stated, that which was ill-considered on his part apparently, to a great degree, resulted from this.

"When I returned from Yugoslavia, Sorsa explained that no evil intent was intended by this article in DEMARI. Even I can now say that it did not significantly change the situation," states Mauno Koivisto and becomes silent for a moment.

"Well, what else is there to say..."

When the republic's largest newspaper printed the news about the Prime Minister's trip to the Soviet Union, this was also somewhat irritating for many reasons.

"It seems quite clear to me that if the President of the Republic has made an official visit to a certain country, then an official visit by a prime minister cannot be contemplated for a few years.

"An unofficial visit is something entirely different, but no agreement has been reached on such a visit. I have observed that if newspaper editors are convinced of something, no arguments will even be heard.

"It is especially irritating that the news is related without any question mark and in such a way that it is fact and not a presumption even though it is only a presumption..."

"And if it did not happen as was presumed in the news, then the fault does not lay with the news reporting, but 'some new complications have arisen'. Such articles also serve their own policies, by which possibly an attempt is being made to have a certain influence.

"It does not make any difference as long as it is a question of domestic matters -- even though even in this instance it is, of course, questionable news reporting -- but when it is a question of foreign relations then such news reporting, of course, arouses many questions in foreign countries."

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CSO: 3107

MAX JAKOBSON DISCUSSES RELATIONS WITH USSR, WORLD SECURITY

Stockholm SVENSKA DAGBLADET in Swedish 24 Dec 80 p 36

[Article by Ingmar Lindmarker: "In War Everyone Loses"]

[Text] The winds of the news are as cold as the winds blowing along the Esplanade in Helsinki, but Max Jakobson views the events of the day with a longer perspective. He is guarded about what can happen in Poland, yet he interprets what has happened and not happened heretofore as encouraging. He believes that Europe is in the process of developing a security system, not based on treaties or institutions, but on an interdependence which is recognized by all. In the long run that can give the nations of Europe a certain feeling of security.

The interview with Max Jakobson, the most internationally well-known Nordic diplomat, was conducted when the situation in and around Poland was most critical. An invasion seemed imminent, the headlines grew ominous, but then the voice of Finland's Jakobson spoke calmly about the functioning of a holy alliance in Europe. "It is significant that in this situation all parties have shown a strong desire to avoid actions which will disturb the stability of Europe," he said.

Max Jakobson was head information officer with President Kekkonen in Hawaii in 1961 when the Soviets suddenly requested military consultations with Finland. He has subsequently closely studied the so-called "crisis of the notes" and writes about it in his new book. Foreign Minister Ahti Karjalainen was sent to Moscow by Kekkonen. When Jakobson was later asked how he reacted when he received the Russian note at his cottage on the South Pacific island, he replied, "I went for a swim."

"There is no country in Europe at present which wants to use violence to try to change the existing European structure," said Max Jakobson. "They all have too much to lose if there should be a war."

"What has happened in Poland is symbolic in that regard. Everyone has behaved very carefully because nobody wants to disturb this system. The ideological antagonisms which have been prominent in the forefront have still not become the dominant factor."

Within a Distinct Framework

Jakobson believes that both the three inner and the three outer principal actors in the Polish crisis have shown evidence of unity and tried to hold their actions within a certain framework. Within the country they are the party, Solidarity, and the Catholic Church. Outside it is the Soviet Union with its ideological and political interests, the western lending banks, and on the political level the western powers.

"This is something new in international politics," said Max Jakobson. "It could not have been taken for granted in advance. It shows that perhaps a community of interests is growing in Europe which crosses over ideological boundaries."

Poland a Touchstone

"But Poland is a touchstone," he added. "The effort to renew the Polish system in a democratic direction and on the basis of national unity without provoking the Soviet Union's security interests can collapse and lead to a setback for the entire process. If that happens there will be fear that the powers of darkness will gain the upper hand, the very forces which fear a European alliance of ideologies."

Max Jakobson stands out as Finland's international spokesman. Therefore what he says about Poland is significant, in that he, more clearly and logically than most, has interpreted and more precisely expressed that small European nation's right and possibility to form its own policies in the shadow of a superpower.

Public Relations Office in the Center of Helsinki

The environment of the interview was surprising. It was not the Foreign Ministry's formal rooms, but a business office in the center of Helsinki. The ambassador received us as the chief of something called the Commercial Delegation, an organization which not even usually well-informed Finns can satisfactorily define, but which can briefly be described as a coordinating and public relations office for business.

Yet it is here that almost all western journalists and political observers come to get an explanation of Finland. Max Jakobson is a master of precise explanation of foreign affairs. It is he who, with convincing elegance and originality, dissects such topics as "finlandization" and "self-censure."

Finland Always New!

"The irritating thing is that foreign observers always discover Finland as something new," he said. "They come here knowing nothing of the country. Could you imagine a foreign chief editor coming to England without knowing anything about Churchill?"

What is known about the 57-year-old Jakobson is that six years ago he retired from a brilliant diplomatic career. It was slowed by only one setback, which perhaps is felt that much harder. That was when the Russians obstructed his candidacy for the post of secretary general of the UN, and chose Waldheim instead.

"Disappointment? Yes, of course. It was a complicated story. I will write about it some day."

He is suave, with a quick and easy smile, but he keeps his distance. He would rather talk about Poland than about his disappointment as an individual.

The explanation of why Moscow said "nyet" to this cool, intellectual, urbane Finn can perhaps be found by the reader in his two previous books, "Vinterkrigets diplomati" [Diplomacy in the Winter War] and "Egna vagar" [My Own Ways].

In the Academic Book Shop on the other side of the street from the anonymous delegation's office, stacks of Max Jakobson's latest book are melting in the 1980 Christmas rush.

Line in the Water

The title is translated as "A Line in the Water." It comes from a Kennedy quotation, "The line which separates domestic policies from foreign policies is as indistinct as a line drawn in water."

That fits Finland. Kekkonen could have said it. It was President Kennedy who had Max Jakobson seriously try to explain Finland's policies for a greater public. Chief of Information Jakobson from Helsinki met Kennedy before Kekkonen's trip to the United States in 1961, and was amazed when the American president disclosed how little he knew.

Why is Finland Still There?

"Why has the Soviet Union allowed Finland to retain its independence?" asked Kennedy.

Almost 20 years later Jakobson continues patiently to unravel the Finnish riddle. Kennedy's question, he said, applied to Finland, but most small nations have the same problem, namely being regarded as objects of superpower politics.

"We still have a certain freedom of action, and we choose between alternatives. That is not unique with Finland. Almost all small nations desire to survive and retain their independence."

National Foundation

"In today's world situation that is a very important factor. We have slowly discovered that ideologies do not have the same power as nationalism. It is nationalism which is the fundamental motivation for most people, not ideology. Just look at Poland..."

When nationalism again shows itself to be a vital force, is there not a risk of isolationism and protectionism?

Defensive Nationalism

"Yes, that has already happened. It is also a big problem in our countries, that a new type of protectionism is growing. The nationalistic reaction against integration and internationalization which has taken place can take ugly forms, such as the Iranian revolution."

Max Jakobson sees counterreactions also in societies such as Finland and Sweden. It is a different form of nationalism than the aggressive kind of the 1930's. Now it is more defensive, and arises mostly among small nations when their national identity is threatened by internationalization.

But what does the internationalist and world citizen think of this?

"I think that if one deals only with foreign policies and international questions one becomes more and more aware that the order of things in the world, such as it is, has its roots in national states, and that international society and cooperation happens because of national interests."

The new type of nationalism does not need to be a negative phenomenon. Jakobson would rather see it as a necessary reaction against an internationalism which has expanded without anyone being able to control it. And it will gain new momentum with the technical advances in communication which lie just ahead.

"What will this lead to if it continues?" asks Max Jakobson. "What will happen to Finland? Will this be some kind of politically and culturally underdeveloped country?"

Identity Difficult to Preserve

"If we do not beware of unchecked internationalization, primarily in the cultural area, it will be difficult to preserve our identity. There is talk now of even greater political units, but I am not at all sure that that would be good. Are we to fall into the fate of being a part of the periphery of Central or West Europe, having decisions made for us from far away?

"The line runs through the water, straight but vague, national and international, domestic and foreign. The questions are rhetorical. That in itself is the basic reason why Finland will never allow itself to be ruled from afar."

The 1961 Crisis of the Notes--New Theory

In his new book Max Jakobson will relate a partly new theory about the 1961 crisis of the notes. It was at that moment in the post-war years when Finnish nerves seemed to be quavering, since Khrushchev had requested military consultations according to the pact with Finland on friendship, cooperation, and mutual assistance.

Jakobson has gone through the entire stenographic protocol, three thick volumes in English, from the Soviet party congress in the fall of 1961. He has learned that the note to Finland probably had some connection with a conflict within the party leadership which arose during the party congress.

That sounds like a flimsy explanation for someone to come up with, but not when it is Max Jakobson's political opinion. Relations between the Soviet Union and Finland are not flimsy, on the contrary they are stable. Soviet policies toward the Nordic countries are, according to him, extremely careful and conservative. Soviet policies have been consolidated. Finland is considered a part of the European system and Finland's situation can not be disturbed without disturbing the entire system.

But about the Soviet attacks on Norway? And are not feelings sometimes irritated between Oslo and Helsinki just because relations with the Soviet Union are so different?

"Norwegians are always a little afraid that they will not get help if something should happen," said Jakobson. "We are afraid that we will get help. In this way our lines get crossed each time the Norwegians do something like advance weapons storage."

Gentle smile. A friendly little diplomatic needle to the brothers on the other side of Sweden.

Like other Finns, Jakobson has a tendency to tie his country's security less to the Nordic area, and more to Europe and the east-west balance. Nordic cooperation is nice, but limited. The tendency to always speak of the Nordic countries as a separate entity can be misleading. We have not succeeded with Nordic solutions, neither economically nor strategically.

Both Finland and Sweden contribute initiatives to disarmament. For Max Jakobson, recently named director of the Stockholm-based Research Institute for Peace (SIPRI), these are lawful and necessary suggestions, but a pre-condition for disarmament is to have a functioning international security system.

"Only within such a system can confidence be created and fear avoided. It is necessary to induce nations to feel secure without weapons. We are a long distance from that."

Effective security systems have heretofore been based on power. The Roman Empire, the European solutions after the Napoleonic Wars are examples.

The idealistic efforts to create security after the world wars, League of Nations and United Nations, did not become what had been hoped for.

In the 1960's, said Max Jakobson, a security system was gradually formed which was based on cooperation between the Soviet Union and the United States. That which we call detente aims at such cooperation and contains several elements:

- The strategic balance of power between the superpowers with accompanying agreement on limitation of arms.
- Non-proliferation agreement which is in the common interest of both.
- A settlement on Germany and acceptance of the status quo in Europe.

- A vague understanding not to let conflicts in the third world become a danger to cooperation between the two, to limit such conflicts via the UN, and to draw back and prevent their spreading.

- An unwritten agreement that China will remain outside that security system.

"Now it can be said that this system of cooperation has broken down, or in any case weakened and become less functional," said Jakobson. "That is because almost all the elements on which the system was based have changed."

- A strong American opinion exists that conditions of strength have changed to the Soviet advantage.

- Rapid developments in weapon technology mean that, for example, SALT is not as important as before.

- The principle of non-proliferation of nuclear weapons is becoming more difficult to maintain.

- Conflicts in the third world can not be controlled or limited.

- China can not be kept out of relations between the superpowers. On the contrary China is actively engaged in efforts to destroy them.

- The only thing remaining is the status quo in Europe. Therefore one can say that Europe continues to be the quiet corner of the world.

Weaknesses in the United States

Max Jakobson believes that the weakening of international security is largely due to the fact that the superpowers no longer have the same power as previously. The dependence of the United States on oil from the Middle East, the decline of the dollar, doubts abroad about the political will of the United States, and lack of consistency in foreign policy are obvious weaknesses.

The Soviets are weakened by increasing uncertainty over the leadership after Brezhnev, by exhaustion of their ideological power, by stagnation of the economy, and by uncertainty over the security situation in East Europe, particularly Poland.

Terror Only Security

There is one exclusive reason which brings balance to the events in Poland and Europe. Our only security in the world is called the balance of terror.

"In spite of detente and the security system which existed at the end of the 1960's and early 1970's, armament continued without a pause," said Jakobson. "In some ways it has its own dynamism, and is independent of political circumstances."

"The frightening thing is that what is now happening threatens to destroy the entire balance of terror and cause destabilization. A really effective defense

against missiles is said to be on the way, and that would change the entire SALT concept. A means of localizing and destroying submarines would have the same effect."

The world does not seem very pretty from the viewpoint of the Commercial Delegation in Helsinki. But Max Jakobson is not one to talk in such terms as optimism and pessimism. He is the cool observer who calculates the risks and knows the pattern of action.

As indistinct as a line drawn in water...

In his new book he relates a story about the inscrutable Dag Hammarskjold. He was in Paris for negotiations on the Marshall Plan, and reported by telephone to Stockholm. An official in the Foreign Ministry became alarmed that Hammarskjold spoke openly about confidential matters--what if the Russians were listening?

An older colleague calmed him down. "If we can not understand what Hammarskjold is saying, how can the Russians understand?"

Perhaps the story has an application in Helsinki.

To speak clearly on politically sensitive subjects has become Max Jakobson's specialty. He is carefully listened to in both east and west. Both sides have shown that they understand what he says.

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CSO: 3109

BRIEFS

KOIVISTO: PRESENT COALITION SOUND--Prime Minister Mauno Koivisto (Social Democratic Party) believes that the present center-left coalition is sound. Koivisto said on the radio on Monday that he believes the present coalition will last until the next elections. According to Koivisto, the development after that will also depend on the election results, but a coalition of the present kind is likely to continue even after the elections. The radio interview with Koivisto indicated that he disagrees with the chairman of his party, Kalevi Sorsa. Sorsa said just before Christmas in his numerous birthday interviews that it appears the government coalition's end is in sight. Contrary to Koivisto, Sorsa predicted that domestic politics are drifting towards a state of instability. Also on Monday's radio, Prime Minister Koivisto expressed his stand on the difficult energy problems. According to the prime minister, Finland is one of the countries most dependent on import energy, and "it is a weakness we have to keep in mind." According to Koivisto's estimates, the hopes of substituting domestic peat for energy imports should be abandoned. Koivisto sees the future as insecure, because in his opinion we can no more look forward to a time of steady growth. In the prime minister's opinion, past steady progress is going to be followed by a period of shifts back and forth. [Text] [Helsinki HELSINGIN SANOMAT in Finnish 30 Dec 80 p 10] 9571

CSO: 3107

DEFENSE BUDGET FOR 1981 DISCUSSED IN DETAIL

Paris DEFENSE NATIONALE in French Dec 80 pp 157-164

[Report by Gerard Vaillant]

[Excerpts] It is unquestionably a good budget which Yvon Bourges has bequeathed to his successor at the Ministry of Defense, since none of the proposed amendments were adopted.

The Great Increase in Funding Does Not Compensate for Inflation

With 123.2 billion francs--104,443 exclusive of pensions--the defense budget remains the biggest in the government, accounting for 17.07 percent of the total. It has increased by 17.87 percent* and exceeds, by 4.453 billion francs, the amount prescribed for 1981 in the 1976-1982 program law.

It is true, as Mr Cressard, spokesman for the Finance Committee, pointed out during debate in the National Assembly on 23 October, that, if provisions for pay increases this year included in the defense section, whereas they had been up to now included in that of common allocations, the projected budget, then brought down to 103 billion francs, is no longer increased by 17.87 percent but by 17 percent, and has no longer increased by 0.09 percent of the gross domestic commercial product (PIBM), to which the government was committed in November 1979, but by 0.053 percent, amounting to 3.797 percent of the PIBM.

Likewise, it is true that the 1981 program objective, which was 99.99 billion francs, has been exceeded, but actually the program was based upon provisions for increased prices (7 percent) which have proved erroneous. Revised to take inflation into account the program, affirmed by Cressard, should have required a budget of 114.797 billion francs, exclusive of pensions, or 4.23 percent of the PIBM. Of course, it is appropriate to take the economic situation into consideration and it would have been extraordinary if only the Defense Ministry escaped the consequences of monetary erosion. It is nonetheless not useless to appraise the shortfall in catching up which has thus resulted for the armed forces, and which--still according to the spokesman for the Finance Committee--

*while the government's total budget increased by only 16.44 percent

will involve 24 billion francs in the first 5 years of application of the program law and this in part explains certain delays in major programs, many of which are not due solely to technical imperatives.*

Continuing Balance Between Title III and Title V

In absolute numbers conforming to the program law, the 1981 defense budget is also consistent with the spirit of that law in the sense that it confirms the balance between Title III (operation) and Title V (equipment) by giving the latter priority. Title III, with 56.758 billion francs, represents 54.3 percent of the total of committed funds, compared with 59.3 percent in 1980, and increases by 16.4 percent while Title V, with 47.685 billion francs, amounts to 45.7 percent of the total budget, compared with 40.7 percent in 1977 and 45 percent in 1980, and increases by 19.68 percent. These percentages, showing the favorable evolution of funds for equipment, were nonetheless the object of a remark on the part of the Finance Committee: the 1981 budget does not in fact have the same structure as the 1980 budget because of the transfer, this year, to Title V of funds for supporting the equipment program of the ground forces. Redrawn with the 1980 structure the Title V of 1981 represents no more than 45.16 percent of the total of committed funds and has increased by no more than 17.56 percent.^{**}

The impact of fuel expense upon Title III must be emphasized. It has in fact increased by 70 percent, which means that, exclusive of fuel, funds for operation have increased no more than 13.9 percent, a percentage which is lower than that for operation expenses in the civil budgets (16.3 percent).

* In his report in behalf of the Finance Committee, Cressard, repeating the basic hypotheses relating to the gross domestic product (PIB) upon which the program law was established and translating them into real terms, concludes that the perverse effects of inflation will thus have cost the ground forces the equivalent of the equipment for three armored divisions, the air force equivalent of 60 Mirage 2000 aircraft, and the navy that of 3 corvettes. The only conclusion to be drawn is that alas, to err is human, especially in the matter of predictions. It will be well to remember that in the next program law in 1982.

** 11.86 percent for the common section, 17.25 percent for the air force, 19.62 percent for the ground forces, 24.65 percent for the navy, and 18.40 percent for the gendarmerie. For their part the program authorizations have been increased by 19.43 percent for the common section, 14.91 percent for the air section, 27.34 percent for the ground section, 29.77 percent for the navy, and 15.73 percent for the gendarmerie.

Creation of New Gendarme Positions

The funds entered under Title III are going to permit:

--raising the pay of draftees to 10.50 francs per day as of 1 April 1981 and of the special progressive pay for volunteers;

--raising the posting allowance for draftees serving in Germany from 24 to 55 francs per month;

--increasing a certain number of bonuses;

--statutory reforms for weapons studies and techniques engineers (IETA), personnel of the SDECE [Foreign Intelligence and Counterintelligence Service], and of nursing technicians of the armed forces' hospitals; and

--creation of 725 additional gendarme positions (83 officers, 562 gendarmes and noncommissioned officers, and 80 females; these last are intended to work in the general staffs and company commands and to function as secretaries, radio operators, and vehicle drivers, thus releasing a like number of gendarmes who will devote themselves to missions more specific to their service).

In addition the government has decided to strengthen the territorial detachments where there are nuclear power plants. These created reinforcements will be financed by a cooperative fund drawing upon the EDF [French Electric (Power) Company] but this in no way means that such gendarmes will be EDF employees. They will remain under the sole authority of the gendarmerie, their mission being to exercise surveillance, by means of patrols, over the environs of the power plants. Twenty positions will be established under the heading in 1981 and indeed are to be added to the 725 above mentioned.

Those parliament members who still judged the strengthening of the gendarmerie insufficient in consideration of what Mr Barre had announced in his "Blois program" ("1,000 additional gendarmes annually") were reminded by Mr Le Theule that the ranks of the gendarmerie will have increased from 75,868 in 1977 to 79,026 in 1981, a growth of 3,158.

Nuclear Forces Still Have Priority

Now let us look at what the armed forces are going to do with their equipment funds in 1981.

The funds will as a matter of priority serve to continue the development of the strategic nuclear force and preparation of future generations of weapons systems. We can place this effort at 25.92 percent of program authorizations (the orders) and 30.01 percent of the committed funds of Title V. In toto, with the operating expenses entered in Title III taken into account, it is 19 percent of the defense budget which will be devoted to the ensemble of nuclear forces.

Priority of priorities returns to the Ocean Strategic Force (POST). There will be continued development of the new MSBS [sea-ground strategic ballistic] M4 missile which is to be put into service aboard the "Inflexible," the sixth SNLE [missile launching nuclear submarine] in 1985. With a range greater than 4,000 kilometers and carrying several independent nuclear warheads, the M4 also provides a more rapid firing rate than the M20 and has a higher level of "hardening" in the face of adverse nuclear attacks.

Likewise actively continued is development of the medium range air-ground (ASMP) missile which is to equip the Mirage 2000 and Super-Etandard of the navy but will also be installed upon 15 Mirage IV aircraft that will be maintained in operation up to 1993. The first tests of the ASMP will begin in 1981.

As for the Albion Plateau, where there is a squadron of nine S3 missiles with 1-megaton thermonuclear warheads and with range greater than 3,500 kilometers, it will see continued the transformation to the S3 of a second squadron to be accomplished in 1982.

We know that the president of the Republic in his press conference of 26 July 1980 announced that a new component of the FNS [strategic nuclear force] is under study; it consists of mobile ballistic missiles and will be the subject of a decision between now and 1982.

Fate of the Strategic Air Arm

Several parliament members pleaded for maintaining an air component of the strategic nuclear force, notably Jean-Pierre Bechter, vice-chairman of the National Defense Commission. Dispersed, and housed beneath hundreds of concrete shelters, the aircraft could be neutralized only by a massive enemy action, making what is at stake greater than that which is represented by the Albion Plateau, and also greater than the destruction of one or more SNLE on patrol far from the sanctuary, and in which the aggressor would be difficultly identifiable. To that should be added the flexibility of employment of the air vehicle and the significance with which its visible movements and various degrees of alert are clothed. Also, Bechter believes that the disappearance, without replacement, of our strategic air force would diminish the credibility of our nuclear deterrence. To him the mobile ground-ground missile appears to have many faults: difficulty in moving it by road without running into hostile demonstrations by certain groups, firing emplacements known and programmed for enemy missiles, and terrain for maneuvering indeed inadequate for our ground forces.

In his reply to Bechter, Le Theule pointed out that for the present we are only at the study phase and that, even though it is true that those are more oriented toward ground-ground mobile missiles, the deliberations of the Ministry of Defense are not excluding any possibility, especially since certain arguments developed by Bechter on the penetration and survival capabilities of the "piloted nuclear component" are being taken into consideration in our deliberations about the long term. "It is too early to respond," the minister added, "but I believe that in 1982 our ideas will be much more precise.... For the

moment the outfitting of the Mirage IV, whose service is being extended with the ASMP, by nature give credibility to this component of our deterrent force."

As for the reinforced radiation weapon, the neutron bomb, studies are still continuing. "The main thing," said Le Theule, "is to know that a decision for production may be made toward 1982 or 1983. But in such case," he stated, "it will be only one of the possible elements of our atomic forces and only the president of the Republic will decide to use the weapon."

As far as our tactical nuclear forces are concerned, the funds for 1981 will permit establishment of another squadron of nuclear equipped Jaguar aircraft (15) to be added to the four squadrons (two with Mirage III E and two with Jaguar aircraft) and to the five Pluton regiments (30 ramps) already existing.

The concept of employing the ANT [tactical nuclear weapon] remains unchanged; we reject the nuclear battle.

Equipment of the Ground Forces: Delays

In 1981 the ground forces will continue to be equipped with antitank weapons: 35 HOT and 140 Milan [missiles] ordered and 33 HOT and 100 Milan to be delivered in 1981 which will bring the total of missiles delivered up to the end of 1981 to 115 and 220 respectively. In addition there will be ordered 60 AMX 30, 20 Roland, and 50 AMX 10 RC tanks, 37 cannon 155 AUF 1, 110 AMX 10, and 320 VAB, 3,420 tactical vehicles and 54,000 5.56-millimeter Famas assault rifles (instead of the 46,000 initially planned) in response to the decision by the president of the Republic to accelerate the production rate of that weapon. There will also be ordered 22 Gazelle SA 341-342 helicopters (armed with the HOT; the antitank squadrons of combat helicopter regiments are equipped with this weapon).

Several parliament members noted the effort expended to provide for program authorizations, especially major programs, and also the delays suffered by the latter. We are reproducing below the table which appears in the report by Jacques Cressard, spokesman for the Finance Committee.

Naval Construction Efforts

The navy is the big winner in the 1981 budget, and the effort allocated to new naval construction is particularly significant. The program authorizations have in fact increased by 50 percent and in 5 years they will have quintupled, from 810 million francs in 1977 to 4,225 billion francs in 1981. During that same period the tonnage ordered will have been 9,300 tons on annual average compared with 6,800 tons during the preceding 15 years. That is to say that it become urgent to remedy the obsolescence of the fleet.

In 1981 the navy will order a fourth nuclear attack submarine; a sixth anti-submarine corvette; the mine chaser No 8 of the tripartite Netherlands-Belgian-French program; two Superpatra patrol boats, Nos 1 and 2; a fourth refueling tanker; four light amphibious boats, Nos 1-4; four 400-ton training

Program	Orders			Deliveries		
	Number Provided by Law	Placed 1977-81	Percent Com- pletion	Number Provided by Law	Placed 1977-81	Percent Com- pletion
AMX 30	320	234	73	207	141	71
AMX 10 RC	330	222	67	190	69	36
155 GCT	190	107	56	110	4	4
155, tractor drawn	100	0	0	20	0	0
Roland	133	97	73	110	81	74
SA 341-342 (helicopters)	128	91	71	109	64	59
AMX 10 P-PC	450	345	77	512	364	71
VADAR	345	abandoned			abandoned	
PAMAS 5.56	246,000	193,000	82	148,000	51,000	34
HOT	192	176	92	167	115	69
Tactical vehicles	18,200	8,400	46	10,100	6,617	66
VAB	1,830	1,509	82	1,732	1,111	64
RITA	73	66	90	51	20	39
Milan	692	700	101	930	960	103
120mm Mortar	240	190	79	158	116	73

vessels; and a fourth hydrographic ship. These orders will represent 17,000 tons since 10,100 tons of the total had been ordered in 1980. Taking these orders into account, and deducting 16,000 tons which will enter service in 1981, we shall have 70,400 tons under construction at the end of 1981. A quarter of the fleet will then be replaced or on the way to being so.

A program for 11 public service ships and 3 surveillance aircraft will also commence in 1981. These include two coastguard ships of 2,000 tons, four 300-ton patrol boats, and a trawler (intended for the Terres Australes). The order for the first of these ships (a patrol boat and the trawler) as well as the three aircraft will be placed in 1981 and they will enter service in 1982. The ships will be put into operation for the navy within the scope of the public service mission assigned to it.

Air Force: Disturbing Limitations

The air force seems to be much less favored even though it will be authorized to order large F1 aircraft upon which it had not counted. But these

aircraft, which had not been entered in the program law are intended to compensate for the delay which has arisen in the Mirage 2000 program so as not to delay the first replacements of Mirage III aircraft reaching the end of their service lives. Twenty-two Mirage 2000 will nevertheless be ordered within the 1981 budget, which will bring the total orders for the Mirage 2000 to date to 48, and for the Mirage Fl to 246.

The corresponding munitions (110 Matra Super 530) are also included in the orders, thus bringing their total to 450. Also to be noted is the order for new munitions: antirunway bombs and grenade launching bombs, while the precision guided (by laser) weapons system begins its construction phase with the order for 15 ATLIS pods. Manufacture of the Magic 2 is continuing, as well as deliveries of the Magic 1, of which 1,545 units will have come off the line by the end of 1980.

The effort for equipping aircraft with electronic countermeasures is not being relaxed. Our air forces have commanded being equipped with a range of electronic equipment responding to the threats that they will have to face.

Air transport will record an order for five new Transall airplanes capable of holding 9,000 liters of additional fuel and having the two-fold capability of refueling or being refueled in flight. A number of parliament members nevertheless denounced the limitations of our air transport capabilities, which restricts the range of our intervention to 5,000 kilometers unless intermediate bases are available. Our civil air fleet can certainly be requisitioned but it is not operational under all circumstances and is not adaptable to transport of all heavy equipment. We had contemplated purchasing American C141 airplanes but production of that aircraft having ceased the Americans are reserving for themselves those which do exist.

This deficiency is without doubt the most troublesome for our Defense Ministry, which is more and more confronted with the possible operations of various kinds, with or without use of force, and more or less far from metropolitan France.

Antiaircraft defense will receive 56 double-barreled 20 millimeter cannon and four new Crotale batteries in 1981, which will bring their total to 20 and which will have the benefit, thanks to 3 new Centaur radars, of the possibility of improved low altitude detection while six new Aladin radars will also be ordered. This antiaircraft defense is still considered insufficient by Mr Huygues des Stages, a member of the National Defense Committee. Other members of that committee, Robert Poujade and Jean-Marie Daillet emphasized the inadequacy of the air cover for the French army.

One can only share the opinion of Loic Bouvard, reporting the Air section, who concludes his report as follows: "Last, the place of the air force in French defense and its capability to defend French territory must be seriously reexamined when the next military program law is drawn up; it may in fact validly be wondered whether 450 combat aircraft are sufficient for our country to assure support of our ground forces and secure mastery of the air over our territory."

Toward a Program With a Sliding Horizon?

Many times during the debates there was mentioned the nonexistence of civil defense to protect our population against the effects of nuclear weapons, emphasizing the obvious linkage of this question, which falls within the jurisdiction of the minister of the interior and the prime minister, with the Ministry of Defense, some speakers, Huyghes des Etages among them, asked for a joint debate to be organized, combining civil and military defense. Joel Le Theule did not reject the idea of such a debate and expressed the hope that in liaison of the responsible committees a solution in this sense could be found. "All facilities," he stated, "will of course be accorded to provide information to the parliament. In particular, in the beginning of the year we can contemplate drawing up a document which will be purely factual. Without taking the form of a white paper, it will include a description of our security forces. It would be of actual interest only if it were periodic, that is, annual."

Next, contemplating preparation of the next program law, which will be submitted to the parliament in the spring of 1982, the minister mentioned the ideas he gave out in the past when, 20 years ago, he recommended institution of a program with a sliding horizon and he affirmed his desire to study planning more precise and less uncertain than the present formula. "Perhaps," he said, "we will together be able to devise a solution which will be more satisfactory to the parliament at the a posteriori, indeed the a priori level."

General Bigeard, chairman of the committee, expressed the opinion of many of its members when he stated that "to maintain our efforts at top level would require 4 percent of the PIBM immediately and reach 4.5 percent if we wish to fulfill our obligation."

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CSO: 3100

MODERN DIJON AIR BASE DESCRIBED

Paris LE FIGARO in French 17 Dec 80 p 7

[Article by Pierre Darcourt]

[Text] Flying straight over Air Base 102 at low altitude, the geometric outline of the runways and installations, which blend with the landscape and greenery, is difficult to make out. The effort begun 3 years by the Air Force to protect and strengthen its bases has not let up.

Air Base 102, located 4 km east of Dijon since 1914, also bears the name of a distinguished "ace," Georges Guynemer, and received the first military combat aircraft flag.

Today, with its 2,500 men, its 55 Mirage jets, its two main runways, its "motorized service shops," an automated administration center whose computer inventories the 50,000 spare parts stored in warehouses and makes it possible to obtain them in 10 minutes, 50 heavy utility trucks, 200 transport trucks, operational barracks buildings and ultramodern kitchens, it constitutes an autonomous combat deck, or rather a "ground aircraft carrier" suited to its missions: air defense (interception) and ground forces support.

The "lord" of the base, Colonel Roumilhac, 48 years old and a pilot since 1957, assisted by a team of outstanding officers, must supervise everything--camouflage measures, missions of Mirage jets shooting skyward like volleys of arrows, the organization of security and defense devices and air control of the base and civilian traffic: 45,000 arrivals and departures annually (including 10 percent commercial or civilian aircraft) plus stopovers of NATO aircraft--Belgian, Dutch and German--en route to Corsica or Sardinia.

A City

"A base is also a city, whose operating and maintenance budget amounts to F 14 million," the colonel smilingly remarks, "with its library, its sports fields, its gymnasium, its social services, its banking offices, its childcare center and even a PTT [postal, telephone and telegraph services] office. We represent the largest restaurant service in the area: 4,000 hot meals daily."

But the ground aircraft carrier, spread over 500 hectares and crisscrossed by 50 kilometers of roads, takes precedence over everything else. The radio and command post is located underground. A company of commando marksmen in black berets and fitted fatigues, flanked by police dogs, patrols the perimeter of double high-voltage electrified fences. Between the fences, dark-haired "corridor dogs" lie in wait. The protective hangars for each aircraft, made of steel and concrete shells, have just been equipped with semispherical doors (a nearly 150-ton shield moved by an electrically operated rack and pinion). In the event of an explosion, they close against the hangar tightly, turning it into a hermetically sealed "tin can." The aircraft is thus protected against bomb blasts and wind effects. The camouflage has been carefully arranged.

The concrete runways, very light in contrast to the natural environment, have been darkened. The use of paint, which made the concrete shiny, posed problems, but they were solved by "scoring" the runways. Some of the available fields have been placed under cultivation. Thousands of fir trees taken from neighboring forests have been planted. The concrete munitions bunkers, buried under thousands of cubic meters of grass-covered soil and sealed by armor-plated doors, are arranged at a "dead angle." In anticipation of a conflict, the base has restored or built individual and collective shelters. A further precaution: the "release" of aircraft which can "blast off" on 11 prepared emergency airstrips. Antiaircraft defense centers around the automatic twin-mount double-barreled gun and Crotale surface-to-air missile. But the old 12.7- and 50-mm machineguns have been retained. "This consists," as Colonel Roumihac says, "of putting the maximum amount of flak into the air to prevent an easy approach to the base by hostile aircraft." To destroy the targets assigned to him, the pilot of a ground-attack aircraft equipped with conventional weapons must examine them by a visual process (optical or televised). Camouflage measures, "toughening" of protective measures, concealment with earthworks and the density of fire tend to interfere with this visual acquisition and to reduce the effectiveness of enemy units flying at low altitude.

The vulnerability studies conducted by the Air Force's Operational Research Group specialists have shown that all of these precautionary air raid measures increased the survival factor of a base by as much as 30 times. At Dijon, as on the 14 ground "aircraft carriers" of the FATAc [expansion unknown], the program begun 3 years ago is in the process of being completed.

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BRIEFS

PROMOTION TO GENERAL--On the proposal of Mr Robert Galley, minister of defense and of cooperation, the Council of Ministers approved the following promotions and appointments on Tuesday, 23 December: Ground Forces--Col Jacques Coupez, appointed commander of the Paris fire brigade, is promoted to brigadier general. Ordnance--Chief engineers Alain Orszag and Emile Arnaud are promoted to general engineer, 2d class. National Police--Col Gilbert Pacot is promoted to brigadier general. Air Force--Administrative Col Jacques Teyssedre is promoted to administrative brigadier general. Inspection of Armies--Army inspectors Guy Jourdain and Guy Schmit are promoted to general army inspector. Fuel Service--General Military Engineer Gilbert Borde, 2d class, is promoted to general military engineer, 1st class. [Text] [Paris LE MONDE in French 25 Dec 80 p 19] 11915

CSO: 3100

SOCIOLOGICAL ASSESSMENT OF PSI, SOCIALIST VOTERS

Rome RINASCITA in Italian 26 Dec 80 pp 10-11

[Article by Gianfranco Pasquino: "How New Is the New PSI?"]

[Text] Anyone who wants to conduct a sociological analysis under the present circumstances of the Italian Socialist Party [PSI] immediately encounters a great difficulty. We do not actually possess systematic, up-to-date or fully satisfactory systematic studies of the party as an organization, of its members and its intermediate cadres. At the same time, we have very little, limited, information on the socialist electorate and on its fluctuations. Finally, and this is an extremely interesting aspect, we would like to know whether and how the party has changed over the past 4 years (since Craxi became secretary) and actually in the past 2 years (that is, since the Turin Congress).

To the extent that periodical, but very fragmentary and substantially inadequate, data exist to capture a reality as complex in itself and as changeable as that of the PSI of the 1970's, the last systematic and in-depth study of itself that the party conducted goes back to the organizing conference held in 1975 and published under the title "The Socialist Party. Structure and Organization," Marseilles, Padua, 1975. The data concerning party cadres to which I will refer in the course of this article were gathered by a team I directed in March 1978 in a very long and elaborate questionnaire given to the delegates of five regional congresses: Piedmont, Emilia, Veneto, Tuscany and Campania. Obviously, the picture that emerged from it cannot and must not be considered totally representative of a party which is very different from area to area. However, the information that emerged, checked against other data, seemed to be sufficiently plausible (it will be possible to increase, check and correct them through an analysis of the delegates to the coming national PSI congress which I hope I can carry out on that occasion).

The data on the socialist electorate are the product of a series of current studies by the Carlo Cattaneo Institute. These are ecological (that is on the land) analyses and, to the extent that the model can be refined, they should be accompanied by interviews and surveys to gather, weigh and assess the attitudes of voters toward the party. It is to be hoped that movement will be made in this direction soon. In the meantime I will rely on hypotheses that seem to me to have their own plausibility and which, even though in a fashion that is still too general, have had the effect of directing the attention to an important phenomenon such as that of the opinion electorate. Having stated this premise, I will go on to the analysis of the socialist cadres and then to some observations on the voters.

I will note that this is a "photograph" taken in 1978 and that, in part, but probably only in a very small part, the picture may have changed in the course of the last 2 1/2 years. The prevalent picture of the PSI among politicians and scholars is that the socialist party is substantially a middle-class party with limited worker representation. And the prevailing picture is not contradicted by the data. The delegate to the regional congress is above all male: Only 7.7 percent are women (a situation that is reflected all the way up to the parliamentary level where there is only one female deputy). In the second place, it is relatively young--only 6.3 percent is over 45, while 31.4 percent is under 30--but, as can be seen, more than half--exactly 52.3 percent--falls into the crucial area between 31 and 45 years. Surely they are very well educated: In fact, 31.9 percent hold diplomas, and that figure touches 50 percent if to it is added the number that have attended or are attending university.

We know that the level of education is closely related to type of employment and socioeconomic conditions: A level of education is equated with non-manual employment and good socioeconomic conditions. These correlations hold also in the case of the socialist cadres. The high percentage, one fifth of the sample, consists of employees, white collar workers, who are active in the public and private sector. The second group in order of importance (14.5 percent) is represented by trade union and party officials. Their presence calls attention to the fact that even in the case of the local PSI, the area of politics as an avocation and not as a profession is restricted, very restricted if the tendency, as is likely, is still more frequent in the higher levels. In a very general way, similar percentages are registered among teachers, professors on various levels (15 percent) who also evidently are able to enjoy the fruits of an employment that leaves considerable free time. So far, it could be said that this is the picture of the middle class; perhaps to these figures could be added five percent of students, a relatively low percentage but which could indicate a certain difficulty in penetrating the youth.

The two other important employment groups noted among the delegates are: Workers and artisans (respectively 10 and 2.5 percent) and professionals, high public and private officials, private and public managers and entrepreneurs (a total of 13.5 percent). Considering these data, the PSI, in terms of its intermediate cadres, is composed of persons from the middle class, professionals and managers and only to a small extent of workers and artisans. Even though the sociological composition of a party does not determine its policies, it constitutes a restriction on the potential mobility that that party intends to exploit. And this is something to keep in mind.

Regarding socioeconomic conditions of those interviewed, it is interesting to note an improvement regarding the relationship between family conditions when the interviewee was an adolescent and his present situation. In particular, while 19 percent of the socialist cadres describe the economic conditions of their families during adolescence as "bad," only 9.2 percent describe their own situation in that way. As a consequence, there has also been an increase in the percentage of cadres which enjoy good socioeconomic conditions: An improvement which reflects the more general experience in the country in the postwar period.

With a justly famous expression, Pietro Nenni described the socialist party that was moving toward the end of the center-left phase as a party of councillors. The data available indicate that a considerable percentage of cadres occupy elective positions, but the percentage of delegates who have party positions (as high as 82 percent) is much higher. The difference between the two percentages seems to indicate that the "administrators" are often still the product of an external succession and not totally within the party. That is to say, that the PSI succeeds in keeping its channels of relationships with civil society open (naturally additional data is necessary to confirm this hypothesis and to refine the extent, reasons, and processes behind this phenomenon).

How did the socialist cadres enter the PSI? Our survey showed that a very high percentage, almost half, comes from families we could describe as politicized or very politicized. These are families in which not only was there frequent (41.7 percent) or at least occasional (29.6 percent) discussions of politics, but in which the parents were members of a party (47 percent of the sample). The transmission of interest in politics is therefore ensured to a large extent through family channels. In addition to the interest, did the parents also transmit their own political preferences, their own party identification?

The answer to the last question is complex. It would require accurate comparison with, at least, the cases in other parties, first of all the DC [Christian Democratic Party] and the PCI. And information available on these parties indicates that the children of communist parents tend to adopt the political preferences of their parents in higher percentages than the children of Christian Democratic parents. The children of socialists are closer to the children of Christian Democrats than to those of communists. Thus, as there are defections of socialist children toward other parties, there are also the reverse cases: For example, about 20 percent of socialist delegates come from families in which the father or the mother were members of the PCI and a little less than 10 percent from families with social democratic parents. The other parties are practically not represented.

One of the more frequent disclosures of sociological research on political participation consists of the inclination of those who are interested and active in being members of an organization. The socialist cadres are no exception to this tendency. They are members of various organizations but, and this is the most interesting point, what is surprising is the high rate of trade unionism. Almost two-thirds of socialist delegates are members of one of the three major trade unions and as much as one-sixth hold executive positions. There is an overwhelming predominance of members, militants and leaders of the CBLI [Italian Union of Labor and Italian Confederation of Labor Unions] the CGIL-UIL ratio is five to one and the CGIL-CISL ratio is 20 to one. Therefore at this level there is a very large trade union representation in favor of the CGIL. This could explain a series of "unity" attitudes that the socialist cadres expressed in reference to policies to be followed (but this would require a long explanation).

In order to complete the panorama of "who is" the socialist cadre, it is worth referring to a final element of a certain interest: Religion and religious feeling. The image that the socialists have of themselves is that of a lay, and often anticlerical, party. In light of Mitterrand's success in attracting

large groups of Catholica, the PSI recently began a policy in that direction. It was not to be expected that the socialist cadres would indicate deep religious convictions, and the data do not contradict expectations. And yet 20 percent of the socialist cadres say they are Catholic, 25 percent agnostics, and 22.5 percent atheists, 15 percent reply "not interested," and 13 percent are uncertain. To judge by the answers to the follow-up question on religious feeling, even Catholics, however, have certainly lost contact with the organized Catholic world and in the best of cases, live their religious feeling either as a private or personal affair, or as a ritual affair. Only four percent go to Mass almost every Sunday; more than half go only on special occasions (weddings, baptism, funerals) and naturally, 27.6 percent never go to church.

Up to this point the identification file of the socialist cadre, a file that could surely be better defined if, as is hoped for the future, we have fuller data drawn from more diversified areas. But a party is not only a collection of cadres, of militants: it is also a complex of structures and activities. In the socialist party, as in the communist party, the section headquarters is the favorite place for political activity. The life of the section, often difficult, and just as often deprecated and criticized, seems to have maintained its vitality in the five regions for which data are available.

First of all, there are no objective obstacles to participation in section activities since 87 percent of socialist sections have their own headquarters and therefore a place where to meet, to collect material, to find a point of reference for a continuing and not spasmodic political activity. Naturally, the existence of a headquarters does not guarantee that there will also be militants. Actually, the number of active members, according to reports by the socialist cadres themselves, is not very high and the percentage of sections with a large number of active members is only partially satisfactory for energetic political activity. A little more than one-tenth of the socialist sections could boast of more than 40 active members, while 25 percent have less than 20: And the average is around 20 to 25 active members, a percentage that may be satisfactory, but concerning which we do not have adequate parameters for assessment.

In order to have political activity it is necessary that the sections be the place of meeting and fairly frequent debate. The data that emerge, instead, indicate that a large percentage of sections (40.5) have only a few meetings per year; in 45 percent, the meetings are held often during the year, but only 14.5 percent of sections hold meetings once or more per month. And to discuss what? Substantially, there are three subjects of interest: In the following order, they are local problems, party problems, national problems. Comment on this point in the absence of additional information is difficult; it would be necessary to go into a detailed analysis with reference to various local situations and to specific section headquarters (a research project to be carried out in the sections of all parties, obviously).

And how do the socialists discuss matters? Judging by the daily press and by the affairs of the PSI, before and after the Turin Congress of March 1978, it can be said that debate is very vivacious, positions are well-defined, points of disagreement are numerous (at one time, in PROGETTO SOCIALISTA [Socialist Project], [there was disagreement] regarding the phases of the leftist alternatives, relations with the DC and the PCI, and the grand coalition). The socialist cadres,

instead, report a rather different situation: In 10 percent of the cases there is no political debate; in 15 percent there is debate, but not disagreement; in 34 percent there is limited disagreement; and in less than 33 percent of the sections is there broad disagreement. Without an in-depth exploration and appropriate comparisons, it is difficult to say whether this is a matter of containment of disagreement (by the tyranny of the majority); self-control of those who disagree; or simply the fact that the thornier problems were not debated in the section meetings, but "agreed upon" among some leaders.

There is much talk about a "catch-all" party and it is said that the Craxi operation is directed toward acquiring the largest number of voters for the PSI regardless of how they are described. Whether what is attributed to the PSI Secretary is true or not, the socialist cadre have rather conflicting opinions on these problems and, in part, but understandably, they are contradictory. A total of 90 percent of them believe that the PSI "should be always faithful to its principles and to its objectives, even when this leads to a loss of votes;" at the same time, 60 percent accepts a catch-all policy ("the PSI should try to get votes and to represent the interests of the largest number of groups and voters possible"). The situation remains complicated when it is considered that the statement that the "PSI needs a solid ideological base for its objectives and its political choices" is agreed to by almost everyone, while the statement that "in politics it is necessary to try to obtain the best from every situation rather than remain obstinately tied to principles" is rejected by 60 percent but accepted by 40 percent. The tension between catch-all tendencies and ideological coherence, between fragmentation and rigorous adherence to plan reveals a basic realism in the opinions of the socialist cadre, and it could not be otherwise. The story of the PSI and its objective position in the ranks of Italian politics do not permit any shortcut in the solution of these dilemmas.

Obviously, the failure to solve political dilemmas and the limited organizational representation, negatively affect the electoral fortunes of the PSI. It should be noted that this is above all true when the election competition requires, as in political elections, an effort oriented toward acquiring votes for the party on the national level. When the characteristics of the competition are different, for example in administrative elections and in European elections, some of the voters move toward socialist positions, or at least show that they appreciate the socialist option in higher percentages compared with political elections.

The explanation of this phenomenon is probably due to shifts inevitably caused by voters who make use of the opinion vote. Voters of this kind are naturally present even among the Christian Democratic and communist voters, but the opinion voters are less visible in the large number of votes obtained by the two major parties and they are also less important (but, perhaps, this figure is growing both in terms of visibility and importance). For the PSI, instead, the opinion voter is crucial: With his shifts, with his assessments, the opinion voter is responsible for the victories and defeats of the Socialist Party. Inherently unstable, the opinion voter fluctuates in the area of the left and is now a radical (in political elections), now a socialist (in administrative elections); now a socialist, now a communist, etc. Naturally, there is a socialist voter "corps," but it is small compared with the two major parties; just as there exists a slice of the socialist electorate that behaves according to the canons of patronage, "exchanging" its vote for favors, resources, a job.

Being unable to "break in" organizationally, and being unable "and presumably not wanting" to acquire further voters through patronage methods used in some areas, the PSI has no alternative but to try to penetrate the opinion voter. Two problems arose immediatly. The first is that the activism of radicals constitutes a very powerful obstacle to socialist success among the opinion voters (whose size, among other things, whether it is growing or not, is probably still not very broad in absolute terms); the second is that the accentuation of the message directed to the opinion voter can result in a counterblow within the other bands of "socialist" voters. Thus the PSI can be successful in an election either when the message can be adequately diversified from area to area (in administrative elections), or when the appeal to the opinion voter is so strong as to defeat the other "noises" ("socialism is European"). The case of elections for the European parliament).

Having said this, it is no surprise that the election map of the PSI is very diversified and that its progress over the course of the 1970's has been rich in surprises and disappointments. I can offer only some sketchy observations of a general nature (for a more detailed discussion see my "In Search of the Opinion Voter: The Case of the PSI," in A. Parisi (edited by), "Mobility without Movement. The 3 June 1979 elections," Il Mulino, Bologna, 1980). First: The Socialist electorate varies between 10 and 12 percent, but with marked variations in the regional, political and social composition of its voters. The growing emphasis of the south in the socialist vote remains a substantial reality despite gains at Turin and Milan (which accompany the advances in Naples and Calabria). White collar workers and the middle class constitute the two largest social categories in the socialist electorate, which also seeks votes among the workers, but the number is not large. The votes gained and lost by the PSI came mainly from the neighboring parties (among which are the PSDI [Italian Social Democratic Party], and the DC is not to be excluded) and their movement toward those same parties, with regional variations that can be guessed at. The northern PSI is more a debtor and creditor in relation to radicals and communists, and that of the south in relation to the social democrats and Christian democrats.

Second (and finally): The lack of clarity in the socialist political program in the 1970's, and the objective divisions in the party have had an influence, to an extent that is not easy to estimate on the potential electorate, on the socialist area. The disorientation of the socialist "anti-sympathizer" (according to the description of Ernesto Galli della Loggia) has been the weakest point in the PSI search for an electoral consensus. It is impossible to hypothesize whether the transformation of the PSI into a catch-all laborist party will improve the electoral appeal and broaden the area of consensus, but it seems certain that any net change will be made at a cost to militants. If that is so, there will be a reemergence of the problem of recruitment, of training and selection of cadres for the party, and for the public elective positions, and the problem of relationships between the party and civilian society. That problem as of today has not been solved (but that is not true only of the PSI).

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CSO: 3104

FOREIGN MINISTRY SPONSORS DISARMAMENT CONFERENCE

Oslo AFTENPOSTEN in Norwegian 20 Jan 81 p 4

[Text] Should Norway have a national security council or set up a more or less freestanding state study and research organ? Proposals in both directions were brought up yesterday by several of the participants at a wideranging disarmament seminar at Sundvolden under the auspices of the Foreign Ministry. In the view of those making the proposals the purpose of a stronger administrative apparatus was to provide a better basis for a constructive Norwegian debate on security policy and thus contribute to a "forced disarmament," as it was put.

The Foreign Ministry's 2-day seminar on the place of disarmament work in security policy was arranged to create a forum for new ideas and the free exchange of opinions on arms control and disarmament. There was broad participation at the seminar by politicians, research workers, media people and concerned organizations. Today Foreign Minister Knut Frydenlund will be one of the participants.

Yesterday's debate focussed specifically on the need for more people and better organization in disarmament work. The chairman of the government's disarmament panel, school director Helge Sivertsen, set the tone in his introductory speech.

Starting with Foreign Minister Frydenlund's remark that work for detente and disarmament is the most important foreign policy task today, Sivertsen asked if enough was being done in this area in practice. In relation to what is done for the defense sector and the funds expended there Sivertsen felt there was a clear imbalance. The Foreign Ministry could use a lot more workers in this area than it does today, Sivertsen said. He said the Foreign Ministry should note that arms reduction is now a superordinate objective.

Sivertsen also said that Norway should not be afraid to go on the offensive in disarmament questions even though our allies don't always go along with us. He maintained that the prospects of getting negotiations on arms reduction going would be better if this was not linked to other conflicts. There is a danger that the work to eliminate nuclear weapons will be linked to other weapons. But nuclear weapons have a special position. In the worst instance this issue concerns the existence of the people of Europe, Sivertsen said.

Office manager Oscar Vaerno of the Foreign Ministry agreed that adequate funds should be made available and he stressed the need for an analysis of various

consequences. Vaerha recommended a security policy study group that might also look into the effects of new weapons and weapon systems. Assistant Professor Kjell Sejersbæk proposed the establishment of a separate body in a freestanding position such as the directorates have today. He thought this new body should examine issues at an early stage and for example study different aspects of nuclear-free zones and analyze the consequences of various measures.

Both Storting representative Liv Ansen (Labor) and Thor Knudsen (Conservative) opposed the establishment of an independent organ. So did Kjell Magne Bondevik (Christian People's Party) although they all agreed on the need for more discussion and information. Major General Bjørn Egge brought up the idea of a national security council and a separate security policy secretariat attached to the prime minister's office.

Professor Oyvind Østerud said that the debate in Norway on security policy is of a catastrophically poor quality. By setting up a new organ to replace the present disarmament committee we could get a kind of forced disarmament of the debate, Østerud said.

Several of the speakers in the debate, among them Center Party chairman Johan J. Jakobsen, warned against unilateral disarmament.

Jakobsen said that disarmament work must proceed with two principles in mind. The measures must meet the requirement of unweakened security for all countries and balance must be maintained. Jakobsen said with reference to Helge Sivertsen that it is an illusion to believe that by being the first to reduce armaments one is contributing to detente. It is important to start at the right end, said Jakobsen who felt there is reason to question whether the principles of unweakened security and balance have the support in Norway that they had in the past.

Storting representative Per Utøi (Labor) felt the lack of a clearly-defined plan in disarmament work. He thought that instead a kind of competition had arisen to reject Norwegian defense measures. Utøi also warned against believing that Norway can show the way in international disarmament work and said that we should work to strengthen international support for disarmament. Our task should be to contribute to balanced and mutual disarmament moves on the international level, Utøi said.

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NINE BOLT LABOR PARTY RANKS IN VOTE ON STOCKPILING

Oslo AFTENPOSTEN in Norwegian 14 Jan 81 p 3

[Text] "Our experience is that since World War II in the areas where there was a weak defense we have experienced war and unrest and their repercussions. In areas where there has been a good defense, there has been peace for 35 years," Minister of Defense Thorvald Stoltenberg said yesterday when the Storting approved by an overwhelming majority the agreement between Norway and the United States on stockpiling of allied military materiel in Trøndelag.

The Storting measure on allied stockpiling was adopted by 95 votes to 13. Besides the Socialist-Left Party and the Liberal Party, nine "dissenters" from the Labor Party voted against the general agreement. The nine from the government party were Thor-Eirik Gulbrandsen, Sighjørn Johnsen, Anne-Lise Bakken, Thorbjørn Berntsen, Inger-Lise Gjørv, Roald Bye, Ingrid Eide, Tom Thoresen, and Oddleif Fagerheim.

Ingrid Eide said that the broad popular opposition to the agreement cannot be broken down by the Storting's action yesterday. She said the agreement has come to resemble an iceberg of which one can only guess at the shape and size and future direction. Stein Ørnhei (SV [Socialist-Left Party]) said that such stockpiles will be bombing targets which can also easily become targets of atomic bombing, and he said the arms build-up is a crime in itself. The agreement will be entered into with Ronald Reagan's United States, and it is not a matter of a bunch of marines that will come to Trøndelag to eat the food, says Ørnhei.

Stein Ørnhei presented a proposal to reject the general agreement, but it was voted down by 97 votes to 11. The Liberals got support only from Erlend Asdahl (SP [Center Party]) for a proposal that the government should propose a strengthening of our own defense within the NATO alliance as an alternative to the proposed stockpiling.

Minister of Defense Stoltenberg pointed out that our task in averting war is to make it untempting for anybody in any situation to attack our country. Such a temptation must be made too costly, purely militarily. "Stockpiling is a step in the direction of making the alliance less dependent on atomic weapons. By creating suitable conditions for responding with appropriate force at any level of aggression the so-called 'atomic threshold' will be raised," said Minister Stoltenberg,

who concluded by saying that this measure means the opposite of Norway's binding itself more strongly to the atomic strategy of the United States.

Knut Frydenlund, minister of foreign affairs, also stated that it is obvious that no nuclear weapons or chemical weapons will be placed in Norway. The foreign minister emphasized that the stockpiling measure represents no change in Norwegian security policy and will lead to no stress in the situation in the Nordic area. "If doubt arises concerning the government's ability and will to attend to the country's security, it will be difficult to get adequate support for an active peace policy," Foreign Minister Frydenlund pointed out.

Per A. Utøi (A [Labor Party]), vice chairman of the defense committee, recalled that our defense budget is over 9 billion kroner. Not a single krone has gone to build up any attack force. Our defense does not represent any threat to anybody that has no aggressive intentions toward us himself, he said. Utøi emphasized that this agreement will give us quick help so that the pressures on our own forces will be as slight as possible, if we have to go to war again. Per A. Utøi concluded by saying that by this agreement we can strengthen our conventional defense, and thus reduce the NATO alliance's dependence on the United States' nuclear weapons. "Stockpiling is certainly a step in the opposite direction from binding ourselves to the atomic strategy of the United States," said Per A. Utøi.

Least Risk of War With Allied Support

"Giving the Soviet Union the impression that an attack on Norway will be met with purely Norwegian forces is the same as giving the superpower an impression that such an attack can possibly be carried out without disproportionate risks," Kåre Willoch, parliamentary leader of the Conservative Party, pointed out in the debate in the Storting yesterday on the general agreement with the United States on allied stockpiling in Trøndelag.

"If we depended on a purely national defense, the risk of such an attack would increase. And if we should create conditions that would increase the possibility of an attack on Norway, it would not only mean an increased danger to ourselves. It would also mean increased danger of a world conflagration, with the possibilities of atomic warfare that that involves," Kåre Willoch emphasized.

To opponents of stockpiling, who say that Norway is exposed because of membership in NATO, Willoch said that throughout NATO's history the threat has been least against the countries that have been members of the alliance. On the other hand we have seen a country bordering on the Soviet Union, which was not a member of any defensive alliance, attacked, and it is at this moment the victim of an aggressive war of unparalleled brutality.

Per Hysing-Dahl (H [Conservative Party]), chairman of the defense committee of the Storting, also emphasized that stockpiling of allied materiel in Norway will not make the country more exposed as a military objective. These stockpiles will be used only if Norway has been attacked because another power wants to avail itself of our territory for the advantages that would give, especially in connection with domination of the Atlantic Ocean.

"The agreement before us will not involve the stationing of allied personnel in Norway in peacetime. Neither nuclear nor chemical weapons will be stored," said Hysing-Dahl.

Hanna Kvanno, the SV's parliamentary leader, said, however, that under this agreement with the United States, Norway will be equipped step by step as an advanced NATO base in an extremely sensitive area. "If the Soviet Union views Norway as so dangerous to the superpower's access to the sea that that access may be threatened, the result will inevitably be that the Soviet Union will seek to destroy that threat," she said. Hanna Kvanno said that if there is war it is almost inevitable that atomic weapons will be used. "We are afraid of that and terrified of it, and that is a healthy fear, for it can lead to people's waking up and pressing for real negotiations on disarmament that can lessen tensions and hence the danger of war," she said.

Thor-Eirik Gulbransen, who was one of the nine "dissenters" in the Labor Party, said that when he voted against the agreement it was because too little is known about the consequences of the measure that the Storting is taking in this matter.

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CSO: 3108

COUNTRY SECTION

NORWAY

CP ORGAN: FAKE CABLE ON NUCLEAR WEAPONS NOT FROM EAST BLOC

Oslo KLASSEKAMPEN in Norwegian 23 Dec 80 p 2

[Article by Alf Skjeseth]

[Text] The false telex communication revealed by the Foreign Ministry could just as easily have come from Norway as from an East European country.

The false document is reminiscent of earlier attempts to spread misleading information stemming from East Europe. But several sources with whom KLASSEKAMPEN has been in touch point out that the wording of the document is so clumsy that it could hardly have been sent out by Soviet or Czech professionals in this field.

Regardless of who sent it the purpose of the fake seems clear--to spread rumors and unrest about increased American pressure on Norwegians to make changes in our base and security policy just before Foreign Minister Knut Fydenlund's visit to the Soviet Union. If the contents of the communication had reached the public, citing American Secretary of State Edmund Muskie as the source, it would have created a violent outburst in the Soviet press no matter how many emphatic denials were issued by Norwegian and American authorities. It was to prevent this kind of situation that the Foreign Ministry decided to inform the press of the false document on Sunday before the news could be spread in other ways.

Labor Party

It is not known how and to what extent the false information was distributed. The reason why the Foreign Ministry decided to take the bull by the horns and make the contents public was a fear that several copies might be in circulation. KLASSEKAMPEN has learned that it was a man in the critical wing of the Labor Party in the defense and security debate who received the communication in his mail box last Tuesday. This person wished to remain anonymous. He is active in politics but Kjell Colding, office manager in the Foreign Ministry, has told KLASSEKAMPEN that the man is not a Storting representative. He is not "just anybody," as we were told.

The man received the letter on Tuesday in an envelope with Swedish stamps on it. He told NTB [NORWEGIAN PRESS AGENCY] that the cancellation stamp was illegible.

On Wednesday morning he turned it over to the Foreign Ministry which immediately started its investigations.

"It was so clumsily worded that we would have had doubts about the contents even if the Americans had not confirmed that it was a fake," said office manager Colding. Foreign Minister Knut Frydenlund received constant orientation on the matter. It has not yet been decided whether to call in a police investigation to find out who the perpetrators were if possible.

The fact that the communication was made public in the middle of the foreign minister's Soviet trip and not before or after probably means that the acting leaders of the Foreign Ministry had reason to fear that the contents might leak out to the mass media or to Norwegian political circles in the middle of Frydenlund's meeting with Gromyko. In that case the damage would have been done.

NTB's Washington correspondent wrote that "a copy of the false telex communication was sent to Labor Party headquarters in Oslo." This information supposedly came from "informed sources" in Washington. The Foreign Ministry knows nothing about this and finds it strange that sources in Washington would have this kind of information. And Labor Party secretary Ivar Leveraas said he did not understand the NTB report:

"It's true that I was away a good deal of last week and don't know about all the mail we received. But it would be remarkable if I hadn't heard about a message like that," he told KLASSEKAMPEN.

Experts in the United States believe that the fabrication has East European origins. "There are some obvious errors in language and composition suggesting that the text was translated from Russian. There is nothing very remarkable about this since there are many examples of the Soviet secret police (KGB) and other East European intelligence organizations fabricating telex messages that were claimed to be official reports from the American State Department," wrote the NTB Washington correspondent.

But it is by no means certain that this particular fabrication came from the East.

"We don't know where the false message was fabricated, whether it was in Norway or somewhere else," Foreign Ministry office manager Colding said.

Unsuccessful Provocation

The United States must put "constant and deliberate" pressure on Norway and Denmark to ease the restrictions of the base and nuclear policy there.

The oil and gas reserves in the Arctic must be regarded as NATO's tactical and strategic reserves which Norway must not be allowed to handle in a narrow national way.

Stockpiling heavy American military equipment is an extremely vital step in opening up chances to deliver the "most modern weapons" to Norway.

These politically inflammatory remarks--signed by U.S. Secretary of State Edmund Muskie himself--were intended to hit Norway like a bombshell the wee' before Frydenlund went to Moscow according to the plans of the unknown telex provocateur.

If Secretary of State Muskie really had signed a cable with this message for transmission to various embassies and military facilities in West Europe it would have been a bombshell indeed. But the producer of the message used too much heavy artillery and too little reflection. Among other things this is true of the statement that Arctic gas and oil should be regarded as a kind of joint NATO reserve. And the author tripped up badly when he issued a stern warning against nuclear-free zones in northern Europe in a cable dated June 1980, at least 4 months before this idea even turned up in the Norwegian defense debate.

It is quite logical that critics of the present defense policy--especially those from the debate on stockpiling--should be chosen to receive provocations of this type. If the sender had managed to tempt a Jens Evensen, a Thorbjorn Berntsen or a Berge Furre--or for that matter DAGBLADET, NY TID or KLASSE-KAMPEN--into coming out with the message as a "revelation" the intention would have succeeded, even if there had been a flood of denials afterward. But the way this particular cable was worded turned it into a dud.

Soviet Union

There is much to indicate that we have here a Soviet-inspired attempt to spread false information, an attempt of the classic type. If it had worked out the Soviet authorities would have had enough ammunition for the propaganda war to last all next year. But several experts say the cable is too clumsy and awkward to have come from KGB experts. If it had the message would probably have been worded moderately enough so that it would seem probable that it might have come from the American State Department. On the other hand the message might have been a kind of trial balloon from the East to see how much people would be willing to swallow in Norway.

Norwegian Instigators?

Technically there is nothing to indicate that the message was not formulated by Norwegian instigators. In that case it could have come from the most extreme pro-Soviet groups in an effort to whip up public sentiment against the United States and NATO by spreading the impression that the United States is ready to force nuclear weapons on Norway at any time and to annex Norwegian oil resources. A third possible explanation--more farfetched but not inconceivable--is that the fabrication was planned by the extreme right--based on the premise that the Soviet Union would be blamed and thus be discredited in the eyes of the public.

It is unlikely that a police investigation would lead to the source. We will probably never know who pretended to be the American Secretary of State in this case in order to fish in the muddy Norwegian defense debate. The provocation failed this time--but it was a useful reminder of the kind of methods being used.

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CSO: 8039/0515

PEACE RESEARCHER DEFENDS IDEA OF KOLA IN NUCLEAR-FREE ZONE

Oslo AFTENPOSTEN in Norwegian 20 Jan 81 p 2

[Article by R. H. Solstrand]

[Text] In an article in AFTENPOSTEN on 9 January 1981, page 2, researcher Erik Nord presented his evaluation of some of the views I expressed in the same newspaper on 15 December 1980. He also brought together some interesting pieces of information concerning the balance of strength between NATO and the Warsaw Pact. I find it necessary to comment on some of Nord's statements in connection with my own views as well as with the facts in the case.

First, the proposal for a nuclear-free zone in the North. If Nord reads my article with open eyes he will see that I did not dismiss this proposal. I expressed my doubt as to the possibility of achieving a real arms reduction effect but stressed that we must not allow such doubts to prevent us from trying to make use of all the possibilities that exist. I also mentioned some possible negative effects of such an agreement. It is also our duty to look at those aspects. The final decision on this important matter must be made on a broad and balanced basis.

It amazes me that Nord--and others along with him--so categorically rejects the idea that the Kola area must be included in discussions of a nuclear-free zone in northern Europe. The Soviet Union has a good many nuclear weapons in this area with a range that makes them suitable only for use against Scandinavia. I am unable to understand why it is more unrealistic to negotiate on these weapons than on other nuclear weapons in the East and West. And if it should turn out that the Soviet leaders reject such a negotiation proposal as totally unrealistic it would force me to state that the biggest obstacle to real disarmament lies in the unwillingness of the Soviet Union.

Next we come to Nord's assertion that my article was lacking in nuances and based on incorrect information. It was certainly lacking .. nuances. In my view newspaper articles of this type do not provide any opportunity for presenting background material in such depth and breadth that it can serve as the basis for reaching conclusions about such a complex problem as the balance of strength between East and West.

It gives me a slight chill when I see numerical comparisons of the type Nord presents. They are intrinsically interesting and worth looking at but it is easy to fall into the illusion that one has now seen the only and complete truth. I don't suspect Nord of believing this. But his many readers who do not work with such figures every day and know nothing about the very complicated mechanisms the figures represent could come to believe that now they had been given a nuanced and correct picture of the balance of strength.

Therefore I am afraid that Nord's article could actually have been much more misleading in its information than my concise evaluations.

I am convinced that we can never acquire a useful understanding of the balance of strength between two great powers by counting weapons, soldiers or the amount of money in defense budgets. In addition we must be able to answer many other questions each of which can completely upset the picture given by the figures in isolation. How effective are the various types of weapon? How vulnerable are they? How quickly can they be moved? How reliable are they? How will the weapons actually be used and what is the geographic distribution of forces in the initial situation?

Let me mention a few of the great weaknesses in Nord's figures, which could be extremely and unfortunately misleading. They disregard the fact that the NATO land territories are divided by a vast ocean. This means that in a conventional war in Europe the Warsaw Pact lands would have a relatively easy time bringing in reinforcements from the interior regions of the Soviet Union while American reinforcements would have to make a long and quite exposed trip across the Atlantic Ocean.

A comparison of defense spending as Nord gives the figures contains an enormous bias. The figures conceal the fact that we with our western standard of living have an entirely different wage scale for our service personnel than is the case in the Warsaw Pact lands. If we are going to start arguing with figures I think Nord should also explain that the Warsaw Pact lands use 15-20 percent of total defense spending to pay their personnel while the corresponding figure in the NATO countries is around 30 percent. The rest is available for the acquisition and operation of military equipment.

Nord's discussion of the number of tanks in NATO and Warsaw Pact countries also presents a very distorted picture. It is true that he mentions the great numerical superiority of the Warsaw Pact lands but he seems to want to explain this away by saying that only a scant third of their tanks are what he calls "new." He thus gives us the impression--whether deliberately or not--that the rest of them are practically unusable. And he says nothing about how many of the NATO tanks are modern. He also commits the misleading error of comparing the number of tanks on each side and then comparing the defensive antitank weapons on each side with each other. But it is more relevant to compare the tank strength on one side with the antitank defenses on the other.

In this way Nord manages to ignore the extremely important fact that the tank strength of the Warsaw Pact lands is probably the single most important factor

contributing to the perplexing weakness of NATO's conventional defense capability in central Europe. How much this means we can only get a glimpse of by studying in realistic detail how tanks, infantry, artillery and fighter planes work together in a complex, dynamic combat process on real territory.

I don't think we will ever find simple answers to questions such as these: Who is strongest among the superpowers? Who is the most to blame in the arms race? The answers will always contain a good deal of subjectivity and they will be colored by our sympathies and antipathies. But the answers may not have much to do with the kind of security policy we should pursue in Norway. Therefore the future debate should concentrate more on how we can adapt our security policy to international realities without losing sight of the overall goal of national freedom and independence.

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CSO: 3108

CENTRAL BANK FORECASTS MODERATE DECLINE IN ECONOMY

Oslo AFTENPOSTEN in Norwegian 24 Dec 80 p 5

[Text] Developments indicate that the Norwegian economy will be characterized by moderate decline through the first half of 1981. This was made clear in a report by the Bank of Norway on the economic situation during the fourth quarter of 1980. This report will appear in the magazine of the Bank of Norway, PENTER OG KREDITT, in January.

The poor prospects for international growth emphasize the fact that the economic problems of 1981 cannot be overcome by an isolated economic effort on the part of Norway. The economic picture for the years 1981 to 1985 make it unrealistic to expect anything other than very moderate growth for the Norwegian economy as well, if the economic balance is not to be endangered.

Since oil and gas production are expected to show relatively little increase during the next 5 years, the increase in production in Norway--as opposed to the preceding 5-year period--must come primarily from the Norwegian mainland, the Bank of Norway states.

Thus, maintenance of moderate growth will presuppose a sharp increase in productivity. This means that demand must be stimulated to a greater extent by private consumption, investments in companies, and from abroad, it says.

Concerning inventories within industry and wholesale trade, the Bank of Norway says that inventories are now at a considerably lower level than during the last half of the 1970's. Assuming that the authorities do not again encourage an unusual buildup of inventories, a tight money and credit policy will give us reason to expect a relatively modest buildup in the inventories of export goods during 1981, the Bank of Norway says.

9336
CSO: 3108

LACK OF REALISTIC PLANNING COULD HURT 1981 ECONOMY

Oslo AFTENPOSTEN in Norwegian 19 Dec 80 p 2

(Editorial)

[Text] Next year, the total lack of a realistic and comprehensive economic policy can cause us problems, which the present government, in any case, will not be able to handle. The 1981 national budget, which was given final approval before the close of parliament's fall session, is clearly inflationary and, consequently, will contribute toward further undermining our competitive strength. According to the economic prognoses of the Industry Association, industrial production is expected to drop by 2 percent in 1981 and, to an even greater extent than this year, the competitive strength of Norway's industry will decline compared to that of other countries. We are in a position where the threat to vulnerable jobs will increase.

Many years of inflationary politics are now having a serious effect. According to all indications, next year will set a new record in price increases, which confirms the government's inability to carry out policies that are adapted to the problems the country faces. For the government's part, it has long admitted that the main problem is a price and cost level that lies above the average for those countries with which we compete. But as Rolf Presthus of the Conservative Party stressed at the budget debate in parliament, good goals can never be attained if this recognition is not followed by sufficient action. This is now being confirmed in issue after issue.

Since the government, through its policy of economic expansion, has helped reinforce the wave of inflation, it is now hoping that labor and industrial organizations will demonstrate the responsibility and moderation that the authorities themselves have not taken especially seriously. According to Finance Minister Ulf Sand, recent developments will place great demands on the upcoming wage negotiations. First of all, the government wants to emphasize especially the need for a comprehensive agreement that does not endanger jobs in sectors of our industry that are facing still competition, and second, that the wage agreement must have a social profile that will make an increase in the graduated income tax this fall unnecessary. Thus, while the government itself has presented a budget that will unleash sharp price rises, it is shifting its responsibility for maintaining competitive strength over to the parties in the wage negotiations. According to the government, it is a necessary prerequisite that the parties involved attach

great importance to our competitive strength during the negotiations, if we are to continue to cope with unemployment.

We will not go into great detail concerning the political double standard revealed here. Actually, the government's conduct characterizes itself. We have, as always, confidence in the major organizations, that they will assume the social responsibility that is incumbent upon them in a situation in which jobs are at stake. If the offers and demands take competitive strength into account, we know that the margins are even smaller than before. But in the name of truth, it must be admitted that the authorities' handling of the problem has not exactly created a favorable atmosphere for the upcoming negotiations.

9336
CBO: 3108

AIR FORCE TO PURCHASE SIXTEEN SAAB SAFARI TRAINERS

Oslo AFTENPOSTEN in Norwegian 16 Jan 81 p 12

(Article by Knut Falchenberg)

[Text] The Norwegian Air Force will purchase 16 single-motor training planes from Sweden on favorable terms. The contract is expected to be completed in the course of a few weeks, and by fall all of the 16 planes of the Saab Safari Supporter type will have been delivered. The price will be about 7.5 million Norwegian kroner, which can be described as half price. AFTENPOSTEN is informed by the air force's procurement command.

The new planes will replace 25 aging trainers of the Saab Sapphire type that are now in use at the flight school on Værnes. In time of war the planes can be used for reconnaissance and other support missions for the army.

"The especially favorable price offer we got from the Saab-Scania aircraft factory is connected with the fact that the 16 planes are of the 6th run to be produced. Actually there was another customer that was to have bought them, but now Norway has been given a chance to take over the order on reasonable conditions," AFTENPOSTEN was told by Erik Senstad at the Defense Ministry.

"Even though a 7.5 million kroner purchase does not involve really big amounts, the Defense Ministry will try to get the purchase included in the 'big arithmetic problem' on purchase and redemption of defense materiel between Norway and Sweden," says Senstad.

The Defense Ministry has long been considering replacement of the present stock of 25 planes at the pilot training school on Værnes. Maintenance of those planes has become more and more expensive, and in recent years it has been difficult to get spare parts for the motors. Some years ago a number of used Saab Sapphires were bought for the mechanics to "cannibalize" for want of other spare parts. In the procurement command of the air force, however, it has been considered possible to keep the present planes in service until about 1984.

Sudden Turn

But 14 days ago the question of new procurements took a sudden turn when the Saab-Scania aircraft factory offered 16 new Saab Safari Supporter planes to Norway for 7.5 million Norwegian kroner. That is about half the price of a comparable offer that the air force procurement command had gotten from another supplier. For that

reason the Defense Ministry was not slow to react, and in the course of the next few weeks the contract is expected to be finally negotiated.

The offer stipulates that the first 5 planes will be delivered 20 weeks after the contract is entered into. After that, one plane will be delivered each week. Each plane will be accompanied by a "support package," which contains among other things spare parts for 2 years' operation, back-up equipment, and introductory courses for technicians and pilots.

Thursday the defense committee of the Storting was briefed on the plane purchase at the same time that a four-man delegation from the air force was visiting the aircraft factory at Lindköping to take a closer look at the plane type.

The planes are equipped with a gasoline-driven piston motor, and there is room in the cockpit for two fliers shoulder to shoulder.

The head of the Værnes airbase, Sr Lt Gunnar Wergeland, tells AFTENPOSTEN that the new plane type is easier to fly than the flight school's present models. For that reason the school will revise the tests in the future that all trainees must pass, so that the degree of difficulty remains the same. The student pilots that get through the needle's eye at the flight school are sent to the United States for complete pilot training.

The flight school has recently increased its student quota to 50 a year. If that number is maintained, probably 16 new planes to replace the present 25 will prove to be too few. There is a good deal to indicate, however, that the number of students should be reduced considerably, because the shortage of pilots in the air force may be remedied as the civilian airlines maintain an employment ceiling for pilots.

RRIS
CSO: 3106

FOREIGN MINISTRY PUBLICATION DESCRIBES POLAR, OIL EVENTS**Oslo AFTENPOSTEN in Norwegian 16 Jan 81 p 12****[Report by Liv Hegna]**

(Text) For those who wonder what goes on in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs from day to day, the division of planning and analysis has now issued a survey of practically everything that has been said or done in the ministry since 1966. The publication touches on all important foreign-policy themes, and covers the terms of five foreign ministers, namely John Lyng, Svenn Stray, Andreas Cappelen, Dagfinn Værvik, and Knut Frydenlund.

Public statements, speeches, and explanations given by members of governments, secretaries of state, and other public spokesmen in national and international forums are reproduced. In addition to the more constant foreign-policy elements--the Nordic area, NATO, EFTA [European Free Trade Association], and the United Nations, for the period from 1966 to 1973 we find a concentration on Norway's relation to the EC, first in connection with the membership question and later in connection with negotiations concerning a trade agreement.

From the summary it appears that a gradual increase in new subjects took place toward the 1970's: foreign aid policy, fishery boundary, law of the sea, and continental shelf questions, the CSCE [Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe], disarmament, human rights, and environmental protection. Throughout the 1970's it is precisely these fields, together with a new world economic order, north-south problems, oil and energy questions, Antarctica/Arctica, and northern areas that become the subject of broad attention in the publication, obviously as a reflection of what is happening out in the world.

All the annual volumes of the information series of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs are in the library of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, University Library in Oslo, the library of the Norwegian Foreign Policy Institute, and the library of the Nobel Institute.

8815

CSO: 3109

DEFENSE COMMAND WILL BOMB OBJECTS THREATENING OIL RIGS

Oslo AFTENPOSTEN in Norwegian 9 Dec 80 p 56

[Text] Bombs and rockets, torpedoes and depth charge from the Norwegian Armed Forces may be used against drifting object threatening the oil installations on the continental shelf. "We have now arrived at an emergency procedure which, among other things, will involve that the maritime operations center can prepare an action at the same time as the political leadership evaluates whether or not the action is to be launched," Rear Admiral Gustav Adolf Steimler of the Defense Command South Norway tells AFTENPOSTEN.

The reason why they have now arrived at such a procedure is, according to Gustav Adolf Steimler, that the Defense Command South Norway, last year, was asked to assist in sinking a barge which had broken adrift in one of the oil fields.

"At the time, we got the message at a far too late point, so that it became too late before we could have done anything. We, therefore, contacted the Oil Directorate, among others, and we have now made an arrangement, according to which the Defense Command South Norway--the maritime operations center--will be notified immediately when drifting objects which may threaten the oil installations are observed," Gustav Adolf Steimler says.

He points out that early notification is necessary in order for the weapons to be made ready but that the final decision as to which means will be employed will rest with the political leadership.

"We do not expect that there will be much demand for such tasks. Objects usually break adrift in bad weather, and it will hardly be decided to sink drifting objects if one is not certain of being able to hit them. If the object gets too close to the oil installations, there is the danger of such objects being shot afire, and that in itself may present further threats to the installations," Gustav Adolf Steimler says.

The operations, if any, will be incorporated in the daily routines of the Defense Command, and no special emergency forces will be established beyond what they already have.

Bjolf Marstrander, director, chairman of the state emergency action board which was set up in the wake of the Bravo accident in 1977, points out to the Norwegian Central News Agency that such drastic means as the ones which the Defense Command

can offer will only be used in extremely special cases. Only when all other possibilities have been ruled out will the use of explosives be taken up.

It may become necessary to ask assistance from the Defense Command against vessels which have been left by the crew on account of shipwreck, large objects from the oil operations themselves, for example anchor buoys or entire oil rigs which might work loose and drift without control.

AFTENPOSTEN has learned at the Defense Department that the arrangement which has now been reached has got nothing to do with the plans for a special division for use in emergency situations on the continental shelf. Such a division will have to be able to undertake anti-terror tasks in the oil fields, and they are still working to establish such a division.

CSO: 3108
7262

GROUP IN BRIGADE NORTH TRAINS TO OPERATE BEHIND LINES

Oslo AFTENPOSTEN in Norwegian 12 Dec 80 p 44

[Article by Knut Falchenberg]

[Text] Few Norwegian soldiers are more thoroughly familiar with Soviet forces than the reconnaissance boys of Brigade North. They train regularly in order to be able to act behind enemy lines, and all 150 members of the division are specialists in field intelligence. "The military service here is harder than average, but, in a way, I am glad that I was sent here, for, here, time at least goes quickly," Øyvind Busterud from Hamar tells AFTENPOSTEN.

The NATO headquarters in Belgium have pressed the button. The training alarm has gone off, and, to the reconnaissance squadron at Skjold, this means that they will have to leave the camp in record time and proceed to the "Alfa area"--a place in the wilderness of the Inner Troms. The division has been lightly equipped in order to get as far as possible with the least possible noise. Caterpillars, jeeps and not least skis are being used diligently. For larger distances, helicopters.

Once they have arrived in the "Alfa area," small patrols are scattered around the area. They are the eyes and ears of Brigade North, which, in case of war, must be able to follow the movements of the enemy and report back to the chief of the brigade over the radio.

"Our entire task is to operate 3 to 4 miles behind the lines of the enemy," the chief of the division, Captain Ole Leinnes, tells AFTENPOSTEN. "That is why camouflage is important to us. Unfortunately, we lack white tents to merge into the snow, and a couple of years ago the enlisted men spent part of their own daily pay to purchase white material to make up for the lack of camouflage," he says.

Spartan Equipment

On the whole, this field intelligence division has got Spartan equipment, with no mysterious electronic or seismic detectors to watch the movements of the enemy. They trust their vision and hearing, a telescope with 20 times magnification and, in addition, a portable radar. This radar does not give the usual radar image but instead gives off a sound via a headphone.

The headphone worn by Tommy Kristiansen, a dragoon from Frederikstad, gives off a rumbling sound. The radar has detected a solitary wanderer in a snow-covered marsh a distance below. His trained ears can interpret the rumbling sound and determine whether it is the sound of infantry, skiers or vehicles that the radar is picking up. And he can, moreover, read the distance to the target, all the way up to 3 kilometers. "Off and on, I cannot help thinking that this may become real, perhaps increasingly so at the present time," he says.

The chief of the reconnaissance squadron, Captain Ole Leinssen, tells *AFTENPOSTEN* that the task of the division in a real situation will be to hide at strategic points and let the enemy pass by. Subsequently, the patrols, each consisting of four soldiers, will have to collect as much information as possible and relay this information back to their own forces on the other side of the front line.

"By way of preparation, the enlisted soldiers are also provided with thorough information so that they will be able to recognize all types of Soviet military equipment. They have got to know everything, ranging from rifles to nuclear rockets. Each patrol is, moreover, equipped with its own notebook, a notebook listing the equipment, in order for it to be able to manage this job," he says.

"I have well-motivated people in the division, and I believe the reason is that we work in small groups, that we have constantly got to train realistically for our tasks, and that the boys have no difficulty seeing the purpose of each individual task they get," Ole Leinssen says.

Hard Service

Gyvind Busterud, an enlisted soldier from Hamar, says that this form of service can be hard. The hardest period he has experienced was a week when he walked a total of 100 kilometers, carrying 20 kilos of equipment. The food was scanty, and the soldiers had to fish themselves in order to get enough to eat.

No. 84, Per Jespersen, from Sandefjord, says that he, nevertheless, feels best when he is away from the camp and out in field practice.

"In one practice, we had to spy on the 'enemy.' We managed to sneak into the field headquarters, under the command car, up to the 'enemy.' We were lying there for hours, listening to all the plans which were being discussed. Things like that can, of course, be fun when one has got to be in the military service," Per Jespersen says.

The men in the reconnaissance squadron belong to the cavalry and call themselves dragoons instead of soldiers. Back at the Haukstadmoen barracks, it cannot be avoided that a bit of friendly competition arises between the dragoons and the 'ordinary soldiers' of the infantry. Outside the camp are two kiosks, one for each group. A dragoon would hesitate to buy chocolate from the kiosk of the infantry.



The portable radar gives off rumbling sounds when detecting an enemy. Tommy Kristiansen, a dragoon from Frederikstad, wears the headphone, while Steinar Nilsen, a sergeant from Oslo, gives the orders.

7262
CSO: 3108

YOUNG LABOR'S JAGLAND: MEANINGLESS TO PUT KOLA IN ZONE

Oslo AFTENPOSTEN in Norwegian 19 Jan 81 p 5

[Text] It is meaningless to stipulate that the Kola base must be part of a nuclear-free zone in the Nordic region and that such a zone in our area can be established only if the same thing occurs throughout Europe, AUF [Labor Youth League] chairman Thorbjorn Jagland said at the annual meeting of the Aust-Agder AUF yesterday.

The AUF chairman said that such a stand would only make it impossible to establish this kind of zone in the Nordic region. "The Soviet Union's strategic nuclear weapons on the Kola Peninsula are part of the central balance with the United States and it would be unrealistic to believe that the Soviet Union will leave the North Atlantic open to the Americans by allowing its most important military base to be included in a nuclear-free zone.

"Similarly it would be totally unrealistic to insist that all of central Europe should become a nuclear-free zone. The debate on strategic weapons belongs in an entirely different place," said Jagland who stressed that Scandinavia has a real opportunity to achieve a treaty that can be guaranteed by the superpowers.

"It is natural to begin where the problems are smallest and the opportunities are greatest," the AUF chairman said. "We are faced with two choices--stronger ties to the U.S. military plan or intensified work for arms control and the reduction of the superpowers' positions in northern Europe. Only the second alternative is relevant in the work for a nuclear-free zone in the Nordic region," said Thorbjorn Jagland.

6578

CSO: 3108

BRIEFS

PRODUCER PRICES UP 12.6 PERCENT--The Central Statistics Bureau's price index for production in mining, industry and power supply, the producer price index, rose 0.3 percent from November to December 1980. The index figure was 131 for both months. In the mining sector the index rose 1.0 percent, for industry it rose 0.4 percent while the index for the power supply sector was unchanged. From December 1979 to December 1980 the producer price index rose 12.6 percent. In the same period the mining index rose 26.0 percent, the industrial index rose 12.3 percent and the power supply index rose 11.0 percent. [Text] [Oslo AFTENPOSTEN in Norwegian 19 Jan 81 p 25] 6578

NUMBER OF BANKRUPTCIES DROPS--Last year a total of 765 bankruptcies and 60 negotiated agreements occurred in this country according to the Central Statistics Bureau's credit market statistics. The comparable figures for 1979 were 800 and 68 respectively. Of the 765 bankruptcy proceedings begun in 1980, Oslo had 127 or 16.6 percent of the total. Akershus had 94 (12.3 percent), Hordaland had 63 (8.2 percent), Nordland and Troms had 46 each (6.0 percent), Buskerud had 45 (5.9 percent) and Hedmark had 44 (5.8 percent). [Text] [Oslo AFTENPOSTEN in Norwegian 19 Jan 81 p 25] 6578

NIKE BATTALION MODERNIZATION--The government has decided to modernize the NIKE battalion with a view to keeping the battalion operative into the 1990's. At present, it is estimated that the equipment necessary for the modernization will cost around 90 million droner. Around half of these costs will be covered by savings in operational expenses as a result of the modernization and by placing two of the battalion's four batteries on reserve status. The rest of the costs will be covered within the framework of the general appropriations for purchase of material. The NIKE battalion was established in 1959. Its assignment is to defend the Ostland area against air attack. [Text] [Oslo AFTENPOSTEN in Norwegian 22 Dec 80 p 9] 9336

CSO: 3108

CONSTITUTIONAL REVISION, CHANGES IN INSTITUTIONAL RELATIONS**Political, Constitutional Consequences**

Lisbon EXPRESSO in Portuguese 24 Dec 80 p 10

[Article by Pedro Santana Lopes and Jose Durao Barroso: "Institutional Short Circuit"]

[Text] The government system established by the Portuguese Constitution of 1976 is still on the agenda. The results of the recent presidential election, by confirming in office a president backed by partisan forces opposed to each other and opposed to the parliamentary majority and the government, have made this issue even more critical, and consequently have enhanced its interest and expediency from the standpoint of a constitutional revision.

It is predictable that the leading political forces, with the immediatism to which we have become accustomed, will be inclined toward proposals that appear favorable to them within the strict limits of the current situation. Hence, the government system that is now insured would be changed or maintained depending on the tactical interests that might become allied in order to obtain or preclude the necessary two thirds majority.

Insofar as we are concerned, we feel quite at ease reaffirming the general direction of the proposal that we made even prior to the presidential election regarding the rationalizing of the government system. (1)

Therefore, an attempt to resort to basic changes in the Constitution out of mere concern for political expediency should not be observed in a more precise definition of the powers of the president of the republic. In fact, it should be recognized that what is at stake in the constitutional revision appears far more important than a temporary advantage in the "ups and downs" of national politics.

We have undertaken elsewhere a detailed analysis of the Portuguese institutional experience with the so-called semipresidential government system. (2)

There, we made a survey of the main areas wherein the lack of operativeness in the system was obvious, also considering some foreign experience and attempting to show that the solution to be adopted at the head of the government system depends on this key variable reflected by the concrete party system more than on any other factor of a legal nature.

Although we are unable, in the limited space of a newspaper article, to give equal treatment to the main underlying issues, or even to cite some of the related problems, we shall nevertheless attempt to systematize some of the considerations that prompt us to reaffirm our option for a new constitutional balance among the chief organs of sovereignty.

Insofar as the government system is concerned, we shall demarcate three areas: that of the analysis of the constitutional experience, that of the values and objectives which the revision should maximize, and that of the methods, ways and means whereby the aforementioned values can be implemented and the aforementioned objectives fulfilled.

1. As for the politicoconstitutional analysis, experience has shown that: a. the present government system does not allow for clarity and visibility in the functioning of institutions. A government with its responsibility "caught" between an Assembly and a president aiming at different political objectives appears as a precarious government, with its legitimacy at times confused, and its effectiveness nearly always curtailed. This is why Portugal has broken all European records for government instability during the "constitutional" period itself.
- b. The so-called semipresidential system (which is currently the essential part of the MFA's [Armed Forces Movement] constitutional legacy), owing to the instability that it creates, has allowed the party system to fall into disrepute, and the military authority to appear to some as a necessary corrective factor, or an updated version of a moderating authority.
- c. This government system enabled the president of the republic to make systematic attempts to outstrip the political parties, capitalizing on all the problems of government instability in his favor. Nevertheless, the parties, the standard for any democracy, reacted positively; and, on 2 December, the "Bonapartizing" direction of Portuguese democracy was reversed when a parliamentary majority was obtained.
- d. Contrary to what has been claimed by the adherents of the so-called central bloc, the bipolarization has had, and still has a constructive role with respect to the clarification of political disputes and, consequently, the effectiveness of the inter-institutional relationship.
- The problem lies in the fact that the present government system allows the political forces which do not obtain a parliamentary majority and the resultant right to form a government to shift their claims to another organ (in this case, the president of the republic), which will thus tend to establish itself, at the least, as a counter-government. Hence, we have witnessed a complete institutional manipulation, depending on interests originating in the current political situation.
- e. The results of the recent presidential election confirm the correctness of the analyses and the legitimacy of the apprehension of all those who fear the attempted imposition of a certain politicomilitary plan, through the weakening of interparty competition and a certain paternalism of a more or less presidentialist proclivity.
- f. Experience seems to have shown that the simplification of the institutional apparatus, done so that the leading political-party forces will transfer their normal competition to a single center of state power, the parliamentary one, appears to

be the best means of preventing the confusion that is reflected by a constant war of positions among the main organs of sovereignty.

a. Far from belying the so-called polarization, the results of the presidential election proved that the essence of political competition in Portugal still lies between two poles, which are generally identified in terms of "right" and "left," with the winner usually being the one that manages to attract a floating electorate which we might cite, in round numbers, at about 500,000 voters who are inclined toward the pole with the greatest apparent security or stability. Hence, these results are the best evidence that the bipolarization turns over to the central electorate the decisions regarding problems, but do not warrant the conclusion that a political-party bloc of the center must be associated with this central tendency. On the contrary! The formation of a central bloc would unquestionably help to generate centrifugal forces on the left and right, and to create grounds for challenging the legitimacy of the Western-type democratic system that we are attempting to consolidate.

2. With regard to the values which the constitutional revision should uphold, from the standpoint of the government system, it is clear to us that:

- a. The constitutional revision should end the transition period, and establish a full democratization of the regime.
- b. The constitutional revision should restore to the people the entitlement to, and exercise of all sovereignty, without any alliances with agglutinating elements for a new version of military power.
- c. That revision should also make a decisive contribution to the government stability that is desired, specifically by simplifying and clarifying the functions of institutions and by adopting measures that will remove the obstacles from the government system, so that the leading powers will be mutually restrained but not abrogated.
- d. From a legal-constitutional standpoint, all the conditions should also be created to accelerate political development, which has in the parties the main agents for modernization, and in a model of open competition (among political forces and not among organs of sovereignty) the necessary requisite for this system to be assimilated by the electorate and to really become a part of the habits and political culture of the Portuguese people.

3. As for the methods whereby such objectives can be attained, we shall stress only the following:

- a. Elimination of the Council of the Revolution, interpreted as an absolutely unacceptable organic vestige of a military power which persists in maintaining itself in the realm of the main policy decisions.
- b. Revamping of the relations among the organs of sovereignty, which must necessarily entail a termination of the government's political responsibility to the president of the republic. (3)

In addition to the power that he already has to dissolve the Assembly, the president of the republic should, on the other hand, be granted the power of initiative with regard to a referendum as a means of resolving potential stalemate situations with the parliamentary majority.

c. The establishment of the principle of the constructive censure motion, similar to that stipulated in the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Germany, whereby Parliament can only dismiss the government in the event of the formation of another majority capable of setting up an alternative government. (4)

In conclusion, and from the standpoint of the Democratic Alliance, the available option is as follows: Either the government system is clarified, putting an end to the focal points of institutional short circuit, or there is capitulation in the pursuit of its political plan. Hence, there are only two ways.

FOOTNOTES

1. For example, see the article by one of the authors, Jose Durao Barroso, in *A TARDE* of 16 September 1980, in which it was asserted: "With the stressing of parliamentary logic and the withdrawal from the president of the republic of the power to dismiss the prime minister, there is a reduction in the scope of the military power which, taking its support from the organ of sovereignty of the president of the republic, might continue attempts to impose its terms on the civilian democratic system. Hence, it is not a matter of personal distrust of one candidate or another. It is, rather, a matter, on the almost certain assumption of our continuing to have a general as president of the republic, of our insuring that the military power (whether it be behind Eanes or Soares Carneiro) recognizes the civilian system's autonomy in functioning and political hegemony."
2. See Pedro Santana Lopes and Jose Durao Barroso, "Government System and Party System," Lisbon, Bertrand Bookstore, 1980.
3. See Article 146 of the Plan of Changes prepared by Pedro Santana Lopes, in "A Constitution for the 1980's" (Draft Constitutional Revision of Francisco Sa Carneiro), Lisbon, Dom Quixote, 1979.
4. See Articles 150 and 151 of the aforementioned Plan of Pedro Santana Lopes.

Comparative Bases for Revision

Lisbon *A TARDE* in Portuguese 16 Sep 80 pp 11, 14

[Article by Jose Durao Barroso: "The Governmental System and Constitutional Revision"]

[Text] At the request of the prime minister, his legal adviser, Pedro Santana Lopes, prepared a proposal to change the draft of the constitutional revision which the former had submitted, entitled "A Constitution for the 1980's."

The critical and most discussed innovation in the document submitted by Santana Lopes consists of the proposal of significant changes in one area: that of the government system, which up until now has been calmly considered untouchable, or virtually so. The most essential innovation relates to the fact that, in the plan now being evaluated, the government is no longer in a state of twofold responsibility (to the president of the republic and to the Assembly of the Republic), but would be answerable only to the latter. Hence, generally speaking, the powers of the president of the republic are limited, with the abolition of the presidential power to dismiss the prime minister. However, the president of the republic is still elected by universal suffrage.

Too Much Parliamentarism?

This plan was hastily considered to establish a "nearly unadulterated parliamentarism," and its foes, in their hasty attack, have on the one hand alluded to the scare of parliamentary instability during the First Republic, and, on the other hand, have cited imagined similarities to the Salazarist practice of reducing the status of the president of the republic to that of a mere "ribbon-cutter." I beg the reader's permission to point out that one would really have to exceed all the bounds of good sense, in attacking a draft constitutional revision, if he made the latter appear, simultaneously, as "Salazarist" and "parliamentarist" in nature.

But let us leave that type of criticism (which can only be explained by complete ignorance of the subject on the part of those making it), and let us attempt to ascertain whether, from the standpoint of comparative jurisprudence, there are any reasons for categorizing the plan of Sa Carneiro and Santana Lopes as "parliamentarist."

In a work published in 1977 by the Inter-Parliamentary Union (Herman and Mendel, "The Parliaments in the World," Paris, University Press of France), its authors, from the Universities of Essex and Geneva, proceed to compile comparative data on the parliamentary institution in 56 countries, as they were on the exact date of 1 September 1974. Now then, it was found that, of those 56 countries, which range from A, representing the Federal Republic of Germany, to Z, representing Zambia, none of them, in terms of legal grounds for the government's responsibility, offers a solution equal to that currently existing in Portugal (see especially Table No 62 on pages 734 and 735). It was also shown that the rule consists of the government's responsibility to Parliament (the only exceptions among the republican and democratic regimes being the United States and Switzerland). Moreover, it was noted that even the regimes which are democratic in name only (such as those of the Eastern countries and certain fascist-type dictatorships) establish, from a legal-constitutional standpoint, the government's responsibility to the parliamentary institution, and not to the head of state.

All this relates to the charge of too much parliamentarism that has been made against the Sa Carneiro-Santana Lopes plan. Hence, in comparative terms, there is no basis for such criticism. In order to consider this plan "nearly unadulterated parliamentarism" (merely because of the fact that it removes the government from a constant threat of dismissal by the president of the republic), we would be obliged, for reasons of consistency with the criteria for categorizing, to label the vast majority of the political regimes existing on the globe "nearly unadulterated parliamentarism"! Because, I insist, in the constitutions of those countries, the government's responsibility is to Parliament, and not to the head of state.

Hence, the debate that is now under way in Portugal should not be viewed, contrary to the manner in which it has been introduced, as one wherein the "semipresidentialists" are opposed to the "parliamentarists." It is, more properly, a discussion between "Bonapartists" or "presidentialists," on the one hand, and "moderate parliamentarists" or advocates of the prime minister's institutional leadership, on the other.

However, I agree that the change proposed by Santana Lopes (in addition to the legal-constitutional judgments on the issue) has an undeniable political significance, namely, that of a complete "about-face" in our semipresidential system. In terms of political dynamics, there is clearly a move from a presidentialist direction to a different parliamentary quality. But it is in the direction of a "rationalized parliamentarism," that is progressing, and not on the path of parliamentary anarchism. I shall explain why subsequently.

Negative Results From Our Semipresidential Experience

I am also of the opinion that, more important than the comparison with experience of other countries, is the analysis of the practical results of our own semipresidential system. The comparative data prove useful, because they help us to make the assessment of our problems relative, and should enable us to avoid obvious mistakes and hasty categorizing. But it is with the concrete experience of our government system that I shall attempt to associate the following conditions.

An objective analysis of what the democratic regime in a semipresidential form has been in Portugal shows us endemic government instability. And, even more significantly, it reveals the fact that the (relative) stability has only been achieved when a parliamentary logic has been imposed (with the present government), after obtaining a majority in the Assembly of the Republic.

An impartial assessment of our experience with the government system also leads us to discover that Portugal is the country showing the greatest government instability in all of Western Europe. For example, during the "constitutional" period alone (which we might consider more stable from a government standpoint than the "revolutionary" period), there have been six governments! And this occurred only between the years 1976 and 1979 (the date of the election of the Democratic Alliance). And if we add to the six "constitutional" governments the six "provisional" ones, we find that Portugal, in less than 3 years' time, has "seen pass" three more governments than West Germany had after World War II, and one more than Luxembourg or Ireland had in the past 30 years! Italy itself, which is the "classic" example of government instability, has shown an average of one government per year since the establishment of the democratic regime. In Portugal, that average exceeds two governments per year!

So, how can one continue to accuse the Sa Carneiro-Santana Lopes plan for constitutional revision of introducing factors for government instability? I would tell its critics that, if they seek a parallel with the troubled experience of 1910-1926, they will not go very far. That rebuttal exists: It is the experience in Portugal of the semipresidential system established by the Constitution of 1976-77.

Stability as a Political Value To Be Maximized

Thus, starting with the principle that the decision regarding constitutional revision should be guided, not by abstract legal-constitutional models, but mainly by considerations associated with the methods, ways and means of improving the effectiveness of the democratic system and of perfecting the sense of its legitimacy, before continuing it is important for us to select the political value to be maximized. Under the present circumstances, that objective can only be institutional stability and, more precisely, government stability. It has been proven that the mixed system of a presidential bent caused a chronic state of government instability in Portugal. Obviously, the government system by itself cannot be blamed for the imperfect functioning of our democracy. It is more important to recognize that the present constitutional arrangement of powers among the organs of sovereignty has invariably contributed to an intensification of all conflict situations. The principle of the twofold responsibility of the government, which has been constantly caught between a Parliament and a president of the republic that have not always been favorable, underscores the lack of clarity in the system and, in fact, allows for conflicts of authority between the government and the head of state. The many "questions" that have been brought up regarding foreign policy are evidence of this.

One of the merits of the document prepared by Santana Lopes consists precisely of the attempt to solve this problem of clarifying the groundrules. The very lack of such clarification has been one of the main sources of interinstitutional tension.

Our present government system, a blend of presidentialism and parliamentarism, has given us the disadvantages of both models without allowing us to enjoy the advantages of either of them. If it were nothing more, the Sa Carneiro-Santana Lopes plan for constitutional revision would at least have the quality of sparing us the difficulties of the always latent Bonapartism. But, in addition, the present plan also attempts to correct or lessen the shortcomings of parliamentarism, by rationalizing it and, if I may be allowed to use the expression, "rationing it."

Prime Ministerial System

This "rationalization" of the parliamentary element is achieved through the full establishment of the principle of the constructive censure motion. The adoption of this system would lead to the government's only being able to be dismissed "normally" through the passage of a motion for censure by an absolute majority of the deputies actually in active service, and that motion for censure would necessarily have to indicate the name of the candidate for prime minister (Article 152 of the Santana Lopes plan). This means that an "overwhelming majority" must also be capable of assuming responsibility as a government majority. Hence, there would be an end to the temporary and destructive alliances that serve to make governments fall, but that are incapable of insuring the government's continuity. Thus, it is hoped to put an end to the comings and goings of "presidential" governments or those of "independents."

Strangely enough, in the analyses of the constitutional draft in question, there has been a muddling of this aspect which, however, has proven to be extremely important in terms of the effectiveness of the system. This has occurred because the analysts either have not noticed this proposal, or else do not want people to notice

it. The "parliamentarist" aspect of the plan has been stressed, concealing from the public this fundamental element for correcting potential parliamentary excesses.

It is true that, in the first version of Sa Carneiro's plan (prepared in collaboration with Marcelo Rebelo de Sousa and Margarida Salema), this recourse to the motion of constructive censure did appear, albeit timidly (Articles 174 and 181 of "A Constitution for the 1980's"). However, because the fundamental step concerning the government's twofold political responsibility was not taken, the necessity for alternative submission of the name of the future prime minister was confined to the second motion of censure. This allowed for an institutional attrition that is quite avoidable, retaining the factors for unnecessary complication of the democratic process.

By fully accepting the mechanism that was introduced into modern constitutional law by the Fundamental Law of the Federal Republic of Germany (Article 67), the current constitutional revision plan attempts to guarantee governmental stability and, rather than being close to parliamentary anarchism, is, in fact, close to a prime ministerial system (or chancellor government) that would reinforce the executive branch more than any other authority.

The adoption of this system in West Germany is commonly offered as one of the reasons to explain the incredible stability of that government system which, it should be recalled, has had only five heads of government (chancellors) since the date of its founding.

There is every indication that recourse in Portugal to this principle of the motion of constructive censure is the ideal way of preparing the system for the possibility of not obtaining absolute majorities in the legislative elections. Because, in this manner, any majority, even if relative, allows the winning party or coalition to remain in power; because it would be incredible for the "overwhelming majority" to succeed in establishing itself as a government majority.

The Socialist Party [PS], which has been the chief victim of the semipresidential system, should carefully consider what it is doing before it refuses this proposal for constitutional revision. In fact, the "central" parties in the political spectrum only stand to gain from the adoption of a model of rationalized parliamentarism because, once in power, it would be extremely difficult to overthrow them, in view of the necessity for an alternative government majority to appear.

The present proposal for constitutional revision, viewed now from the angle of the party system that exists in Portugal, thereby contributes to solving one of the main problems of the difficult democracy in which we are living: that of not excluding the PCP [Portuguese Communist Party] from the democratic system but nevertheless keeping it as far removed as possible from the area of power. In other words, conditions must be created in Portugal for a future alternation between the right-center (AD) and the left-center (PS). A democratic regime must always have solutions in reserve. By making relative majorities possible, and lending them a certain guarantee of government stability, the Sa Carneiro-Santana Lopes plan for constitutional revision contributes to dispelling the potential dangers that might come from the extremes in times of crisis.

I agree with Marcelo Rebelo de Sousa when he claims that "a government system cannot be changed as one would change shirts." But wouldn't it be better to change the government system now than to keep changing governments ever afterward?

The Military Question

One point that has not been analyzed (or even mentioned) to date is that of the implications of this constitutional revision plan with regard to the military question.

In Portugal, the Council of the Revolution is usually cited as an example of the seriousness of an anomalous politicomilitary situation. Obviously, the Council of the Revolution is particularly intolerable, because it not only creates conflicts between the society and the Armed Forces, but also exacerbates intra-institutional tensions, that is, those within the military institution itself.

But truth requires us to say that the military problem in Portugal is not confined to the Council of the Revolution. And if, as seems predictable, the latter disappears from the roster of organs of sovereignty after the forthcoming constitutional revision, the country will then realize that the military question still persists, despite the absence of the Council of the Revolution.

If the Democratic Alliance did not find a civilian candidate for the presidential election it was not because it did not want to do so; it was, rather, because it could not. By this I mean to say that, whether or not we like the idea, the truth is that Portugal is still a kind of "barracks democracy." Military guardianship, even if it is discreet and democratically elected, is still military guardianship. And the current situation, wherein the president of the republic also holds the position of chief of staff of the Armed Forces, has revealed itself as typical of a "banana republic." So how can we continue to claim that the Armed Forces are quite "disciplined" and "normalized"? The first act of discipline should consist of an acceptance of the organic and functional separation of the two areas (civilian and military), and of the latter's subordination to the former.

Now one extremely important aspect of the Sa Carneiro-Santana Lopes plan for constitutional revision consists precisely of an indirect limitation of the military guardianship over the civilian democratic regime. With the stressing of parliamentary logic and the withdrawal from the president of the republic of the power to dismiss the prime minister, there is a reduction in the scope of the military power which, taking its support from the organ of sovereignty of the president of the republic, might continue attempts to impose its terms on the civilian democratic system. Hence, it is not a matter of personal distrust of one candidate or another. It is, rather, a matter, on the almost certain assumption of our continuing to have a general as president of the republic, of our insuring that the military power (whether it be behind Eanes or Soares Carneiro) recognizes the civilian system's autonomy in functioning and political hegemony.

If, perchance, a military candidate for the presidency of the republic (whoever he might be) did not accept these limits on presidential power, then we would have every reason to distrust his statements about the supremacy of the civil system in a democratic society.

And if, perchance, the Democratic Alliance did not accept this innovative plan for constitutional revision, and hesitated to change the government system, then we would have every reason to distrust its desire and capacity to make a de facto change in the lives of the Portuguese people.

FRAGA, POPULAR ALLIANCE BECOME MAJOR POLITICAL FORCE**UCD Voters Switch**

Bilbao EL CORREO ESPANOL in Spanish 16 Dec 80 p 25

[Text] Madrid, 15 Dec (Europa Press)—The image, both of Fraga and the Popular Alliance (AP), has improved, according to a survey made by Metra Six on the current position and potential of the AP. Of the 1,695 voters interviewed, 306 abstained, 454 voted for the UCD [Democratic Center Union], 709 for the Democratic Coalition, and 226 for the National Union (UN).

According to this survey, the Popular Alliance has doubled its voting support in the 1979 elections, with an increase from 8 to 17.8 percent (retaining the abstention rate for 1 March 1979), or 22.1 percent, if abstentions were reduced to 11.2 percent.

These are mainly votes, according to the survey in question, won over from the UCD (which lost a number of votes to abstentions), which dropped from 36.9 percent to 16.5 percent or 20.5 percent of the vote. "The fact is that some 19 percent of the UCD voters (with a low index of voting consistency: 48.8 percent) in 1979, i.e. 672,000 persons, would vote for the AP today (with an 88.4 percent voting loyalty index, i.e. practically double that for the UCD). Also, some 13.3 percent of those who abstained in 1979 would vote for the AP today (700,000 persons).

When it came to rating the AP (on a scale of 0 to 10), it won 4.85 points (UCD--4.57, PSOE [Spanish Socialist Workers Party]--3.97, PCE [Spanish Communist Party]--1.74, and CD--4.47), "being preferred by men over 39 years of age and residents of cities with more than 100,000 inhabitants, and Madrid. And in particular in the Sevilla, Madrid, Toledo, Asturias, Galicia and Murcia regions."

The image of the AP has improved very visibly, according to this survey, in terms of "the personality of Fraga" (19.7 percent), "the clarity of the AP" (9.2), the "political inconsistency of the UCD" (8.9), and "because it is the only party which can resolve the problems of the country" (8.1 percent).

Image of the Leaders

The degree to which leaders are known is as follows: Adolfo Suarez, 99.6 percent; Manuel Fraga and Felipe Gonzalez, 98.7; Blas Pinar, 91.6; Areilza, 78.4; Osorio, 71.3; and Silva, 64.8.

The average rating (from 0 to 10) puts Fraga in first place with 6.12, followed by Suarez with 5.03, Felipe Gonzalez with 4.96, Areilza with 4.46, Osorio with 4.13, Silva with 3.86 and Blas Pinar with 3.26.

According to this survey, the various leaders have experienced the following changes in their images: up 3.29 for Fraga, up 10 for Felipe Gonzalez, down 5.9 for Areilza, down 7.5 for Blas Pinar, down 10.4 for Silva, and down 31.3 for Adolfo Suarez.

The respective parties have undergone the following changes in their images: up 19.8 for the AP, down 0.2 for the PSOE, down 10.7 for the FN [New Force], down 20.9 for the PCE, and down 34.5 for the UCD.

The development of Fraga's image in the eyes of the various parties was as follows: up 4.4 for AP voters, up 38.2 for UCD voters, up 25.7 for those who abstained, and up 14.2 for the FN voters.

The survey showed that Fraga's image improved for the following reasons: "participation in televised debates," 28.5; "he is a good politician," 15.3; "clearer and more consistent than the UCD," 12.7; "has a more democratic image," 10.2, and "has greater rallying power and clear ideas," 10.0.

The AP voter, according to this survey, falls between the UCD voter and the FN voter, but closer to the former. The fact is that although the AP voter's sociological background coincides in many respects with that of the FN-UN voter, "the ideological difference represents an important enough brake to make an effort to win votes focused on the FN-UN electorate ill-advised. On the other hand, the sociological distance between the UCD voters and those of the AP is not so great as to prevent a broad shift between the two groups of voters."

Interview With Fraga

Madrid ABC in Spanish 30 Nov 80 p 9

[Excerpt] The leader of the Popular Alliance and the Spokesman of the Democratic Coalition in the Congress of Deputies, Manuel Fraga Iribarne, visited the ABC premises. In one of the regular exchanges we have been having with leading personalities in public life, Fraga Iribarne reviewed the general political situation from his perspective as a conservative political leader. The PSOE, whose moderation he praises, because he deems it necessary in a democratic Spain; the results of the partial Senate elections in Seville and Almeria, in which his own party experienced a substantial gain; the rumors of disagreements within the CD; the development of a natural majority in the government; terrorism and the development of the autonomy situation were, among other contemporary subjects, the focus of his comments in the course of the two intensive hours of dialog with representatives of our political section, with the editors of this periodical present.

During the first moments of the discussion, Mr Fraga gave a political assessment of the recent elections to the Senate held in Almeria and Seville. He said first of all "that one must neither exaggerate nor minimize the importance of the results of elections affecting a half of the legislature," and he added that "in any case,

the results seem to confirm the trends already evident in the regional elections held this year in the Basque country and Catalonia." He noted, as the most important factor, the spectacular decline of the UCD, which in the case of Andalusia, he said, "is of special importance because this decline may have resulted from the policy of 'demonstrations for autonomy' sponsored by the government party in this region." He added that the Socialist Party of Andalusia also paid a "high price" for its alliance with the UCD on the confidence motion, and that abstention, which cannot be attributed to situational reasons alone, was quite extensive. Concerning the Popular Alliance, he said that "we have seen a substantial increase in the two provinces." With regard to the PSOE, he said the most interesting thing to note is that it maintained its position and triumphed "thanks to the moderation evidenced by its leaders, except on the subject of foreign policy." In any case, he concluded, "there is nothing in these elections which can surprise us."

[Question] Does the fact that the Popular Alliance participated as such in these elections rather than in the Democratic Coalition mean that in some way the coalition has now deteriorated, been bypassed or has broken up?

[Answer] No, it means none of these things. If partial elections had been held in other provinces, I cannot say under what banner or with what candidates we would have participated. But it was clear in Almeria and Seville that there was no other base than that of the Popular Alliance, and for this reason this choice was made. However it seems that the political "trademark" is important, and this cannot be denied. What it does seem to me there is a need to stress is that the majority of the parties in the Democratic Coalition are now participating in the Popular Alliance.

Insisting on the rumors which have spread recently about the existence of major political divisions within the parliamentary group in the Democratic Coalition, he said that "ours is a coalition of leading personalities ('among whom, naturally, I do not include myself'), an honest and open group in which there is discussion on all the major themes. Mr Areilza has on some issues, such as the Basque statutes, maintained a very specific position which, naturally, the group has accepted. This does not suggest the existence of cracks in the political consensus. In any case I must say that just as Areilza has in fact said, the declaration of a state of emergency in the Basque country was not dealt with within our group."

A Majority With Minorities

Later on, Fraga Iribarne answered another question on the possibility that a broad parliamentary majority is currently developing, a majority which the UCD is trying to develop with the votes of the Catalan minority and the possible votes of the Basques if, finally, the economic agreements are signed and the establishment of the security council is approved. "Would you join in this majority?" he was asked. The leader of the Alliance answered: "If such a majority were formed it would seem to me very dangerous. The specific subject of the agreements seems good to me, but this is not the case with the security council which, as I said when the subject arose, is a serious error. The PNV [Basque Nationalist Party], on the other hand, has never clarified, never specified what its aspirations in the

regional picture are. Therefore, and because with regard to Navarre a clear case of colonialism exists, my reservations are greater than with regard to the people of Catalonia, whose support of the government also seemed to me, as I said at the time, dangerous. Therefore, and until the PNV makes specific statements about unity in Spain, I have no hope of reaching an understanding with them."

A Functional Government

In connection with the presumed support which various economic, financial and military sectors might give a "functional government" headed by Alfonso Osorio, Manuel Fraga shared the latter's view to the effect that a cabinet of this kind outside the constitution would not be possible. "What is happening is that nothing is happening. In other words, as there is not a government which can govern, and there is no situation with a future, and as there are few Spaniards who think that this can continue until 1983, as indeed it cannot, it is natural then that Villa y Corte Street is full of rumors." He quoted the example of the question which put Reagan in the White House, when Americans planning to vote for Carter were asked if they believed that that year was better than the preceding one, and the preceding one better than the one before that. He concluded that "this is what has happened in Seville and Almeria, for Spaniards do not believe that we are better off this year than last and better off last year than the one before. "The problems," he went on, "continue to grow, terrorism is on the increase, the economy continues to be in crisis. Given this situation, the appearance of new demons is inevitable."

Mid-1981 Elections

Bilbao EL CORREO ESPANOL in Spanish 18 Dec 80 p 21

[Excerpt] Madrid, 17 Dec (Europa Press)--Manuel Fraga Iribarne, president of the Popular Alliance, said during a dinner meeting held last night that any political force which is not prepared to face elections between the middle of 1981 and the middle of 1982 would be irresponsible. "We are going to be prepared by the middle of 1981," he said.

"It would be best," Fraga added, "if within the limits set by the constitution, the elections were delayed as long as possible. Currently," he added, "the country has an opportunity to form a majority like the French one with the current composition of the chamber. This is a good solution and I hope that we will move toward it. I believe that a rapprochement between the UCD and the AP is possible and desirable," he went on to say.

Statements by the UCD Leader

On the subject of the statements made by Abril Martorell to the effect that the Popular Alliance had been voting with the Communist Party for 5 months, Fraga said that "obviously this is false. One need only review the votes in the Cortes. Mr Abril does not know which is north and which is south."

Also, he said that the UCD has always maneuvered to take over the political territory of every other group. The Socialist Party has not yielded, and intends

to recover its territory. Instead of rejoicing that the PSOE is moving toward social democracy, the UCD is complaining that its territory is being taken over, when it is this party which moved in on that of the PSOE.

With regard to the UCD congress, Fraga said that what is happening worries him, in the sense that he would like to see solutions adopted. Concerning what might happen at this congress, he would only say that "it is more likely that the minority without principles will yield than that the majority which does have them will."

Also he said that the relations between the parliamentary group of the Democratic Coalition and the UCD have improved, but that the talks are more complicated now, because it is necessary to talk both with the parliamentary group and with the government.

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CSO: 3110

CHANGES IN PSUC RESPOND TO SOVIET OFFENSIVE IN ITALY, SPAIN**'Leninists' Control Party**

Madrid YA in Spanish 8 Jan 81 p 10

[Article by Maria Angeles Llinas]

[Excerpts] A period of crisis, instability and difficulties, especially in the Parliament of Catalonia and on the state level with the PCE [Spanish Communist Party], is what is starting now in the Unified Socialist Party of Catalonia (PSUC), following its fifth congress, which brought about the abandonment of Eurocommunism.

Although the victory at this congress went to the pro-Soviet sectors opposed to the continuation of what has been the party's Eurocommunist line to date, it was, in fact, the "Leninist" sector which turned out to benefit most from this crisis, which has placed the Eurocommunists in opposition to the leadership in the party. The fact that the Leninists will make the "greatest gain" from all this is shown, first of all, by their being the ones who elected, through the Central Committee, the party's two leading positions, those of the new president and the new secretary general. It was the Leninists who had to elect them, when no agreement was reached by the pro-Soviets, who wanted Antoni Gutierrez Diaz and Gregorio Lopez Raimundo to retain the leadership, and the Eurocommunists, who would not agree to participate in any way in the new executive body. Further evidence that the Leninists have improved their position in the party is the fact that the party's new secretary general, Paco Frutos, made his election to that post, the day before yesterday, contingent on having the top-ranking leaders of this sector: Andreu Claret, Antoni Luchetti, Maria Dolores Calvet, Jose Luis Lopez Bulla and Jose Maria Rodriguez Rovira, with him in the executive body. It is also proven by the fact that the commission formed to elect the approximately 20 individuals who will comprise the new executive committee includes three clearly Leninist names: one, that of Andreu Claret; another, that of Rafael Ribo; and still another, that of the secretary general, Paco Frutos.

Yesterday, the commission which will have to elect the new members of the executive body within a maximum period of 10 days started acting, first of all to try to convince certain Eurocommunists of the second rank to lend their support to the new executive body. What the party's new leadership most fears now is that the Eurocommunists will join the opposition; something which, moreover, is most likely. And it is likely, also, that they will set themselves up as a faction, which would

entail their immediate expulsion, because the democratic centralism that is in effect in all the Communist Parties, including the PSUC, does not allow the different movements in the party to set themselves up as factions. Although, at the moment, there has not yet been any talk of their suppression, in the long run this is not to be precluded, because the Eurocommunists are beginning to reorganize, as shown by the manifesto that they issued after their defeat at the congress, on behalf of continuing to uphold their Eurocommunist theories. It is also proven by the fact that, as recently as yesterday, a sector of them, headed by Jordi Borlla and Jordi Sole Tura, was preparing to hold some public functions: one, specifically, at the Law School in Barcelona, to continue explaining their Eurocommunist theories. This Eurocommunist sector, which is also called that of the "pure Eurocommunists," is of the opinion, as Jordi Sole Tura stated after his sector's defeat, that, "the crisis in the PSUC which began after the suppression of the Eurocommunist theories is part of an offensive by the Soviet Union to put an end to Eurocommunism in the PCE and in the Communist Party of Italy, starting with the party most in dispute: the PSUC."

Socialist-Communist Gap Widens

Madrid EL PAIS in Spanish 8 Jan 81 p 10

[Text] Yesterday, the political relations secretary of the PSOE [Spanish Socialist Workers Party], Enrique Mugica, expressed gratification at the "clarification of political space" implied by the results of the recent PSUC congress, which is a definitive indication that the Communists are going to stop occupying Socialist electoral space.

"The clarification of political forces is very important. Eurocommunism attempted to eradicate the differences with Socialism in order to obtain more electoral space, but we have always said that Communism has not changed in essence. Within a few months of a 'summit' meeting in Madrid held by Eurocommunist leaders, the strategists of the French Communist Party broke the unity of the left in France: This is a fact that should be very carefully considered."

In Mugica's opinion, what occurred in Barcelona is revealing. "The Catalonian Communists were the first to show a liberal, antidogmatic image; and, furthermore, the Catalonians are by far the strongest sector of the PCE. Those images did not correspond to the reality, and it was merely on the surface, to win votes. When they reach what they consider their limit on votes, they stand pat, and revert to what I believe are the inherent characteristics of Communism: theoretical dogmatism, internal ranking and alignment with the expansionist positions of the USSR."

Mugica believes that the shift made by the PSUC will not have any repercussions on the left's municipal pact. He claimed: "If they broke the pact, they would be the first to be hurt." With regard to the positions assumed by the PSUC in foreign policy, Mugica is especially surprised by the theory opposing Spain's entry into the European Economic Community, "which is very disturbing."

Finally, he added: "This shows that the spirit of the 21 conditions of the Third International is still in force, which brought about the split in the workers'

movement, with a debate which, essentially, was nothing more than an alternative: accept either liberty and democracy, or the authoritarian forms of leadership in the workers' movement proposed by the Third International. With whom is the unity of the left going to be achieved now? With the Stalinists?"

The minister of justice, Francisco Fernandez Ordóñez, from the Social Democratic sector of UCD (Democratic Center Union), for his part, declared: "The results of the PSUC congress will pose problems between that party and the PCE, and hence a certain amount of political destabilization. Although I do not wish to voice opinions on internal affairs of other parties, it is a fact that, in any event, we shall have to wait until the next PCE congress, at which they will unquestionably have to undertake a clarification. Another matter to be considered also is that of the PSUC's future relations with the PSC [Christian Social Party]-PSOE, in the municipal and autonomous policy of Catalonia, and the way in which this change will affect the Autonomous Government of Catalonia."

Miguel Roca, spokesman for the Catalonian minority in the Congress, has expressed concern that what happened in the PSUC could be directed toward a radicalization, "which would be very detrimental to the consolidation of the autonomous institutions and in coping with the economic crisis effectively."

Only Eurocommunism Is Credible

Barcelona LA VANGUARDIA in Spanish 7 Jan 81 p 9

[Editorial by Vladimir de Senir]

[Text] The greatest obstacle that the Communist Parties in the multipartisan democracies, that is, those with an oversupply of political ideologies, must overcome is credibility.

Apart from the theoretical tenets of Marxism, which call for an ideological struggle that must be upheld and observed as another one of the many relative truths that make up our world (because absolute truths are best left to the theologians), the fact is that, for the present, the taking of that path toward a more just society, in which man is not exploited by his fellow man, in which minority interests do not prevail over majority interests, and in which there are no class discriminations, suffers from something fundamental and nonnegotiable: liberty.

Up until now, practical Communism continues to be combined with the lack of liberty; and we do not deem it necessary to enumerate instances which, since they are common and repeated, have become trite. We already know that the path toward such a Socialist and Communist society is long, that we must have patience and understanding, and be united, and that an inevitable step is that of the dictatorship of the proletariat, or its equivalent. But, while that step may be indispensable, just as the lack of liberty is inevitable in the case of a dictatorship, the Communist Parties are going to find "the sale of their product" very difficult on the market of the multipartisan system. To "sell" Communism in a democratic society with the example of the Soviet Union backing one, as a mainstay, is something akin to tightrope walking; and the proof of this is the constant balancing acts that the European Communist Parties must practice; parties which, nevertheless,

appear to be bogged down (the French one is a good example) in electoral standings which will hardly facilitate their access to power, which is what is involved.

"Selling Communism" on the free market of ideas with the Soviet Communist activity as a guarantee of quality is like wanting someone to buy from us a brand new Mercedes, from which, once inside, he cannot emerge until the seller tells him what to do, and the steering wheel of which is automatic, and he cannot decide on the direction in which he wants to go. And that indispensable credibility, which must be consubstantial with a good seller (that is, a politician who offers ideas) is what has been achieved by the so-called Eurocommunists who, with a view of the political market, have known how to adapt their product to a reality that is quite different from that of the country which holds the original patent.

One may agree or disagree with the theory of Eurocommunism, but what is indisputable is that its goal to attain a revolution of the majority which will lead to Socialism with liberty, without excluding liberty itself along the way, deserves credibility. In fact, to the Eurocommunists liberty is not only a mere goal, but also a means, certainly, because the contrary would be unthinkable in our society; just as, among the right wing, the boundary between what is credible and what is to be rejected is stipulated by respect for individual and collective liberty.

The PSUC, with its course of action since its clandestine status, had attained that necessary credibility. A greater internal clarification of the party was certainly necessary, as an editorial in this newspaper even requested a few days ago, while recognizing the constructive work accomplished by the Catalonian and Spanish Communists during the difficult transition period, a period which, moreover, we consider not completely ended yet. It is possible that the ever tempting electoralism has prompted those who are Communists to have some very moderate proposals out of opportunism, which some people, perhaps in a rather exaggerated fashion, have gone so far as to categorize as Social Democratic. But such mistakes, like many others, should not be ascribed to Eurocommunism, a mere adaptation (and that, too, in Marxist practice) of Communism to the European situation. We already know that the victorious defenders of the "pro-Soviet" faction, or, if you do not like the expression, the minstrels of "flowers and violets" of the USSR (because they do not consider either the pros or the cons of anything), are of the opinion that "Eurocommunism has Eurocentric concomitance, as if Europe were the center of the world." It is surely difficult to ascertain whether Europe might objectively be considered the center of the world, but, to many of us (Catalonians, Basques, Andalusians, Castilians...Spaniards in general, and Europeans in particular), Europe is our "sociopolitical ecosystem," in which we have always lived, and wish to continue to do so, with even greater impetus, unity and solidarity. However, what is certain is that the Soviet Union is not such, even if only because of how far distant it is. And the PSUC's Eurocommunists have simply understood that feeling, because they too share it, without reneging on their strictly Communist tenets.

A great unknown has appeared among the Catalonian Communists, and hence among the Spanish Communists. There will be time to analyze the consequences of this turning point in the PSUC, with data that can be verified. At the moment, our personal opinion is that what happened is a step backward by the Communist movement;

just as the invasion of Czechoslovakia was a step backward, and the more recent one of Afghanistan is.

"Eurocommunism does not create differences, it expresses them," is the claim of those who advocate pursuing the line that has been undertaken. And those differences are precisely the ones that exist between a Communist with a pretext for invading other countries ("forced by circumstances"), and eliminating liberty for the sake of the final utopian goal, and a Communism with respect for multipartisan democracy and liberty; a liberty which has been, is and will be the authentic desire of the human being.

P.S. It is quite certain that the "pro-Soviets" will consider these reflections to be merely the ideas of petit-bourgeois reactionaries...Perhaps, but the objective reasoning of the votes (the only truly democratic final examination of political ideologies) will tell at the proper time whether what has happened is a step backward or not. Meanwhile, from our vantage point as political observers and reporters, which we have left temporarily to express opinions, we shall continue our attempt to convey to our readers the thinking of the new (but aged) PSUC...And free of charge, so that the pro-Soviets can "take advantage of the free publicity that the news media are giving us lately", lately and forever.

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CSO: 3110

AP PRESIDENT PRAGA ON SPANISH-ISRAELI DIPLOMATIC TIES

Madrid ABC in Spanish 9 Jan 81 p 10

[Text] Madrid--Manuel Praga Iribarne, the president of Popular Alliance (AP), arrived yesterday in Madrid from Tel Aviv after a week's stay in Israel on an invitation from the Israeli Foreign Ministry.

Mr Praga said upon his arrival that it had been a very interesting trip, during which he had conversed with major government and opposition figures and that he had been received by the Sephardic community at the Council of Jerusalem. Mr Praga also mentioned that he had visited several borders and that his visit had coincided with intense domestic political activity.

As to possible diplomatic relations between Spain and Israel, the AP leader pointed out that upon leaving Madrid he stated that he was very much in favor of establishing such relations and that he is still of the same opinion.

In this regard he pointed out that in politics nations have to be able to face up to risks, which is a characteristic of strong, serious governments, not weak, extemporizing ones. It is in Spain's interest, he added, to make this decision, and it cannot accept any opposing pressures. He also pointed out that both England and France have relations with the Arabs and with Israel at the same time.

In conclusion, Mr Praga noted that the state of Israel is an irreversible fact and that Spain ought to have interests in it in many spheres.

The president of Popular Alliance stated that it is very regrettable that factions that call themselves "progressives" but that are merely an opportunistic left wing refuse to recognize that Israel is a socially advanced country, which shows that ideology gives way to purely opportunistic interests.

Praga Iribarne also told the EFE agency that "our foreign policy is practically nonexistent. It is a collection of weaknesses, postponements and smiles, not a foreign policy."

Praga expressed concern about "the danger" that the Soviet Union's military might represents to Europe, criticized U.S. President Carter for preventing the manufacture of the neutron bomb and hampering the installation of medium-range missiles and asserted that "Spain cannot defend itself alone and on account of its geographic location it cannot simply choose neutrality."

He then explained his support for Spain's entry into NATO, which is opposed "somewhat dogmatically" by Spanish socialists, "because countries are divided into those that have a defense and those that are defenseless, and it is bad to be defenseless both as an individual and as a country."

The AP president said that "Spain is not in a position to create its own defense, and I do not know whether the United States and Russia, which have sought alliances such as NATO and the Warsaw Pact, are."

Praga said that not even Israel, "the country that has made the greatest efforts to defend itself in modern times," could have done so without the aid of the world's and the United States' Jewish communities.

In answer to a question, Praga Iribarne said that he was "convinced that 90 percent of UCD [Democratic Center Union] voters are closer today to the so-called "critical" positions, adding that "if we live in a democracy, this should be reflected, sooner or later, with all of its consequences, in the UCD structure." In the opinion of the AP leader, "the attempt to unify differing ideological groups around the UCD has failed."

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CSO: 3110

SOCIAL DEMOCRATIC LEADERSHIP BRACES FOR ELECTION IN 1981

Stockholm DAGENS NYHETER in Swedish 3 Jan 81 p 18

(Passages within slantlines in boldface)

[Text] The Social Democratic leadership ordered during the days between Christmas and New Year increased readiness for a new election in 1981. The labor unions all around the country were urged in a letter to keep the candidate lists of the party up to date in case a new election would be necessary.

No responsible party leader dares at this time to believe in a new election. But the political situation is so unstable that anything can happen. Most people do, however, consider it most likely that the conservatives will in some way reform their government in case the present three way division would collapse.

There is going to be a politically dramatic time. All the three government parties are setting up new party programs that will be assumed during the year. All the five parliament parties have regular party congresses and the Center Party has an additional meeting during the winter on top of that.

It may become dramatic for the Social Democrats in the fall when the course of the wage earners' investment fund matter will be determined. The week before the party congress the Swedish Confederation of Trade Unions has a congress and will for its part have a determining say in the fund matter. If there is a rerun of the 1975 fund collapse when the Confederation of Trade Unions proceeded faster than the party dared to it will be time for new tensions between the two branches of the workers' movement.

A few weeks later there is a collision between the congresses of the Liberal Party and the Moderate Coalition Party simultaneously with the spring break of the Parliament. The possible resignation of Bohman attracts the main interest in Falun at the same time as the Liberal Party gets a new party program in Stockholm.

Already in the beginning of May there will be a crowding of the political arena when the Swedish Communist Party and the Social Democrats at the same

time, although not together, will remember that 50 years have passed since the Adalen shots in 1931. Most of those who were shot were communists, the Communist Party points out in a survey of the activities of the year.

Here are some of the more important events of the different parties:

/The Moderate Coalition Party/: On 9 March part 2 of the membership campaign begins. On 27-28 March a national conference of municipal politics in Uppsala, county days in Western Norrland on 27 April and in Kalmar on 8 September. Party Congress in Falun 22-26 October whereby a new party program will be assumed.

/The Liberal Party/: On 31 January-1 February national conference in Jonkoping with the Christian Social Council, an organization within the party that has worked since the 1960's and is now led by Bertil Hansson from Gothenburg.

The party congress, which is now called national meeting, is held 22-25 October in the People's Hall in Stockholm.

In the end of January a program committee presents its proposal for a new party program based on the conference that took place during the fall. Six thousand members of the Liberal Party then answered 25 questions about how the Liberal Party politics should be planned for the future. "Let More People Form the Future" was the title of a debate book within this context.

During the spring the proposed program will be circulated before the party leaders can have their say.

New Program

/The Center Party/: An additional party meeting in the Concert House in Gothenburg 13-14 February. Four hundred representatives and 100 council members and parliament group members will assume the party program that has been waiting since the spring of last year. The delay is due to the fact that the popular vote about nuclear power intervened. The regular meetings will be held in Ronneby, the Association of Center Party Women and the Center Party Youth League 11-13 June and the Center Party 14-17 June.

There is going to be one meeting between elections since the Center Party will have time for one additional regular meeting during the election year.

/The Social Democrats/: There will be a large conference in the exhibition halls of Alvsjo outside Stockholm 29-30 January. The theme will be wage earners' funds and economy. The participants are around 600 ombudsmen, parliament members and municipal representatives. Palme will go there directly from his second trip to Iran-Iraq.

On 10-12 May the Adalen shots will be remembered and a bronze sculpture will be erected on the way to Lunde. Lenny Clarhall of Sodertalje is the sculptor and the commune of Kramfors together with the Memorial Foundation have collected the money.

The Congress of the Confederation of Trade Unions

On 20 September the Confederation of Trade Unions will have its congress in the People's Hall in Stockholm. Immediately thereafter, on 26 September-3 October, the party congress will be held in the same place.

The main theme of both congresses will be the wage earners' funds. The party will also assume a kind of an action program against the economical crisis or as it is called "a program for the slow reconstruction of Sweden." The leader of the crisis group is Ingvar Carlsson.

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CSO: 3109

BOOK LOOKS AT EFFECT OF POLLS ON POLITICAL PARTIES

Stockholm DAGENS NYHETER in Swedish 3 Jan 81 p 4

(Article by Erik Asard)

(Text) There is no evidence showing that the opinion polls influence voters to any significant extent. The polls seem to have a larger effect on the general debate and on parties and politicians. This is claimed by the two political scientists Soren Holmberg and Olof Petersson in their book "Within the Margin of Error, A Book About Political Opinion Polls."

It all started in the wheat fields of the American Midwest. A woman politician, Alex Miller, ran for office in the state of Iowa. Mrs Miller was worried. At that time it was extremely unusual that a woman would run for office in political elections. How was it going to go? What chances did she really have?

In order to find the answers she asked her son-in-law to study the matter. He had shortly before defended his doctor's thesis at the University of Iowa and developed a new method for making choices.

By means of his new measurement technique he came to the conclusion that Mrs Miller stood a good chance to win the election and that she also did. The first political opinion poll in the modern sense had succeeded in making a correct prediction.

The name of the lucky son-in-law was George Gallup. Within a few years he had founded his own research institute and managed to get over 100 American newspapers to prescribe to his polls. A new profession--that of the professional opinion poller--was born.

Have You Seen the King?

The poll technique spread like wildfire to other Western countries. In our country the Swedish Gallup Institute was founded in 1941. The first investigations were rather amateurish and say more about the spirit of the time and the interviewers than about the opinions of the Swedish people in different matters.

"Have you ever seen the King in real life?" was one of the questions presented in the summer of 1943. "Yes," claimed 55 percent of those who were interviewed. The answer of the consequent question "Has he spoken with you?" was "Yes" for only 7 percent of the interviewed individuals.

Other groups in society were treated with somewhat less respect. "Do you think that party-affiliated communists should be allowed to become public school teachers?" This rhetorical question was presented by the Gallup Institute in the spring of 1948, in the beginning of the Cold War 1948. A majority (61 percent) of those who faced this question answered with a "no." It has to be considered surprising that as many as 20 percent of the interviewed persons dared to say "yes" regarding the formulation of the question.

The field did, however, soon get a bad reputation. In the 1948 presidential election in the United States the poll institutes failed to determine the winner. The Republican Thomas Dewey was the clear leader according to the polls. Regardless of that the president in office, President Truman, won a substantial victory. The opinion polls disappeared for sometime from the news pages of the newspapers.

Sifo

In the mid-50's they did, however, reappear. Then Sifo, the Swedish Institute of Public Opinion Research, started its activities. Sifo soon gained a dominant position in the market. Sifo has largely been able to maintain that position through the years, particularly with regard to opinion polls and political evaluations.

Sifo and other institutes receive their large incomes from market research for the private industry. But what really sells the name of the company and what gives prestige and public relations are the studies of party sympathies and the popularity of the party leaders. Such measurements are nowadays made on and off by two private institutes (Sifo and Testologen-IMU), two public institutes (SCB and PUB, the Audience and Program Research Section of the Swedish National Radio) as well as one internal institute, the Gallup Institute of the Social Democrats (a successor of the old institute of the 1940's).

We know what it usually sounds like when a new party sympathy poll is made public. The newspaper headlines, the radio voices and TV reporters announce that one party has advanced and another one gone backward. Some party representative is given the opportunity to make a statement about the destiny of his party. The editors and political commentators try to explain the changes and to predict the future of the parties. There is a wave of reaction going through the political debate.

Few Assignments

The citation is taken from a book by the two political scientists Soren Holmberg and Olof Petersson. Its title is "Within the Margin of Error. A Book About Political Opinion Polls" (Liber, appr. 100 Sw. crowns). I

would wish that every journalist and creator of public opinion would take the time to read it, carefully and with a lot of consideration. That would avoid wasting a lot of printer's ink! Party strategists and sympathizers would be spared a lot of tears, joy and false expectations!

The authors' thorough examination concludes in a criticism that runs along several lines. The first one to appear in the gun port is Sifo. Most of Sifo's studies of politics and social matters are made on assignment by the industry or for newspapers that are closely associated with the Conservatives. Apart from that Sifo does not, as a rule, undertake studies for more than one political party at a time. Since 1973 the name of the client is the Moderate Coalition Party.

A Conservative Trend

It is, therefore, not a surprise when Holmberg-Pettersson determine that Sifo's opinion polls represent a definite "Conservative trend." The tendency is observed not only in the matters that are presented, but also in Sifo's own press reports. When one reads the many investigations ordered by SVENSKA DAGBLADET in later years one does understand exactly what is indicated. The problems and the views of the workers' movement, the environmental movement and other movements have been conspicuous by their almost total absence.

Is it then possible to trust the opinion poll results? Opinion polls are often both arbitrary and dubious, often even meaningless in single matters.

The response percentage is often low, sometimes only 60 percent and the questions presented are often biased to the advantage of the client. The institutes love to construct questions for only three kinds of people: the ones who are for or against something as well as those who are hesitating. Such a simple division into three is often very unsatisfactory in illustrating a more complicated pattern of opinion.

Well, what about the voter barometers, that nowadays immerse us with a rate of one or two per month? Even here the authors want to nuance and play down. These barometers contain less information than what you would usually believe, they write. In Sifo's case, for example, the ups and downs of the parties are mostly the result of random variations depending on the investigation method used.

False Signals

Figures that vary from one time to the other and create profound comments on the editorial pages, can be assumed to be false opinion poll signals without any basis in reality. Changes that are part of a more long term trend have, however, been proven to be more trustworthy.

There is no evidence that the voters would to any significant extent be influenced by the opinion polls. They seem to have more effect on the general debate and on parties and politicians.

An example is the changed strategy of the Liberal Party in the middle of the election campaign in 1971. The party started its campaign with a subdued profile and with Ola Ullsten as the statesmen-like government leader in Stockholm. Then came the August figures of Sifo, which were poor for the Liberal Party. It was necessary to change the tactics.

Instead of sitting calmly in the Government Office Building, Ullsten and others had to rush out to the streets and market places all over the country. The liberal ideas had somehow become lost--now was again a time to draw the own profile.

Party Politics

The ones that are most badly affected are, however, the mass media. It is sad to read how, above all, the press usually treats the polls. Technical information about the polls is hardly ever given. The press reports of the institutes are as a rule published without changes; the critical distance is missing. The editors' comments of voter barometers are also partial. The political color shines right through. The concern for one's own party is put before a sober analysis of the development of the opinion.

During the 1960's and 1970's it has become increasingly popular to use opinion arguments in the political debate. In the editorial pages the argumentation is built on the referral to the opinion of the "people" in various matters. The authors have also studied this and state that it is legitimate to use the opinions of the majority of the people as an argument in a debate.

Yes, but the question is how relevant this is. The quality of an opinion is not determined by how many or how few people stand behind it. On the other hand the referrals to what "the people" think or do not think is not important in the evaluation of the practical possibilities to carry out a certain action.

But that is another and more complicated story.

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CSO: 3109

PALME URGES DISARMAMENT EFFORTS, NUCLEAR-FREE ZONES

Stockholm DAGENS NYHETER in Swedish 31 Dec 80 p 6

[Text] "It is possible to create a far better world by means of the common [sense] that we possess and the knowledge that we have." These are the words of Olof Palme before the beginning of the new year. He is surprisingly optimistic: He even uses the word promising. The block for the solution of the most threatening problems of the world, the arms race and global starvation, is the lack of political willpower, according to Olof Palme. And hereby the growing peace movement may become the factor that creates such willpower.

The global situation has with few exceptions only become worse since the end of World War II. What hope for the future does Olof Palme see?

"Despite the general pessimism I have become seized by a certain optimism. In recent years I have been able to penetrate more and more into what is called the questions of the fate of the world. The more knowledge I acquire the more optimistic I become about the global situation."

The big problems of the world can very well be solved--global starvation may be eliminated by the year 2000 and the arms race can be stopped during the eighties, according to Palme.

"If feelings and common sense could work together even these obstacles could be eliminated."

The Military Pacts Continue To Arm Themselves

The latest figure for global military expenses is 2,000 billion crowns in 1 year. Two-thirds of this are used by the Warsaw Pact and NATO, the Western Defense Alliance. How is it then possible to be hopeful? Olof Palme brings out several light points in the darkness:

"Two-thirds of humanity have been freed from colonialism since World War II. Democracy has with great vitality demonstrated its strength, dictatorship has collapsed in Europe. And the people of the dictatorships that are still existing show that the spirit of liberty persists, like now most recently in Poland."

Olof Palme says that he becomes more and more convinced that we, the people of the world, have the common sense to end the arms race and global starvation.

He says that you can start anywhere and he declares three requirements that have to be met:

1. /Human rights/ [in boldface]--the great threats of the arms race that could wipe out the entire globe and of global starvation and of global poverty as well as of the increasing environmental pollution.

2. /Human rights/ [in boldface]--humanity is threatened by the increasing occurrence of torture and injustice against individuals. Olof Palme is very critical toward statements made by certain Americans in power, like Mrs Kirkpatrick, member of the future Reagan government and U.S. ambassador. She has stated that military dictatorships are the most natural government form in Latin America.

3. /The Nations' rights/ [in boldface]--every nation has a right to be independent. The nations should not become pieces of the games of the great powers.

"Violence in the relationship between people is a sign of weakness," says Olof Palme. And military violence between nations is a sign of political weakness."

He brings up Afghanistan and El Salvador as examples. These countries will never become pieces of the games of the great powers, because they are nations that protect their freedom. And then he becomes optimistic again about the rights that he listed.

"There is no belief in fate according to which these rights would be humbled."

Olof Palme sees another cause for hope, an important one, in the growing peace movement. As Alva Myrdal often points out only a revolt by the people could stop the arms race. The peace movement was great in the 1950's, it gradually slowed down, and is now speeding up again. A contributing factor is, Palme states over again, the knowledge that people acquire.

"Now we know the reality, the reality that is expressed in facts. For example how many hundred thousand people would die immediately if a not especially big atom bomb would be detonated over, for example, Hamburg. How many hundred thousand would die somewhat later of the blast waves and how many would die some time after that of radiation damages and other damages. And that of maybe 7,000 physicians in the area only so many would survive that one physician could devote 5 minutes every 14 days to the care of each very seriously injured person."

"That is the reality, says Olof Palme. It has not been considered decent to talk about it before, it has been considered as atrocity propaganda. But now this reality is being talked about. And the growth of the peace movement is promising."

Is there a rightist wind blowing in the world? Ronald Reagan as the president of the United States, for example? Olof Palme does not want to comment on Ronald Reagan. He says that some of Reagan's statements convey fear, but he wants to wait to see what the new administration will be like. He does not quite believe in a rightist wind.

There is indeed a spreading rightist trend based on fear. It uses both military power and socks weakness in order to proceed. It is egoistic, it is built on the fear that your job is threatened, or a fear of communism. It is an infertile movement that is leading nowhere. I hope that a wind of peace is blowing, a wind of solidarity.

Apply Pressure on the Politicians

The people themselves can form the peace movement that Olof Palme thinks will force the politicians to disarm. He suggests that people should join the Amnesty and the various organizations of the peace movement and he states that the important thing is to acquire knowledge. Over again he cites Alva Myrdal. The best cure for fear is knowledge, says Palme.

What do the Social Democrats do in order to support the peace movement?

"We perceive ourselves as a peace movement, not in competition with others, but that is the way it has been since the beginning. In the very first party program peace was one of the main points. The Socialist International is really, as recently expressed by Willy Brandt, one large peace movement."

What can the alliance-free and the neutral nations do in order to support peace?

"Pursue the disarmament matters, like Sweden's proposal for a disarmament conference, presented in Madrid. That is excellent. To declare to the great powers that the responsibility is primarily theirs."

Zones Without Nuclear Weapons

Nuclear weapon-free zones that are among the most important parts of the discussion about peace will be a main theme for the disarmament commission lead by Olof Palme and which will shortly have its second meeting. It has representatives from all parts of the world and from different nations and powers.

"It is natural, says Olof Palme in a determined way. If you let go of hope and just let everything slide the nuclear war is impossible to avoid. But the awareness of this fact should cause people to say no in a determined way to this craziness and to invest instead in a peace race.

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